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ART. I.—SAVONAROLA.

FEW men have excited such strong sympathies and equally strong antipathies among divines, historians and poets, and been submitted to such contradictory judgments both in the Roman Catholic and Protestant communion, as Jerome Savonarola, the leader and martyr of an unsuccessful politico-religious reform movement in Italy, and one of the most prominent and remarkable of the mediæval forerunners of Protestantism. He has been extravagantly lauded by the one as an inspired prophet, reformer and wonder-working saint, and as unjustly condemned by others as a priest-demagogue, a deluded fanatic, or a hypocritical impostor. It is still an unsettled question whether he resembled more St. Bernard or Arnold of Brescia, Luther or Thomas Münzer, Charles Borromeo or Gavazzi. He was burned as a heretic and schismatic under the excommunication of one pope, and almost canonized by another. Luther, Flacius, Beza, Arnold hailed him as a witness of the truth in the dark night of popery and as the prophet of the reformation; while latter Protestants, as the skeptic Bayle, the pietistic Buddeus,* and the liberal Roscoe, the enthusiastic admirer of Lorenzo de' Medici, assigned

* Buddeus, however, retracted in latter life the unfavorable view which he had maintained in his *exercitatio historico-politica de artibus tyrannicis H. Savonarolæ*.

him a place among impostors or fanatics. In our own age he found new, though more moderate and discriminating apologists, mostly on the Protestant side, in such biographers as Rudelbach and Hase. Poetry also has revived and idealized his memory through the immortal epos of Lenau, which bears the name of the monk of San Marco.*

Fra Girolamo Savonarola was born September 21, 1452, at Ferrara of a respectable family, originally from Padua. He received a careful education according to the standard of his age with his five brothers and two sisters. He was destined for the medical profession, in which his grandfather, Michael Savonarola, the physician of Nicholas, Prince of Este, had acquired great distinction. But his serious religious disposition pointed him to a different direction. Even in his boyhood he loved retirement and avoided the gardens of the ducal palace, the favorite play ground of the youth of Ferrara. In his twenty-third year the growing conviction of the corruption of the world and the Church in his vicinity, drove him from the house of the parents to a Dominican convent at Bologna, where he hoped to work out the problem of his salvation. Two days after the arrival he wrote to his father: "I could not support the enor-

* The documents on the Life of Savonarola have been published in great part by Quetif, Paris, 1674, and more recently by the learned Dominican Marchese in Archivio storico Italiano. Tomo VIII. Firenze 1850, and by Giudici in Appendice alla storia dei municipi Italiano. Firenze 1850. The following are the most valuable biographies of Sav. *Pacifico Burlamacchi* (died 1519): *Vita del P. Girolamo Savonarola*, ed. Mansi, Lucca 1761 (in *Miscellanea St. Baluzii*, vol. 1). *Joan. Franc. Pico de Mirandola*: *Vita R. P. Hieron. Savonarolae*. 1530, ed. Quetif (with other documents), Paris, 1674. *Bartoli*, Dominicano: *Apologia del P. Savon.* Firenze 1782. *A. G. Rudelbach*: *Hieronymus Savon. und seine Zeit.* Hamburg, 1835. *Fr. Carl Meier*: *Girol. Savon., aus grossentheils handschriftlichen Quellen dargestellt.* Berlin. 1836. *Carl Hass*: *Neue Propheten. Drei historisch-politische Kirchenbilder.* Leipzig, 1851. p. 97—144, and p. 304, ff. (Compare also Hase's *Church Hist.* § 293, p. 380 ff. of the seventh edition). *F. T. Perrens*: *Jérôme Savon., sa vie, ses predications, ses écrits, d'après les documents originaux et avec des pièces justificatives en grande partie inédites.* Paris and Turin, 1853, 2 vols. *R. R. Madden*: *The Life and Martyrdom of Savon.* 2nd ed., London, 1864. 2 vols. Compare also an instructive and judicious article on Savon. in the *London Quarterly Review*, N. 197, for July, 1866. The main facts are also incidentally noticed in the historical works of Guicciardini, Nardi, Commines, Roscoe and Sismondi. Of Lenau's *Savonarola* the third edition appeared at Stuttgart, 1849.

mous wickedness of most of the people of Italy. Every where I saw virtue despised, vice in honor. When God, in answer to my prayer, condescended to show me the right way, could I decline it? Oh, gentle Jesus, may I suffer a thousand deaths rather than oppose thy will and show myself ungrateful for thy goodness." Then he asks his father to forgive him the secrecy of his departure, or flight rather, which had cost him bitter torment, and assures him that he would not return to the world, to be Caesar. "As a man of strong mind, I beseech you, comfort my mother, and both of you send me, I entreat you, your blessing."

Even at that early period of life, he seems to have looked upon Rome as the source of the corruption in the Church, if Rians, the editor of Savonarola's poems (which are not of much importance), is right in his calculation as to the date of the poem *de ruina mundi*. For there, in the fifth stanza, he makes the bold assertion that the downfall of Rome was necessary to a reformation.

"La terra è sì oppressa da ogni vizio
Che mai da se non leverà la soma,
A terra se ne va il suo capo Roma,
Per mai non tornar al grande officio."

At first Fra Girolamo wished to occupy a very humble position and performed the meanest services in the convent. But his superiors made better use of his talents and soon employed him as a teacher of what was then called philosophy and natural science. His favorite studies were the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the standard divine of the Dominican order, of St. Augustine, and the Bible. The last he knew in great part by heart.* There are still four copies of the Scriptures in different libraries at Florence, with annotations from his hand. His fervid imagination was captivated by the prophets of the Old Testament, and the Revelation of St. John. He made their terrible de-

* So says his personal friend and biographer, Count Giovanni Francesco Pico de Mirandola, in *Vita R. P. Fr. Hier. Sav.* c. 4: ut totum fere sacrorum canonem et memoria teneret et profunde exacteque (quantum homini licet) intelligeret.

nunciatory language his own, and felt it his duty to apply it to the prevailing vices and corruptions of the age. He became convinced that he was a divinely commissioned prophet and soon mistook his own inferences from the Scriptures for divine inspirations.

His first pulpit efforts, however, were by no means encouraging. The number of hearers, attracted by his growing fame as one of the most learned and pious members of the Dominican order, dwindled down to twenty-five, so that he retired for a period and reassumed the humble office of a reader. But suddenly, at Brescia, the hidden power of his eloquence broke forth and made an extraordinary impression. He preached on the Apocalypse, of which it has been said : *aut insanum inveniet aut faciet*. He declared that one of the twenty-three, or rather twenty-four elders was commissioned to reveal to him the terrible judgment which should shortly fall upon Italy and especially upon the city of Brescia. At first, however, he gave his announcements of the approaching doom and reformation not as revelations, but as the conclusions of his reason from the Scriptures.*

From this time he soon rose to the position of the first pulpit orator of Italy, and wielded an extraordinary influence over his hearers till the year of his downfall. His voice was rather harsh, his gesticulation at first somewhat awkward ;† but his speech was full of passion, fire, and earnestness, surging up from the inmost depth of his soul and flowing forth, in true Italian style, from his eyes, his hands, his features, as well as from his lips. He spoke with authority, as one who believed to be entrusted with a divine commission. The fervid imagination of his Italian admirers, as we learn from Burlamacchi, in speaking of the

* "Non perrivelazione, ma per ragione delle Scritture." So he confessed himself in the trial as regards his first reformation sermon at San Gemignano.

† Pico, however, gives him also a good voice and agreeable manner : "Pro-nunciabat voce libera et acuta, non fervido solum, sed ardenti vultu, gestuque venustissimo. Ita vero illabebatur in auditorum aures, imo vero in præcordia, ut attentos eos extra se pæne raperet."

days of his glory in Florence, beheld angels hovering over him on the pulpit, and the holy Virgin herself giving force to his benedictions, palms of martyrdom adorning his head, and even blood welling from his side !

In the thirty-eighth year of his age, A. D., 1490, (according to others, in 1489), he was sent by his superiors to Florence as teacher of the novices of the convent of San Marco. It is still full of recollections of his fame, and possesses besides considerable artistic interest by the frescoes of Fra Beato Angelico, who there embodied his prayers in pictures of angelic beauty. Here commences properly Savonarola's career as a politico-ecclesiastical reformer. To understand it fully, we must call to mind the actual condition of Florence at that time.

The republic of Florence, the city of Dante, surpassed in the fourteenth century all Italian cities in wealth, power and culture. Villani represents in its history the history of all Italy. Machiavelli furnished in his Florentine history a practical manual of political science. In the beginning of the fifteenth century a commercial house, the celebrated Medici family, rose gradually and almost imperceptibly to princely dignity and influence by enormous wealth and prudence, and made the beautiful city on the banks of the Arno, the centre of the reviving classical literature and art. Cosimo de' Medici (died 1464), who as a Rothschild of his age, indebted to him nearly all the crowned heads of Europe, including the Pope, and patronized, at the same time, on the most liberal scale, the sciences and arts, both from policy and taste, was the first to exercise monarchical power under republican forms, although the people, jealous of their sovereignty, banished him for one year (1434). After his sickly son, Piero, his highly gifted grandson, Lorenzo the Magnificent, confirmed and increased the power of that house. Roscoe regards him as the most extraordinary man of his age, especially as a statesman.*

* The Life of Lorenzo de' Medici, called the Magnificent. Bohn's edition, page 9.

He gave up the commercial business, married a princess Orsini, and was himself called "principe," in the duplicity of the Italian and Roman language. Yet he wrote to his first born: "Although thou art my son, remember that thou art only a citizen of Florence." After the failure of the Pazzi conspiracy; which gives us a fearful picture of the Italian state of morals at the time, an archbishop and even a pope being the prominent actors in its criminal schemes, he maintained his temperate, but undisputed sway to his death in 1492, and left it to the less prudent and less vigorous hands of his son, Piero II., while his younger son, Giovanni, was crowned already in his thirteenth year with a cardinal's hat and destined to ascend as Leo X, the papal throne, at the most critical period of its greatest power and greatest danger. The nephew of Lorenzo likewise attained the pontifical dignity as Clement VII.

Such then was the condition of Florence when Savonarola began his career as a preacher of repentance and republican agitator. The liberty of the people was sold to a highly gifted family of bankers; the public treasury embarrassed by reckless expenditure; heathen literature and secular culture flourished more than ever, but in connection with all sorts of sensual enjoyments; the outward forms of religion were observed, but the inward condition of the Church was rotten to the core, and only too faithfully represented by the worldly and immoral popes, who immediately preceded the Reformation. We may apply to this Medicean age the words which Lenau puts into the mouth of Savonarola:

"Die Künste der Hellenen kannten
Nicht den Erlöser und sein Licht,
D'rum scherzten sie so gern und nannten
Des Schmerzes tiefsten Abgrund nicht."

With this Medicean family and with the cotemporary pope Alexander VI, who in wickedness surpassed all his predecessors in the latter days of Avignon and during the age of the "pornocracy" in the tenth century, Savonarola

entered into a conflict of life and death. The two leading ideas of his mind and passions of his heart were the reformation of the Church, and the liberty of Italy. By them he shook the Florentine commonwealth to its base; by them he prepared himself a tragical death, and acquired an immortal name among the martyrs of reform before the reformation.

The mendicant friar opened his activity first in a close hall, then in the garden of San Marco. The growing multitude of hearers compelled him to preach in the church. On the first of August, 1491, he began a series of sermons on his favorite Apocalypse, and derived from it the practical theme: The Church of God must and will be renewed; but before this God will inflict heavy judgments upon Italy; both will take place in the present generation. This he announced with the confidence of divine inspiration. He uncovered the abyss of corruption, that yawned under the splendor of this modern heathenism. He spared no class and condition of society, but attacked with special severity the vices of the clergy and the monks. "Ye know nothing of the Scriptures," he tells them, "ye do not even know grammar; and this would be tolerable, if you were of good life and did set a good example. You keep concubines, ye do worse, ye are notorious gamblers; ye lead lives more flagitious than the seculars, and it is an awful shame that the people should be better than the clergy. I speak not of the good, but of the bad. Give up your mules, give up your hounds and your slaves; waste not the things of Christ, the gains of your benefices on hounds and mules. And the same I have to say to the bishops. If you do not yield up your superfluous benefices which you hold, I tell you, and I proclaim to you, (and this is the word of the Lord), you will lose your lives, your benefices and all your wealth, and ye shall go to the mansion of the devil." "Your sins," he says in another sermon, "make me a prophet. Hitherto I was the prophet Jonas, who exhorted Nineveh to repent. But I tell you, if you do not listen to me, I shall become the prophet Jere-

miah, who announced the downfall of Jerusalem and then wept over the ruins of the city. For God will renew his Church, and that has never been done yet without blood." Every image, every word, every event in the prophets of the Old Testament, and the Revelation of John, he applied directly and immediately to his age and country, as if it had all been revealed for the special benefit of Florence, of Rome, of Italy, at the end of the fifteenth century. In an exegetical point of view, his wild allegorical interpretations of prophecy are absolutely worthless. But as specimens of an impassioned Italian eloquence and effectual practical application, they are remarkable.

It was, however, not so much a doctrinal, as a practical and disciplinary reformation which Savonarola aimed at. Wycliffe, Huss, Wesel, Wessel, Goch, and several other mediæval forerunners of the reformation, made a much nearer approach to the doctrinal positions of Protestantism. He felt himself in harmony with the traditional creed of the Roman Catholic Church, as much so as the leaders of the reformatory councils of Pisa, Constance and Basle. He held the holy Virgin in high veneration as the patroness of Florence. His views on practical piety were monastic and ascetic. The severe rigor of the law predominates largely in his sermons, over the winning power of the Gospel. Even in his uncompromising antagonism to the pope and the Roman corruptions, he proceeded more from moral, than dogmatic principles. But we must make allowance for his age and position. The ultimate tendency of his work looked evidently to a thorough reformation of the Catholic Church, which twenty years after his death broke forth with such irresistible force in Germany and Switzerland.

A year after his settlement in Florence (1491) Savonarola was elected prior of the Convent of San Marco. Contrary to custom, he refused to pay a visit on this occasion to the head of the State. This was the more improper as Lorenzo, and his grandfather, Cosmo, were liberal patrons of the Convent. He feared the friendship of Lorenzo more than his enmity. He regarded him as the chief represen-

tative of that polished worldliness, which he hated with all the rigor of an ascetic, and as the enemy of the liberty of the people. He directed the arrow of his denunciatory eloquence occasionally to the palace of the Medici and undermined their power. Lorenzo employed all the means of courtesy and prudence to secure the favor of the influential prior; but his tempting offers and indirect bribes were rejected with scorn. In his last sickness he sent for him and asked absolution at his hands. For he was accustomed to pay the Church all the respect which decency and prudence seemed to demand. Savonarola required from him faith, a restitution of all his ill-gotten gains, and the restoration of liberty to Florence. Lorenzo complied with the first two conditions; at the third demand he turned the face to the wall in silence, and the friar withdrew. Politian, however, who was present, says nothing of the last condition, which rests only on the authority of Bur- lammacchi and may be a latter addition. According to Politian's account, the prince promised in the strongest terms to amend his life, and received the blessing of the Prior, making the responses in the firmest and gentlest tone.

Lorenzo died, April 8, 1492. His son Piero, had neither his talents nor his moderation. In the same year (Aug. 2) the infamous Cardinal Borgia, a man of uncommon energy and sagacity, and still greater vices, ascended the papal throne as Alexander VI. He had shamelessly bought the triple crown and soiled it with perjury, murder, and incest.* Savonarola at first acquiesced with the rest of Florence in the sovereignty of the new ruler. Perrens quotes a passage which reads almost like adulation of Piero, and contrasts strongly with his harsh demeanor to Lorenzo. But he continued in the style, if not with the

* It is distinctly asserted by the distinguished historian, Guicciardini, and others, that Alexander, together with his two sons, kept criminal intercourse with his daughter, Lucretia Borgia. But W. Roscoe, while he denounces this pope as "the scourge of Christendom and the opprobrium of the human race," (*Life of Lorenzo*, p. 336), has undertaken the defence of his infamous daughter. (*Life of Leo X*, Bohn's ed. p. 323, ff.)

authority, of the old prophets, to chastise the sins of the government and to announce in a time of profound peace, the approaching judgment of God over the tyrants of Italy. "The divine word," says Roscoe, "descended not amongst his audience like the dews of heaven; it was the piercing hail, the sweeping whirlwind, the destroying sword."* "*Eccegladius Domini super terram cito et velociter*," was his oft repeated text, which, however, is not found in this form in the Bible. "I will tell you, he will come in a storm, in the form of Elijah, and the storm will shake the mountains. Over the Alps he will come against Italy, as Cyrus, of whom Isaiah writes."

Soon afterwards, in August, 1494, Charles VIII. of France, crossed the Apennines with a powerful army, but not, as Savonarola hoped and urged, to free Florence and to reform the Church, but to take possession of the vacant throne of Naples. Piero de'Medici concluded a disgraceful treaty and surrendered all the fortified places to the enemy during the war. Florence rose in fury. Piero and all his faction were declared rebels and traitors. They fled from the city and took refuge in Bologna.

This was the crisis, which raised Savonarola to the height of power. He called an assembly of the people to the cathedral and became by common consent the lawgiver of Florence. He laid down four great principles as the ground-work of the new order of things, 1) Fear God; 2) Prefer the good of the republic to your own; 3) A general amnesty; 4) A general council framed on the model of that of Venice, but without a doge. His political and social views he derived substantially from Thomas Aquinas, who had spent much profound thought on the science of government. Like St. Thomas, Savonarola was no enemy to monarchy, but only to despotism. He regarded monarchy as founded in the government of God, the primacy of Peter, and the order of nature—even bees follow a queen. But the peculiar condition of Florence call for a republic. God alone, he said, will be thy King, O Florence, as he was the

* Life of Lorenzo de'Med., p. 298.

King of Israel, and rebuked them for their desire to have an earthly king, as if he had forsaken them. In this theocracy or christocracy, the principle of love to God and charity to the neighbor, prayers and paternosters should rule. All the exiles were called back with the exception of the Medici.

The people exclaimed, *Viva Christo, Viva Firenze*, and entrusted Savonarola in the beginning of 1495 with the organization of the commonwealth on the basis of the ancient Florentine republic and his own theocratic ideal. It comprehended at that time about four hundred and fifty thousand souls, according to curious statistical returns published by Roscoe. About three thousand two hundred of them constituted the Great Council, (*Consiglio Maggiore*), i. e., the citizens with the right of suffrage and of taking part in public affairs. The Select Council (*Consiglio degli Scelti*) consisted of eighty members, who were elected half-yearly from the Great Council and entrusted with the legislative power. The executive power rested in the Signory. It was supreme under the control of the Great Council and under Jesus Christ, the only sovereign, who, together with the holy Virgin took special care of Florence and its new constitution. Savonarola's office and position was anomalous and undefined, but only the more influential on that account. It resembled that of the judges in Israel, or of a Roman censor with dictatorial power. He was properly the agent and representative of Christ, the oracular organ of the theocracy. He ruled from the pulpit, his throne, and from his monastic cell the Signory and the Council, and inspired into it his fervid, ascetic and religious enthusiasm. As to the details of the administration he gave himself no concern. "My mind," he confessed afterwards, "was always engaged in great and general affairs, the government of Florence and the reformation of the Church, and cared but little about small things."

The power which this monk exerted as the prophet, legislator and judge of this theocratic republic, during more than three years, is extraordinary, and admitted even by

the sober historian, Guicciardini, and the shrewd politician, Machiavelli. The latter, who bases the civil government on purely secular interests, attributes his ruin to popular envy and jealousy, which rises against any person of too elevated a position. The whole population was carried away by his sermons and put them into practice. The theocratic republic had its *pacieri* or peace-officers, who kept order and silence in the church and on the streets; its *correttori*, who inflicted punishments on the delinquents; *limosinieri*, who made collections for religious objects; *lustratori*, who attended to the cleanliness of the crosses and other objects of worship; and even young inquisitors, or boy-censors, who watched over the conduct of men and women, including their parents and the negligent magistrates, stole into houses, seized cards, chessboards, bad books and musical instruments, and burned them up. Ill-gotten gains were restored. Deadly enemies embraced each other. Secular amusements, even the favorite horse-races on St. John's day, were given up. Many women left their husbands to enter a convent, others married with a vow of continence either for a time or forever; Savonarola declared that in a perfect state marriage would cease altogether in Florence. Fasting was a pleasure. The communion, heretofore celebrated hardly once in a year, became the daily food of the faithful. Crowds from the city, and the country, even from Pisa and Leghorn, flocked to the cathedral, where the seats were built up in an amphitheatre, and where the pulpit bore the inscription: "Jesus Christ, King of the city of Florence," to hear their spiritual leader thunder against the *Tiepidi* or the lukewarm; the *Arrabiati*, who were infuriated at his doctrines; the *Compagnacci*, or libertines, who detested his austerities and longed for the return of the gay times of the Medici; against luxury, usury, covetousness, sensuality, gambling, splendid and immodest apparel. Frequently in the midst of their devotions they rushed to the public squares, crying *Viva Christo*, dancing in circles, and singing the hymns of Savonarola and his disciple, Girolamo Benivieni. The celebra-

brated painter, Fra Bartolomeo, also a Dominican of San Marco, cast all his naked figures into the fire, and was disposed at times to give up painting altogether as in itself sinful. A cotemporary remarks, "The whole people of Florence went crazy from love to Christ." "And yet," replied Savonarola, "there is no higher wisdom than this folly for Christ's sake." But how easily such a frantic zeal for religion turns over into downright profanity, may be seen from the procession on Palm Sunday in 1496, which was to take the place of the carnival. Not less than 8000 children with red crosses, and grown persons clad in white, like children, went dancing before the tabernacle in the public place and chanting the wildest Christian Bacchanalia:

"Non fu mai più bel solazzo
Più giocondo ne maggiore,
Che per zelo e per amore
Di Giesù divenir pazzo,
Ognun grida com'io grido
Semper pazzo, pazzo, pazzo."

In a sermon of the following Monday in the holy week, Savonarola sanctioned all this sacred revelry by the example of David dancing before the ark; of Elijah running and dancing before the King when the rain came down; of the apostles on the day of Pentecost, when they were charged with intoxication; of St. Paul, when accused of madness by Festus; yea of Christ himself, of whom the people said, "He is beside himself," (Mark 3, 21).*

Such an extravagant enthusiasm could, in the nature of the case, not last long. The Italians are a most excitable and changeable people. They had long lost the virtues necessary to secure and enjoy the freedom of law and the law of freedom. The natural spirit of Florence reacted against the rule of a monastic theocracy and conspired with a powerful ally, the pope, against Savonarola.

A more striking contrast than is presented to us in Savonarola and the cotemporary Alexander VI, can hardly be

* Predica 41, sopra Amos.

imagined. It was impossible that the most rigorous monk and the most dissolute pope could long remain at the head of two neighboring States. The Dominican reformer directed the severest blows of his denunciatory eloquence to what he abhorred as the source of all the corruptions of the Church, the Romish Babylon and its monstrous representative. The cunning pope tried at first to silence him by tempting bribes, and offered him the archbishopric of Florence with the prospect of a Cardinal's hat. The monk replied: I wish no other red hat, but the hat of martyrdom.* Then Alexander cited him to Rome, first by polite invitation, then by peremptory demand. Savonarola refused, assigning as excuses, sickness, engagement and the danger of assassination on the way. The pope, in October, 1496, prohibited him to preach and threatened him with excommunication. Savonarola suspended his sermons for a short time, but following the impulse of his spirit and encouraged by his ardent admirers, he ascended the pulpit again. Still bound in the chains of the Romish system he labored to reconcile his open rebellion against Alexander with the doctrine of absolute obedience to the successor of St. Peter, and bewildered himself and his hearers by sophistic distinctions. "Who has inhibited my preaching? You say, the pope. I answer you, it is false. But here are the briefs. I deny that they are of the pope. You say, the pope cannot err. This is true, but it is equally true that a Christian, as far as he is a Christian, cannot sin. Yet many Christians sin, because they are men. Thus the pope, as far as he is pope, cannot err; when he errs, he is not pope. If he commands that which is wrong, he does not command it as pope. It follows, then, that this brief, which is such a wicked brief, is not from the pope. It is of the devil, not of God. I say, and you know it, that I am manifestly sent by God to tell you this distinctly; and I must preach, though I have to contend against the

* "so non voglio cappelli, non mitre grande nè piciole; non voglio se non quello che tu hai dato alli tuoi Santi; la morte, uno cappello rosso, uno cappello di sangue."

whole world, and I shall conquer in the end." He thus laid claim to a commission superior to that of the pope, and appealed from the infallibility of Alexander to the infallibility of his private judgment. With manifest allusion to him he declared, "The popes disdain the more decorous vice of nepotism; they publicly call their bastards by the name of sons." He spoke also, like Crysostom, of the Herodias dancing and demanding the head of John the Baptist.

In the meantime, however, the affairs at home and the political aspect of the country turned rather against him. The Franciscans, always jealous of the Dominicans, sided with the pope in the attempt to ruin him. A plague broke out in Florence, (June, 1496), for which he knew no miraculous cure, except works of charity. Perrens charges him with a want of Christian courage and self-denial in avoiding exposure and shutting himself up in his cell; but other authorities say, that he refused the many places of retirement offered to him, and remained to console the afflicted, the secular as well as the brethren. Charles VIII, of France, from whom he had hoped in vain a regeneration of Italy and the Church, was compelled to withdraw soon after the conquest of Naples, as the Italian States, led by the pope, united against him. Florence became very unpopular on account of her French alliance, and was threatened by invasion from the neighbors. The Medicean party made an effort to regain its power, and united with the Arrabiati (the malignants) against the common object of their hatred. At one time they desecrated the pulpit with filth and placed a dead ass on the preacher's seat. Then a conspiracy was formed, supposed to have its centre in Rome. It was discovered in time, and ended with the summary execution of the five leaders of high rank, (Aug. 21, 1497), without their being permitted to appeal to the Great Council. But the friends of the Medicean faction meditated revenge, and threatened the life of Savonarola, who had not lifted up his voice for mercy. His friends found it necessary to give him a military guard on his way to the pulpit.

Encouraged by these circumstances, the pope threw off

all his temporizing lenity. In May and again in October, 1497, he hurled the sentence of excommunication against Savonarola on account of heretical doctrines and obstinate rebellion to the holy see. The sentence was to be publicly read in the churches.

Savonarola, encouraged by a new Signory elected January 1st, 1498, and consisting mainly of the Frateschi, his partisans, celebrated mass in great splendor, gave the holy elements to the magistrates, ascended the pulpit and commenced his last course of sermons, on Exodus, while the Arrabiati beat drums around the cathedral, threw stones and endeavored to interrupt the services in every way. He denied the charge of heresy, declared the sentence of excommunication null and void and appealed from the earthly pope to the heavenly head of the Church. "I lay down this axiom, there is no man that may not deceive himself. The pope himself may err. You are mad if you deny it. How many wicked popes have there been who have erred. How many constitutions have popes issued, annulled by other popes; how many opinions of popes are contrary to those of other popes. . . Our doctrine has enforced holy living; their doctrine leads to all evil doings, to luxurious eating and drinking, to avarice, concubinage, to the sale of benefices, to many lies and to all wickedness. Christ! on which side wilt thou be?—on that of truth or of lies? of the excommunicated or of the blessed? . . . The Lord will be with the excommunicated, the Devil with the blessed." He is said to have declared that he would rather go to hell than to ask absolution from such a pope.

At the same time he prepared himself for the worst, and exhorted men, women and children to be ready to die for Christ. "If you ask me," he said in a sermon at the end of March, "what will be the end of this conflict, I say: Victory. If you ask more particularly, I answer: Death. The master after having used the hammer, casts it off. So he did with Jeremiah, whom he permitted to be stoned at the end of his preaching. But Rome can not extinguish this fire, and if it should be extinguished, God will kindle

another, and it is already kindled every where, although they do not know it."

At the carnival of that year the most gorgeous religious processions were held and an auto-da-fe celebrated in the presence of the Signory; marble busts of female beauties, ancient and modern, splendid copies of Petrarca and Boccaccio were publicly committed to the flames, amidst the sound of trumpets, the ringing of bells and the chanting of the *Te Deum*; then followed another procession and wild dances of friars, priests, and laymen of every age, "whirling round in fantastic reel, to the passionate and profanely-sounding hymns of Jerome Benivieni."

Alexander was furious, and menaced Florence with the terrible interdict, if the city permitted the excommunicated monk to preach. The Signory endeavored to conciliate him. But Savonarola boldly appealed to Christendom and wrote letters to the emperor of Germany, the kings of France, Spain, England and Hungary, urging them earnestly to call a free Council for the reformation of the Church and the deposition of a pope, who was no pope, but guilty of sacrilegious simony and the most monstrous vices, who was no Christian, but an absolute infidel and atheist.* Of these fatal letters one was intercepted by the Duke of Milan and forwarded to Rome. On the 13th of March the pope dispatched a new bull imperatively commanding the Signory to execute the former decrees. The Council was divided; the Piagnoni and the Arabbianti contested every point. Finally they entreated the monk, for the sake of the peace of Florence, to cease from preaching.

At this juncture, Savonarola thought proper to obey, and preached a farewell sermon in the confident hope that the Lord would soon compel him to ascend the pulpit again.

* *Ad Imperatorem: Affirmo ipsum non esse Christianum qui nullum prorsus putans Deum esse, omne infidelitatis et impietatis culmen excessit. Ad Reg. Hisp.: Scitote enim hunc Alexandrum VI. minime pontificem esse, qui non potest non modo ob simoniacam sacrilegamque pontificatus usurpationem et manifesta ejus scelera; sed propter secreta facinora a nobis loco et tempore proferenda quæ universus mirabitur et execrabitur orbis. See the Italian translation of these two Epistles in full in Rudelbach's biography of Savon. p. 462 ff. The Latin original was first published by Perrens.*

But he was mistaken. His own indiscretion and the fanaticism of his disciples precipitated his fate. He solemnly appealed, on the balcony of the church of St. Marc, with the host in his hand, to a judgment of God, and proposed, according to the superstition of the age, the ordeal of fire or other miraculous tests, such as the raising of a dead body, whereby the Almighty himself might decide the momentous question concerning the truth or falsehood of his preaching and prophecy. Other accounts state that the first challenge proceeded from the Franciscans, who always jealous of the Dominicans, were his most bitter enemies. At all events, one of them, Fra Francesco di Puglia, preacher of the church of Santa Croce, (now the pantheon of Italian geniuses), was willing to stand the ordeal of fire. Savonarola, whose courage in action was by no means equal to his courage in word, vacillated, and then declined the perilous appeal. But his devoted friend and partizan, Fra Domenico Buonvicini, the aged prior of the Dominican Convent at Fiesole, eagerly accepted the challenge. Other monks of St. Mark, and even women and children declared themselves ready to risk their lives for what they regarded the cause of God. As Fra Francesco would not condescend to confront any other adversary than Savonarola, a Franciscan convert, Giuliano di Rondinelli, took his place as the champion of the Franciscan order and the cause of the pope, against Fra Domenico, the champion of the Dominican order and the divine mission of Savonarola.

The midday hour of the seventh of April, 1498, the same day, in which Charles VIII of France suddenly died, was fixed upon for the terrible trial, by which the following propositions of Savonarola, drawn up in legal form, were to be sanctioned or condemned by the miraculous interposition of God. 1) The Church of God must and shall be reformed after being scourged (*flagellato*). 2) After the visitation of divine judgments, Florence, like the Church, will attain to great prosperity. 3) The infidels will be converted to Christianity. 4) These things will take place in the present generation. 5) The papal excommunication

is null and void, and those who disregard it, do not sin.* Two piles of wood, covered with pitch and oil and charged with gunpowder, were erected on the place of the Signory and divided by a narrow path, through which the two champions should pass in quick succession. The Signory awaited the spectacle on a lofty balcony; a loggia was provided for the monks; an immense crowd of spectators covered the ground, the roofs and the windows in every direction; five hundred soldiers, besides several hundred Compagnacci and Frateschi kept order. Savonarola, before he proceeded to the place of the ordeal, celebrated mass at St. Mark's, but expressed some doubts, in his short discourse, as to its issue, or as to whether it actually would take place, God not having revealed it. The two rival orders marched in solemn procession from opposite directions with crosses and torches and chanting the 68th Psalm: "Let God arise, let his enemies be scattered: let them also that hate him, flee before his presence. As smoke is driven away, so drive them away; as wax melteth before the fire, so let the wicked perish at the presence of God. But let the righteous be glad; let them rejoice before God: yea, let them exceedingly rejoice." Savonarola, in his priestly robes, bore the host and placed it on the altar, at which Fra Domenico knelt in humble devotion. The Signory gave the signal to proceed to the trial.

But now, when the fire was kindled and the assembled multitude was raised to the pitch of anxious expectation, there arose a singular altercation about the question, whether the two champions should carry the cross or the host into the flames, as the Dominicans proposed, while the Franciscans raised a cry of horror at such a sacrilegious exposure of the Saviour's body. The fierce dispute was protracted till evening, when in the midst of growing tumult and confusion, suddenly a torrent of rain descended from heaven and extinguished the flames!

This disgraceful failure deprived Savonarola for ever of

* We have condensed the eight propositions into five, leaving out nothing essential.

the popular favor, which belongs to the changing vanities of life. The spell of his power was broken. The whole fury of the disappointed crowds burst upon him. He who shortly before had been almost idolized, was now mercilessly denounced as a "poltroon, hypocrite, impostor and false prophet." With difficulty, and amid curses and peltings, he returned with the broken procession, and only the body guard and the supposed miraculous power or inherent sacredness of the host he bore, saved him from the execution of mob-judgment. For the last time he entered the gates of San Marco and for the last time he ascended the pulpit to give an exposition of the events of the day to a few hearers and to dismiss them in peace.

On the following day, which was Palm Sunday, the Arabiati, assisted by hundreds of low ruffians, besieged the convent and fought with the Dominican monks till midnight, while Savonarola lay on his knees before the altar. At length the Signory sent commissioners with peremptory orders to seize him, together with Domenico Buonvicini and Silvestro Maruffi. On his way to the palace he was grossly insulted and mockingly asked: "Prophecy, who it was that smote thee." Some ruffian kicked him behind, and said: "There is the seat of his prophetic power."

On the 9th the Signory commenced the examination of the prisoners and continued it till the 19th, with the exception of Easter day. According to the cruel custom of the age, Savonarola was submitted to the torture, which, as Perrens remarks, he had himself proposed to obstinate gamblers. With his delicate and sensitive frame, he broke down at once and confessed all they asked, that his prophecies were no inspirations, but his own calculations or inferences from the Scriptures, and that ambition and love of power were the only motives of his actions. But as soon as the agony was over, he revoked his admissions. The repetition of the horrid process and the intervening intermissions wrung forth the same contradiction of confession and recantation, on which it was impossible to frame a legal process. A villanous notary by the name of

Francesco Ceccone, who had been involved in the last conspiracy in favor of Piero de Medici, offered his services at the price of four hundred scudi (although he received only thirty in the end), for the infamous work of manufacturing a minute report, which was substituted for the genuine record and published to wondering Florence. The charge of this forgery rests not only on the authority of Savonarola's admiring biographers, Burlamacchi and Pico de Mirandola, but also on that of the impartial Nardi and the grave Guicciardini, and is confirmed by the process itself as published by Quetif, and more recently by Guidici. On the 19th of April the report was read to Savonarola; he answered in ambiguous phrase: "What I have written is true," or like Pilate: "What I have written, I have written." When one of his apostate disciples, Malatesta Sacramoro, witnessed against him: "Ex ore tuo credidi, et ex ore tuo discredo," he deigned no reply. He asked the brethren of San Marco to take good care of the novices, to keep them in the fear of God and the simplicity of Christian life, and to pray for him now, when the prophetic Spirit of God had almost entirely forsaken him.*

He was confined to his prison without further examination for a month. During this time, he wrote a commentary on the penitential Psalm 51, and a part of Psalm 31, with a broken and contrite spirit, accusing himself of pride and ambition, but crying out of the depth of his misery to the infinite mercy of God and finding peace in the merit of the Redeemer. "Misery," he says, "surrounds me and besieges me like a strong army; my friends have gone over to the enemy; all that I see and hear, wears the color of sadness. The recollection of my friends and spiritual children fills me with grief; the thought of my cell and my studies pains me; the weight of my sins depresses me. Wretched man that I am, who will deliver me out of the hands of mine enemies? Who will fight for me, protect and help me? Whither shall I fly? I will fly to the Invisible and

* "Lo Spirito della profetia m'ha al tutto abbandonato," as Burlamacchi, or "quem Spiritus pene prorsus deseruit," as Pico de Mirandola reports.

lead him as a host against anything visible. The Lord is my refuge and my fortress: my God; in him will I trust. (Ps. 91: 2.) In thee, O Lord, do I put my trust; let me never be ashamed: deliver me in thy righteousness. (Ps. 31: 1.) This is comfort indeed. Let sorrow, with all its host, press against me; let the world rise up against me. I confide in God, and my refuge is with the Most High. In thee, O Lord, have I trusted. Therefore I pray thee first of all, to deliver me from my sins; for the sins are the greatest tribulation, and the source of all other tribulations. Take away, O Lord, my sins, and I am free of all tribulation. In thee, O Lord, do I trust; deliver me by thy righteousness, and not my own; for I seek mercy, and offer not my righteousness. . . . No man is justified before God by the works of the law. . . . Thy mercy is thy righteousness for us, O Lord; but it would not be mercy, if it came from the merit of works. Deliver me through thy righteousness, even thy Son, Jesus Christ, who is the righteousness by which man is justified." This is evidently a very near approach to the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. Hence Luther re-published Savonarola's exposition of Psalm 51 in 1523, and accompanied it with a very commendatory preface, in which he undertook to canonize the excommunicated author, though the popes and papists should burst.*

The pope was highly rejoiced and congratulated the Signory on their vigorous measures against the rebellious impostor, but wished them, after having tried him for all the political crimes, to forward him to Rome that he might be tried for his religious offences. He absolved all those who were engaged in the outrages on the convent of Saint Mark on Palm Sunday, even if guilty of homicide, and

* "Das ist," says Luther, "ein Exempel der evangelischen Lehre und christlichen Frömmigkeit. Denn hier siehst du ihn einhertreten nicht als einen Predigermönch im Vertrauen auf seine Gelübde, Ordensregeln, Mönchskutte, Messen und die guten Werke seines Ordens, sondern im Vertrauen auf Gottes Barmherzigkeit, als einen gemeinen Christen. . . . Es durfte zwar der damalige Antichrist sich die Hoffnung machen, das Andenken dieses so grossen Mannes würde verlöschen, auch unter dem Fluche sein; aber siehe, er lebet, und sein Gedächtniss ist im Segen. Christus canonisirt ihn durch uns, sollten gleich die Päpste und Papisten miteinander darüber zerbersten."

promised restoration and plenary indulgence to all the Piagnoni who should repent of their errors. But the Signory, which in the mean time had been newly elected, after disfranchising two hundred members of the Great Council, friendly to Savonarola, humbly asked permission to punish him by a public execution at Florence, that the deluded people might be thoroughly disabused. The real reason was their fear that he might reveal at Rome the political events of Florence. Alexander yielded to this request, whereupon they basely thanked him for his "divine virtue and immense goodness." He condemned Savonarola by what is called the *oraculum vivae vocis*, on the ground simply of Ceccone's falsified records sent to him, as a heretic, schismatic, persecutor of the holy Church and seducer of the people, and appointed the General of the Dominican order, Giovacchino Turriano, a mild but very old man, and a Spanish doctor of merciless severity, Francesco Romolino, as the two commissioners to preside in his name over the execution of an inviolable priest. Alexander is reported to have remarked: "Die he must, though he were John the Baptist," and Romolino declared on his arrival at Florence: "We shall make a fine blaze, for I have the sentence of condemnation (*la sententia formata*) safe in my hands."

On the 20th of May a new examination took place before the papal commissioners, of which Nardi gives an account.* Romolino questioned him two days about his heresies and schisms, the vituperations of Alexander and connections with cardinals inimical to him, his letters to the kings concerning the General Council and the deposition of the pope, his pride and madness and factious turbulence in Florence. Savonarola showed the same wonderful struggle between the weakness of the flesh and the courage of the spirit. He admitted all and recanted all. He confessed on the torture what he denied afterwards. He imploringly prayed to Jesus to forgive him his treasonable weak-

* Signor Guidici has published, from the Magliabecchian Library, the "Processo di Frate Girolamo Savonarola," in the *Appendice alla Storia Politica dei Municipi Italiani*, 1850.

ness. "God thou hast caught me," (colto), he said before his inquisitors in the chamber of suffering, "I confess I have denied Christ, I have told lies. O Signory of Florence, bear me witness, that I have denied him from fear of torture; if I must suffer, better that I suffer for the truth. What I have said, I received of God—God, grant me repentance for having denied thee from fear of torture." This is the key to the whole process.

On such contradictory testimony of a strong weak man the sentence of death was pronounced, May 22, on Fra Girolamo and his two faithful followers, Fra Domenico, the prior of the Dominican convent at Fiesole, and Fra Silvestro Maruffi, a visionary somnambulist. Girolamo spent the last night in fervent prayer, meditation and quiet rest, smiling and talking in his sleep. In the morning of the execution, the 23rd of May, the day before the Ascension of 1498, he partook of the holy communion and implored the Saviour, who shed his blood for him, to forgive him any sins known or unknown, which he had committed since his baptism, and any scandal he had occasioned to the city and people of Florence. To a priest, who asked him whether he was ready to die, he replied: "My Lord was willing to die for my sins, why should I not cheerfully give my poor life from love to him."* The piazza de' Signori was crowded by spectators. The prisoners were stripped of their sacerdotal robes, and left with only a long wollen shirt—their feet naked. When at this ceremony of ignominious degradation the bishop of Vasona, a Dominican and former pupil of Savonarola, pronounced, in the name of the pope, the awful words: "I separate you from the Church militant and the Church triumphant." Savonarola said: "From the Church militant, but not from the Church triumphant, for that is out of thy power." Romolino read the sentence of death, in which heresy was

*Or more fully according to the account of Picus: "Nonne ob eum emoriar ego libentissime, qui pro eo quo me hominem peccatis infectum amore complectebatur, voluit innocentissime mori? Nonne ego animam hanc ejus gratia libenter effundam, qui nec pro millesima eorum unquam, quae pro me tulit, parte satisfacere possim?"

mentioned as the only crime, and offered at the same time plenary absolution, in the pope's name, which was humbly accepted. Then the sentence of the Signoria was read, based partly on the alleged crimes of the falsified records, partly on the degradation of the monks by the papal commissioners.

The prisoners were now successively tied to gibbets, erected in the form of a cross, and committed to the flames. Silvestro died first, exclaiming with a loud voice: "Lord, into thy hands I commit my spirit." Then followed Domenico, who was convinced to the last of the innocence and the divine mission of his friend. Savonarola had to witness the sufferings of his friends, of which he was the cause, and to hear the insulting taunts of his enemies: "Now, monk, is the time to perform miracles." He prohibited his fellow sufferers from making any confession of their innocence, preferring to die in silence, like the Lamb of God carried to the slaughter. As he ascended the steps of the scaffold, he recited the Apostles' Creed. He cast once more a silent glance at the people. For a moment the flames were blown aside and exposed the bodies untouched, which the few remaining partizans regarded as a miracle. While his arm was burning, his right hand was seen raised as in the act of pronouncing the benediction. Some young wretches threw a volley of stones at the gibbets.

The ashes were carried to the bridge and cast into the Arno. Yet some real or supposed relics of bones and splinters of the gibbets became the treasures of succeeding generations, and his admiring biographer, Pico, reports various miracles performed after his death, which he attributes exclusively to this cause, that he was hated by the wicked and beloved by the holy. The manner of Savonarola's death, his crucifixion between two monks, the character of Alexander VI, as compared with Caiaphas, his temporary friendship with Florence, resembling the friendship of Herod and Pilate, etc., gave rise, as in the case of St. Francis of Assisi, to a disgusting and almost blasphemous comparison of the Dominican monk with the Saviour

of the world. With great poetic beauty, but still exceeding the limits of historical truth, Lenau thus describes the last moments of his hero:

“Diess Antlitz auf dem Sterbengange
Ist nicht des Sünders Angesicht,
Der an dem steilen Todeshange
Voll Schwindelangst zusammenbricht;

Auch ist es nicht das eh'rne Trotzen
Fanatikers, voll Gluth und Kraft,
Dem noch die Todesblicke strotzen
Von Flüchen wilder Leidenschaft.

Sein Antlitz is ein hoher Friede,
Sein Schweigen seliges Gebet,
Ein Rauschen nach dem Heimathliede,
Das tröstend ihm herüberweht.

Nun ist sein Auge hell erglommen,
Und blühend sich die Wange malt:
Das ist der himmlische Willkommen,
Der auf den Dalder niederstrahlt.

Und als er zum Schaffote schreitet,
Und mancher seiner Freunde jetzt
Nach ihm die Arme weinend breitet,
Spricht er den Trauernden zuletzt:

Verbrennt man mich, seid unerschrocken;
Wenn meine Asche treibt der Wind,
So denkt, dass diess nur Blüthenflocken
Von schönen Frühling Gottes sind.”

With Savonarola died the ecclesiastical reform, and the republican liberty of Florence, which became the prey of the Grand Dukes of Medici. Two descendants of this house, Leo X, who once fled before the face of Savonarola, and Clement VII, ascended the papal throne and opposed and promoted the Protestant reformation, while another descendant, Catharine of Medici, is inseparably connected with the horrible massacre of St. Bartholomew. The most dissolute state of morals took the place of ascetic rigor in Florence, and for some time there seemed to be no greater crime, than to have believed the great preacher of San Marco, and to have desired a reformation of the Church of

Rome.* Still he retained a few faithful friends, as his biographers, Pico de' Mirandola, and Burlammacchi, and the celebrated painter, Fra Bartolomeo, who, on returning from the scene of execution, drew a halo of glory round the picture of Savonarola, which still hangs in his cell at San Marco, with the inscription: *Vir apostolicus*. In the Dominican order a reaction took place in his favor, and he was revered as a prophet, moral reformer and martyr. Even his canonization was demanded, and is said to have been contemplated by Julius II. The Jesuits declared their willingness to give him a place in the supplementary volume to the *Acta Sanctorum* for May, provided the superiors of the Dominican order would procure the permission of the Roman see. But it would puzzle even their scholastic subtlety to reconcile the excommunication and execution of Savonarola by one infallible pope, with his canonization by another. On the other hand, Luther also, as already stated, from an imperfect knowledge of his works, has boldly undertaken to canonize him in the name of Protestantism. We have already remarked, that Savonarola contemplated no doctrinal reformation, in the sense of Luther, or Zwingli, or Calvin, but a moral and disciplinary, a monastic and ascetic reform of the Roman court, the clergy and the people, like the leaders of the Great Councils of Pisa, Constance and Basil. Nevertheless his proper place, especially in view of his conflict with Rome, is among the many forerunners of the great Reformation of the sixteenth century.

Savonarola wrote a great number of works in Latin and in Italian, sermons, religious and political tracts, epistles, and poems. Even Bayle, who regards him as a false prophet, admits that several of his writings are full of unction and piety. His sermons on the Apocalypse, Haggai, Amos, Ezekiel, Zechariah, the Psalms and the Book of Exodus were mostly taken down and published by his admi-

* "Ne'quali tempi pareva," says Nardi, "che nessuno vizio fusse piu vergognoso o repressibile, che l'haver creduto al Frate ò desiderato la riforma de' costumi nella corte Romana."

ners, but give us even in their imperfect state an idea of the power he once wielded from the pulpit. His "*Compendium Revelationum*" (*compendio di rivelazioni*) written in 1495, is important for his inner history and his claim to prophecy, which it asserts and defends at length. He derives his prophetic mission directly from God, who alone knows the future, and indignantly rejects all arts of divination, especially astrology. Then in a visionary dialogue with the Tempter he suggests and labors to refute every possible objection to his supernatural gift, in a manner that reminds one of the French proverb: "*Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.*" His predictions, he says, cannot proceed from divination and astrology, which he rejects; nor from a disordered imagination, which is belied by his profound knowledge of philosophy and the Scriptures; nor from the deception of the Devil, who knows not the future and opposes the good of his preaching; nor from foolish dreaming women, for he seldom conversed with a female. He confidently appeals to the fruits of his preaching as the crowning test of his higher mission. Rudelbach has devoted a long chapter of his biography (p. 281-333) to the consideration of this confident claim of Savonarola, and comes to the conclusion that he may be called a prophet in the same sense as Joachim of Floris, St. Brigitta, and other monks of the middle ages, who witnessed against the corruptions of the Church, and foretold some kind of a reformation. But such predictions may be mostly explained as rational inferences from the Scriptures and the signs of the times on the ground of an extraordinary power of divination. Most of Savonarola's prophecies are so loose and general, that they exclude themselves from the test of events. His most specific prophecies, concerning the intentions of Charles VIII of France, the speedy conversion of the Turks and Moors, of which he stated he could give the year, the month and even the day, and the promise to Florence of an age of unexampled prosperity after her tribulations, have manifestly proved idle dreams of a pious imagination. He himself notices the objection that he had prophesied many things which

were untrue, and helps himself by the subtle distinction between what he spoke as man, and what he spoke as prophet. The Holy Spirit, he said, did not always dwell in the prophet! The prediction of a reformation is the only one which was fulfilled, but neither in his own age, as he confidently asserted, nor for Florence and Italy, which rejected it, nor in the manner which he desired. His ascetic treatises on the Lord's Prayer, and on the Simplicity of Christian Life, contain much that is sound and edifying. His most mature theological production is the "*Triumph of the Cross*, (*Triumphus crucis, sive de veritate fidei*) of the year 1497.* It is a defence of the Christian religion against the skeptical tendencies, which arose with the revival of letters, especially in Italy, among the higher classes, including prelates, cardinals and popes. He represents Christ as the conqueror, with the crown of thorns, bearing in his left hand the cross and the instruments of martyrdom, holding in the right the Holy Scriptures, riding on a triumphal car, preceded by the patriarchs, prophets and apostles, surrounded by the martyrs and great teachers of the Church, and followed by the innumerable host of believers.

P S.

Mercersburg, Pa., March, 1858.

* The author of the article in the Lond. Quart. Rev., above referred to, in correcting Dr Madden, informs us that an English translation of this work was published at Cambridge in 1661, under the title: *The Truth of the Christian Faith; or the Triumph of the Cross of Christ*. By Hier. Savonarola. Done into English out of the Author's own Italian copy (*Trionfo della Croce*.) The fine poetic Preface is omitted.

ART. II.—HOW LITTLE WE KNOW !

HOW LITTLE WE KNOW!—of the divine; it might be said, of the spiritual, of the heavenly! But the thought has a nearer aspect. How little we know of ourselves, of our present being, of the moving visible things around us! A few steps even here, and every thing grows dim,—a little farther, and all is darkness. The soul starts back appalled at the disclosure of the vast unknown. It is the awe, not only of the undiscovered that stretches so far beyond our remotest science, but of the ineffable that lies directly above our most common knowledge,—of the deeply mysterious that mingles itself with our most ordinary being. It is a fearful thought, this *terra incognita* that lies so near us, this dense obscurity that rests upon those prime properties of matter and force which so constantly affect our daily sight and handling.

We need not go out of the physical, the nearest physical, to find ourselves involved in densest mystery. Take any product of nature, or nature in its universality, and how soon are we brought to a stand by any one of the three most general questions that may be proposed respecting it, *What* is it? *How* is it? *Why* is it? The first we answer most imperfectly through classifications and generalizations, each to be deranged, or thrown aside, on farther knowledge; to the second, we reply most dimly, through assumed laws ever tending to resolve themselves finally into the very phenomena to be explained; to the third there comes from nature no response at all, not even the self-cheating echo of our own voices, to tell us *why* we are, and *why* the worlds exist.

But transfer the inquiry to that higher plane of the spiritual, the divine, the eternal. How voiceless here is our science; how little trustworthy in itself our highest philos-

ophy! Next to "*the fear of the Lord*," is this *awe of the unknown*. As the one is "the beginning of Wisdom," that is, religion in the Bible sense of the word, so is the other the commencement of all right philosophising. It is this that distinguished the Socratic from every other form of ancient or modern thought,—the knowledge of our ignorance! In his interpretations of the Delphic Oracle, Socrates styles it the soul's *καθαρσις*, or purification. It was this scepticism, this religious scepticism, that became the preparation for a true faith, and furnished the best hope of understanding the oracular *γνωθι σεαυτον*. Let no one shrink from the word. It is the best commendation of this religious *scepticism*, that it is, in all respects, the opposite to the most rampant spirit of modern infidelity.

How little we know! We feel strong in the conviction, that it is this thought which our modern world most needs. It might abate the pretensions of our literary class, so called, by leading them to feel how slight, after all, is the comparative difference, or any difference, between them and the common mind. It might make our man of science more modest, by showing him of how little avail are all his discoveries to cure the real ignorance, or relieve the real helplessness of mankind. Certainly is it time for our schools of philosophy to begin to doubt their power of solving either the cosmical or the human problem. How much longer must they continue to talk about the Absolute and Infinite One, his being, his personality or impersonality, his mode of intelligence and action? Are they not weary of the question, How does God *think*, and how "is there knowledge in the Most High," when after four thousand years of wrangling they have not yet begun to settle the first question in anthropology,—how does *man think*, and what is human knowing? Is it an action or a passion, innate in any sense, or wholly from without! All human inquiry needs the chastening of such a feeling, but especially would it seem necessary for that strangest of all paradoxes, the theological polemic. For him, beyond all other men, is there need of the Socratic spirit, and that Socratic maxim which

is in such perfect harmony with the whole tenor of divine revelation.

How little we know of ourselves ! *Who* are we ? *Why* are we ? *Where* are we ? *When* are we ? *How* are we ? *Whence* came we ? *Whither* go we ? *Qui* ? *Quare* ? *Ubi* ? *Quando* ? *Quomodo* ? *Unde* ? *Quo* ? Within this mystic seven, lies every thing that can be thought of the destiny of our world and race. What a dim outline map, what an unfilled blank, may we rather say, is even this small part of all that is, this nearest province to us of the whole of being. Here and there a few points faintly illumined by certain in-born, divinely given and divinely matured ideas of the human soul ; a few shadows rendered visible by what are called the discoveries of science, though what these shadows truly are, and why they thus come and go, she cannot tell. Across it falls a ray from heaven, a line of light, narrow but clear, and infinitely precious, giving some guidance in the unbending aim of its own direction, whilst it casts a deeper shade of contrast on either side,—satisfying, indeed, the gaze that is ever fixed on its own steady illumination, yet to the wandering eye revealing often spectres of doubt and difficulty that never would have been known, or thought of, in the unrelieved darkness of nature.

We stand, then, upon the position, that for any satisfactory answer to these questions, for any answer at all to the most important of them, we look in vain to the highest past, present, or probable future amount of any thing the world has ever called science or philosophy. It is only of late that the former has even ventured to make the claim ; the latter has often attempted the solution of some of them, and by her own confession, has just as often utterly and miserably failed. But it is not failure merely. The light they give us, certainly on all but questions *second* and *third*, or our position in space and time, is absolutely nothing ; or rather, may we say, every seeming advance only increases the obscurity. The faint beams they throw upon the future, only make the deeper shade ; the more light, the

more darkness; the more knowledge the more mystery—the latter ever exceeding, and increasing in a more rapid rate than, the first.

If this be so, the conclusion from it all need not be formally stated. For all thinking minds, for all serious minds, there can be but one issue. Bible or no Bible, Revelation or no Revelation, becomes the question transcending all others. Has the silence of nature ever been broken? Has the Infinite ever come down directly to the finite soul? Has God ever really spoken to this distant world? Not,—Have we found Him? “Can we by searching find out Him?” but has he found *us*? and made himself known to us, not only as the Great Power of nature, the Preserving Life of the world as a whole, the “God of laws,” the *causa causarum*, the Supreme Intelligence, knowing the parts only in their organic relations to the whole,—not only, we say, as Deity, or Divinity, or God in general, but as *our* God, our Father, our Redeemer, our Salvation, our Eternal Home. Has He found *us*, we say again? Has he found *us* lost wanderers in the wilderness of infinity? Has his supernatural voice ever come forth from his holy heavens, saying unto *us*, “This is the way, walk ye therein and ye shall find rest unto your souls”? Do we thus know Him as one who *knows us*, or with something of that knowledge which, in reference to its perfect state, is styled by the Apostle, “a knowing even *as we are known*.” Such is revelation strictly. It is ever supernatural in its very idea. It is the history of God’s supernatural dealings in our world,—of the supernatural as anciently manifested in a chosen nation, thus severed from all the other nations, and now in the Christian Church, thus also distinctly marked off and made the abode of a peculiar power, separate from all other influences, moral or physical, social or political. So also may it be said of the Scripture that contains this revelation. It is not ink and paper; it is not a mere writing; it is not a book simply containing certain words submitted to each man’s private philology to be studied as he would study

nature, but a *Living Word*, * an *εμψυχος λόγος*, growing into the very souls of those who receive it, and having its true historical being only in connection with a *Living People*, in whom its divine power is ever historically and supernaturally attested. In distinction from this, we may talk of a revelation *through* nature, or *by* nature; the real thought intended may be well enough, and true enough in itself; but the language is a perversion of speech and ideas. In one very partial sense, and even then, to a very limited extent, it may be true that "science," as one of high repute,† has lately said, "is the knowledge of God," but of God ever as a Power *in* nature, ever as an Intelligence, great indeed, but looking only to natural ends as well as through natural means,—all-knowing indeed, but knowing wholes or parts only in their organic relation to the all. Thus nature *makes known*, but it is revelation strictly that makes us "*know* even as *we are known*;" and this is faith directly connecting the finite with the Infinite soul. It is faith, the gift of God, coming to us through supernatural means, and thus a supernatural knowledge as well as the knowledge of the supernatural.

But to take our questions in the order proposed. *Who are we?* In other words, what is our place, not in space, but in the scale of being? We know some things below us; we have gone down a little way into the abyss that lies between us and nothingness. We find no end even in this direction. But all estimates of distances, whether above or below, must ever be comparative. To think, or even guess, how far down we may be, requires some estimate, real or assumed, of what is over us, of what is somewhere between us and the Infinite.

Socrates imagines a class of rational beings who might have lived upon the bottom of the ocean. To them, as they gazed upward from their far down dark abode, the distant surface of the water would be their firmamental heaven, an unseen world above the watery plane, their

* James 1: 21

† Prof. Pierce of Cambridge.

highest thought of any transcending sphere. So to man may be the upper plane of the earth's atmosphere, which he supposes to have a defined surface like the waters of the ocean. Could we raise our heads above this plane, like fish above the water, or get upon one of those isles of glory that pierce with their illumined peaks this upper sea, we should behold another sun as it were—so much greater would be its brilliancy. We should see a fairer moon, a purer heaven, more glorious stars. We would not believe them to be the same that had so dimly and so coldly shone down into our earthly sub-aerial cavern. They would seem to belong to another world, and to another universe by reason of that glory which so much excelleth. Our science may criticise the imagery of Socrates; the sense *conception* may be false, but the *idea* remains as true as ever. What has science taught us, what can science ever teach us, as to our true rank, or how can she even guess at any quantitative rank we may possess in the worlds? We are at the head of being on our own small planet. In the pride of this we would regard ourselves as on a par, or in some measure, at least, of respectable comparison with whatever is highest among created things in all parts of the universe. And so in the term "rational beings," we most complacently invent a logical genus including ourselves and all that is not below us. But what a conceit of philosophy is this?—"the positive philosophy," we mean, that philosophy so much lauded by Westminster Reviewers and their boasting school of progress. We do know something of ourselves from history, if we know little or nothing of other beings. Now to think of an eternal development,—for that is all that such philosophy knows or can conceive,—an eternal development, and yet nothing as yet developed higher than this species homo! An everlasting right onward progress, and yet its present ultimate, all that has yet been reached, nothing greater, or essentially greater than man,—this "man of the earth" considered in his worldly or physical aspect as history and science exhibit him! Billions of ages! O what are billions of ages! An

eternity—an eternity of upward eliminations, and still, as yet, no higher product worked out substantially than such beings as murder each other in earth's wars, and befool each other in earth's politics, or defame or praise each other in what is styled earth's literature! O what a conceit of philosophy, we say, is this! that nature, after having reached such a physical product, is never more to destroy it, as she did the mastodon and megalotheria that went before; she is to make no more loops in her cycles, to have no more of her old catastrophies, but to go right on now forever more in carrying out the civilization and cosmical destiny of this her crowning achievement!

And yet, some such view, based upon nature simply, enters largely into our ages' thinking. We love to regard ourselves as at least in the upper regions of the universe, if not quite at the summit; and so some would erect temples to humanity, and make a God of humanity, and a religion of humanity, as being collectively the divinest power in the universe. Such, too, is the tenor of our more common literary speculation. It is hard to bring our philosophy to the humbling thought that there may be chasmas parting us from those above, as wide as those that separate us from the brute world below. It is hard for us to feel that there may be ranks of being, far below other being, and yet so immensely transcending us as to assign us to the lower orders of existence. We do not like to think of it as having truth even in respect to our dynamical or physical being, although humility is forced upon us here. A hard necessity, a mournful doom, which no science can relieve, no philosophy can soften, compels us to "say to corruption, thou art my father, and to the worm, thou art my mother and my sister." But we try to think better of our intellectual, our spiritual being, and revelation does yield us some comfort here, though science and philosophy, are as far as ever from giving us any satisfactory value. For all that they can teach, there may be some higher order of spirituality and rationality, to whom our wisdom, our science, our boasted art, our eloquence, our philosophy,

may be comparatively no greater, no higher, than is to us the obscure instinct of the worm. We rightly hold that there is an immense chasm between even that self-moving, self-adapting instinct and the dead matter supposed to lie below; for a living worm is better than an inanimate planet; but so also may there be chasms above us, and still above us, world without end. And science cannot deny this. In fact all her analogies, if we reject any other or supernatural guidance, point to such a conclusion and no other. There is time and space enough to draw upon to satisfy any demand of any hypothesis. How long eternity! How vast infinity! What immense, what varied workings within these boundless bounds. The possible, the conceivable, becomes the measure of the real. What *has* been?—rather what may not have been within the worlds of time? What may not now be somewhere in the worlds of space? Who shall venture to limit it scientifically, or to conceive it limited by any equality with, or assignable proportion to, our earthly rank, our earthly progress, or any conceivable progress of our race? Measured on the scale of a conceivable universe, our whole solar sphere may be but as the microcosmal water drop, and we the sporting animacules that inhabit it. The quantitative estimate, the only estimate of the scientific analogy, would sink us in an unknown sea of organic change, a sea without a bottom or a shore. But faith can find us in its lowest depths; it bids us, even here, “Be not afraid.” “Fear not thou *worm* Jacob; I have redeemed thee, saith the Holy One, I have called thee by thy name, I hold thee by thy hand, thou art mine.” “Fear not, O thou of little faith, for thou art known unto me, and this is the assurance that thou thyself shalt know even as thou art known.” “Fear not, only believe.” It is thy faith that gives thee thy rank, thy value, thy fixed relation to the Infinite one. All things are thine, “all things are possible to thee, if thou believest.”

This scriptural view of man's rank, or the mode of determining it, may be considered elsewhere; but we would simply say here, that as far as any human philosophy is

concerned, or human knowledge, we have no more right to limit the universe in one direction than in another—in its ascent above us, any more than in its descent below, or its extent around and beyond us. There may be unknown worlds spiritual, rising above our worlds natural, or material. There may be worlds angelic or superangelic, worlds celestial and supercelestial; such terms being used to denote a notional fact, conceivable as a fact, but utterly unknown in respect to the real state or idea. Our space worlds, the worlds of science, may be the lowest in the scale. There is “a glory above the heavens,” a supercelestial glory, from whence God “*looketh down* upon the earth-heavens,” and all space-heavens, as something far below. “He humbleth himself to behold the things that are in the heavens,” as well as “the things that be upon the earth.” “I came forth from the Father into the *world*, (the kosmos); again I leave the world and go to the Father.” The language is not satisfied by the idea of spatial change. It is a transition in rank, in sphere; the coming into the kosmos, is a coming down in the scale and order of being.

Our rank, our sphere, thus regarded, neither philosophy nor science can ever give. They can not tell us *who* we are. The Bible reveals something here, something of our greatness, as well as of our littleness, as we hope to show. It gives us our rank, but not by any of those computations which must in some way enter into every philosophic estimate. It assigns our *intrinsic* value unaffected by any comparison with an outward universe, be it small or wide; it gives us our *constant* value, unvaried by any fluxional ratio rising or falling with the conceived limits of any flowing nature. It does this in a way of its own, a way which science never could have derived from any a posteriori induction, nor philosophy have divined from any a priori dream.

Why are we? Close the ear to every voice save that which comes from nature, or the outward world; shut out every supernatural beam, and carefully eliminate all such

supernatural light as lingers unacknowledged in any human speculation, and we have but one answer. *Why* are we here? To live, to propagate the race, to die. Listen to nature alone; look at the humbling facts she sets at the entrance of our existence, and plants along our whole earthly career; think of the appalling mystery that ever stands before us as its closing scene, and we are compelled to admit that any higher hope we may some how possess, comes not from her. If we believe in any thing beyond, it is in spite of sense. It is some power of faith or feeling that carries us in opposition, and sustains us in opposition, to all the reasons that come from sense; it is some divinely given and divinely preserved tradition that makes us hold fast to the creed in the face of all we most constantly see and know from earthly experience. But taking our premises from earth or nature merely, we could only conclude that boyhood is the truly valuable, the truly rational part of our being. The man is for the child; when past the season of youth, he is no longer an end but a means. In nature's system of interminable links, one thing is ever passing away to make room for another, one individual for another individual, one race for another race; there is no resisting the analogy that forces us on; this train once set in motion, must ever continue in motion; no induction that we can make, can ever give us a stopping place; there is no finish, no *τελευτα*, no fixed relation to the central Infinite, except as we are assured of it by revelation from a higher plane. Philosophy talks of the higher faculties, and may contend perhaps, that their exercise, and not the low uses above mentioned, is the true end and office of our existence. But after all, when viewed in the chain of nature alone, what can she do with these higher functions? They can be in the series only to serve the ends, or uses, of the series. Grant that one of these ends, or the chief of them, is to enjoy (although there is deficient evidence, or only incidental evidence of this in the visible scheme of nature) then such superior faculties, as they are called, are but *means* to enjoyment, or, in a still more subordinate

sense, have their *use* in the preservation of the ever moving continuity. Man has a higher intelligence than the brute, but it is that he may have more enjoyment, aye, and more misery too, if we limit our induction by the sphere of the visible or the known. As gills and fins were needed for the fish, and a higher apparatus of locomotion for the insect and the mammalia, so also the erect form, the higher kind of thinking, are both alike *means* for the preservation of the human place, as long as it is to last, in nature's passing series. Why call them then the higher faculties? If to *think* is after all that we may *live*, or, at the highest, if to *think well*, is but that we may *feel well*, what trick of naming can change the law of ideas, or give the *means* a higher dignity than those *ends* of enjoyment and continuity, to which, as far as any induction can show us, these boasted powers are alone subservient.

Philosophy dreams sometimes of something above what science ever has attained, or can attain to. She has an indistinct vision of some finality in man that is out of and above the physical series. Like the blind beggar, "she sees men as trees walking;" but this is by reason of an ointment that has been rubbed upon her eyes. She fondly fancies that it is her natural vision, but it is in truth a ray from another sphere, that has wandered down through the long and sometimes almost hidden path of a primitive or historical revelation. Listen to nature alone, and we are in an unknown chain of means and apparent ends that are never ends. Unless there be a supernatural finding, a hand reached down for our deliverance, we can never get out of this physical cycle; we can never find any meaning in our higher faculties. Such an outreaching hand can alone give us a positive end, as well as a positive value, and this it does by connecting us through the divine Mediator with the unchanging supernatural centre of the whole.

But *where* are we? Here our natural knowledge holds a more confident tone. We do assume to know something—it is contended that we know much—of our whereabouts in space. Modern astronomical discovery puts in a proud

claim here. We are not disposed to controvert it as measured upon its own scale; but there is another standard, as compared with which, it may be shown to be vastly overrated. To the thinking mind it was, and is, a very old idea, that there is to our earth an immense *outside*, and that this may be filled, most probably is filled, with material and dynamical being to an amount exceeding all mathematical estimate. It came not from science, but from the direct out-thinking that connects vast room with vast occupation, and holds to such a *plenum* because there presents itself no *sufficient reason* why the power, be it physical or divine, which generated one world, should not have generated others, to any extent to which the conception could be carried. Hence the multiplicity, and even "the infinity of worlds," was a very old hypothesis. Our modern science has endeavored to bring this floating conception into numbers and earthly measurements. Its progress here is great, or it is almost infinitesimally small, according to the stand point from which it is viewed. But the grand practical result is unaffected by it. We are still upon the earth, and earth, whatever may be its space position in the universe, is still the real centre in our thoughts. It is still, too, the circumference of our substantial knowledge, of all we know of spiritual or moral being, of all we know of *life* in its lowest or widest form. There is a fallacy here, exceedingly specious, but which a little thought at once exposes. Our knowledge of the astronomical heavens, great as it may seem, is, after all, purely mathematical. That is, it is confined to the ideas of pure space and motion. To such ideas the visible discoveries, far as they may have gone, do only serve as diagrammatical illustrations. The heavens are still to us but a vast orrery. We have discovered,—what have we discovered?—we have discovered *distances, times, magnitudes, masses, motions*; we have discovered angles, orbits, circles, ellipses, ratios, in a word, mathematical functions. It is, after all, the *dead* knowledge of numbers and quantities. Dead, we call it, (however beautiful as mathematical science) because, in

its whole sweep, it has no single fact of *life*, of which it can give us the least assurance. "I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world and go to the Father." There is, we repeat it, more of a cosmical, unearthly knowledge in this single statement, than in all the telescope has brought to light. A monstrous fallacy! some are prepared to say; but they may be challenged to find any thing else. We allude not now to the littleness of our astronomical science as compared with the immensely greater unknown that must be beyond the utmost visibility of the telescope. That might be called an unfair measurement. But within this telescopic field, what has it given but the barest skeleton of knowledge? The heavens are to us just as lonely, just as silent as of old. Imagination may take its flight, and so it could, and did, in the early day. That out-thinking into space and time, to which we have alluded, has ever belonged to the meditative soul. Miles and barleycorns, sines and cosines, have not increased its power, any more than its piety. Seclusion is still as of old, and in the beginning, the imperative law of the worlds. We are as much alone in the universe as in the days of Abraham and Moses. We may believe all parts of the conceivable kosmos physically connected; so dreamed the old astrology; it is, in fact, an *a priori* idea, or necessary law of our soul's thinking; but in all the higher aspects of the relation, morally, historically, socially, religiously, we are still alone, still in the same position as though our one seen, handled, familiar earth were, indeed, the centre and circumference of the physical universe. The practical, the emotional effect remains very much as of old. In this, notwithstanding Copernicus and Galileo, we are still Ptolemaists. The statement would be admitted, perhaps, in respect to the common mind; but an exception may be claimed for the scientific and the philosophical. *They* are no longer "of the earth earthy;" this little planet no longer bounds their spiritual vision. Ah, is it so?—Is it so? It is a melancholy question, an humbling question; but to whom has earth appeared the

larger, aye, the more central world? To Laplace or Bernard, to Auguste Comte, or to Anselm, to the modern French and American naturalists, or to the Augustines and Akempis, who lived before the telescope was known or thought of?

Again—human knowledge may tell us something of our position in space, but in what space? The whole of that vast visible, some where in which we lie, is itself a floating quantity in a larger space, where all is drifting wilder, that is more unknown to us, than the floes of the Antarctic ocean. We are told that we are moving, sun and all, towards some point some where in the constellation Hercules. It may be a sweep so vast that ages of observation will be required to make sensible the first elements of its curvature, or beginning of deflection from a tangential right line. But assuming that there are some mathematical grounds for such a conjecture, the question still returns. We may ask as the anxious Buddhist asks—where are we going to, last of all? We are moving towards Hercules; but where is Hercules going to? The visible kosmos, Hercules and all, is sweeping round some inconceivably more distant centre, and so on to an extent to which there is no limit, but the utter exhaustion of the numerical imagination. Immensely grand is all this, even if it does surround the problem of life with a still denser obscurity, or but serve to create in thoughtful minds a stronger sense of the want of some better knowledge that may hold us fast from being lost in the thick night of all mere natural discovery. Inimensely grand, we say, but even if true, there is no revelation in it,—none in the strict and proper sense of the term. “Verily I say unto you, there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth.” Here is a true revealing. “In the beginning was the Word; and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us—I ascend unto my Father and your Father, unto my God and your God—In my Father’s house are many mansions—Because I live ye shall live also.” Here is *divine* knowledge,—something that comes down to us, that finds us, that determines

our place, not by endless calculations running through the abysmal vortices of space, but by connecting us directly with the centre of infinite being. How personal the language! and it is this which makes it a revelation. "Fear not, only believe." Through all space and time has God come down to us, made himself known to us, revealed to us a value that cannot be diminished or affected by any numerical comparison with an outward universe. Even were this infinite, in a spatial or physical sense, still are we safe. We are known in heaven, our names are written there, we have a treasure there; there is a friend who thinks of us in the metropolis of the worlds; we have an advocate, a mediator, a brother in the heart of the Infinite.

When are we? Quo tempore? What is our place in the great chronology? The most modern of the sciences claims to have made some discoveries here, of which she boasts not a little. Without underrating her at all, it may still be made a question, Whether she has not involved the whole matter in a greater darkness? We have climbed one peak of the Alps, only to find "Alps on Alps," rising interminably before us. Here, too, the darkness increases faster than the light. There is discovered no beginning, no end, no plan that does not terminate in the physical series, and fall into the stream of its passing adaptations, no progress that can make us certain of any cyclical growth that necessarily excludes any cyclical decay.

But has the Scripture given us any thing here. We think it has. It furnishes no obscure intimations that we are in a mighty flood of ages, of worlds on worlds rolling on in time, even as the visible worlds roll on in space. No other idea could have given rise to those vast aeonic pluralities which are so remarkable a feature of the ancient Bible language. As far as words can aid the imagination or the thought, it sets before us that ineffable timeless, worldless state which was *πρωτων αιωνων*.* It makes known to us the *Malkuth kol olamim*,† "the Kingdom of all worlds"

* Col. 1: 26. 1 Cor. 2: 7. † Ps. 146: 13. 1 Tim. 1: 17.

moving on *εις τους αιωνας και εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων*, "for the ages and the ages of ages." It reveals to us the *great beginning* that was "before the sun,"* "before the day,"† the beginning when "the Word was with God,"—the ineffable morn which the Scriptures represent to us as the *απαυγασμα*, or out-shining of the Logos,‡ "the First Born before all creation." It reveals another beginning *in time*, the birth of the physical light, the beginning of the Kosmos in the temporal *out goings* of the same Word by whom "the ages were brought out of the unseen,"|| and "without whom there was nothing made that was made."†† It reveals the beginning of our own earthly system, and chronicles the wondrous *days*§ during which this same hypostatic Word, or "Wisdom, was still with God, rejoicing continually before him, and having *his delight with the new born sons of men*."¶ Curious indeed, and well worth our study, are the revelations, so called, of the rocks and shells, but what are they, we may well ask, when compared with this grand roll of chronology.

And of all this, too, it may be said, that it is not given to us as mere knowledge. Connected with it there is another mighty fact that links us with the ages. Along with the *knowing*, there is again that *being known* to the Infinite, which constitutes the precious personality of the revealing. There is made known to us "the mystery that was hid from the eternities." He who is "the Image of the Invisible God," He who was "the First Born before all creation," He who is the Head of the cosmical constitutions and "by whom all things *stand together*," He also is "the Head of the body, the Church, the First Born from the dead, that he might be first in all things."° He who "was in the beginning," had also a human birth in our solar time; He who was *προ των αιωνων*, "*before the worlds*,"

* Ps. 72: 17. The Chaldee translates it—"Before the sun was His name set forth." So also the Syriac. † Isa. 43: 13. ‡ Heb. 1: 3. || Heb. 11: 3. †† John 1: 2. § Prov. 8: 30. "Day—day was I with Him." See the Hebrew. ¶ Prov. 8: 31. Compare Gen. 1: 26. Hence we see the reason of the transition in the language. He it was who was so personally addressed on the sixth day. "Let us make man in our own image." ° Col. 1: 17.

before all time, came into the stream of our years, and dates from his incarnation the flowing of our historical centuries.

But *whence* came we? What know we here? Science may tell us poorly *where* we are, but this passes wholly out of her range. "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" As a question of origin, it transcends, of course, all historical knowledge. *Whence* came we? It is the question now beginning to be so zealously, yet so fruitlessly discussed of the unity and origin of the human race. To show how little any scheme, or theory, or induction of science can do towards solving it, we need only call attention to the fact, that the antisciputural naturalising here is taking two directly opposite roads. One finds unity where revelation announces diversity, the other diversity where revelation most unmistakably teaches unity. The school of Agassiz would separate men into a large number of unrelated natures; that of the Vestiges of Creation would make us all brothers to the worm and the toadstool. But what do they know about it? With them it is a mere matter of classification. What shall constitute a species, does not, with either, depend upon the known fact of unity of life, but on some hypothesis of greater or less amount of resemblance. One definition, constructed for a certain historical time and space, takes in, or excludes, a certain amount of resemblance; another definition, made for another time and space, or the same definition applied to a greater time and space, or connecting itself with another assumed causality, makes necessary a wholly different view both of classification and origin. We are justified in saying again, what do they know about it, and what does any one know about it, without a revelation? The thought is very obvious, and yet how little is it entertained! What a blank is left in this whole department of historical inquiry,—for such it is—if we close the Bible! What a shadow would rest upon the first and second, and many succeeding chapters of the world's chronology. Some talk confidently of the beginning of histo-

ry, and of diversities then existing. It is the ground of their definition of species. But where, without the Bible, do we find the beginning of human history? Where are the points where the written runs into the monumental, the annalistic, or chronological, into the mythical? All lost, irrecoverably lost. Three thousand years, and what a dim twilight reigns over our world. Four thousand years, and it would be the darkness of historical midnight, but for one silver stream of light that runs up far beyond, one sacred historical ray, narrow, yet clear, giving us just what God meant we should know of these early periods, and leaving all the rest beneath the veil. Put out this heaven-kindled torch, and what have we left for the early day? Egyptian hieroglyphics, dark inscriptions on obelisks, ever promising, yet ever baffling, suggesting indeed much thought of an ancient buried life, yet giving no substantial knowledge of its history or its origin. We have monstrous sphynxes, withered mummies, mouldering sarcophagi; we have strange figures from Assyrian ruins. What do they mean? They mean much when read by the Bible. Take this away, and there comes from this dead matter a pale phosphorescent glow more bewildering than the night itself. Ethnology begins to assume form when studied by the tenth of Genesis. We see something in the dusky Egyptian catacombs, when we throw into them a reflection from the lamp of Moses. With Ezekiel for our medium, we discover some historical meaning in the winged bulls, and eagle-headed lions, that have lately been exhumed from the long concealed Assyrian "chambers of imagery." We are thankful to Layard and Rawlinson for their laborious researches; we are deeply interested in the resurrections they have made from these sepulchres of a forgotten world; but for real light upon the old Assyrian history, for clear painting, not of symbols, but of the actual truthful, ancient life, what is it all compared with the vivid limning we find in the 18th chapter of Second Kings, or the 36th and 37th chapters of Isaiah.

What was the earliest history of our race? Who were

the most ancient men, and what were they doing upon the earth in the oldest times? What a charm has such knowledge for us? Yet these, as well as the still greater question, *Whence came we first of all?* must be answered mainly from the sacred Scriptures, or remain forever in the vast unknown.

The question *How* are we? *Quomodo?* Our manner and law of being, would bring in almost the whole domain of speculative philosophy. *How* we think—How we know, and what is our knowing. Are we soul and body separate, separable, or indivisible? Are souls born? Has the soul ideas? Is there an objective reason? Are individual things the only realities in the universe, or are there true entities corresponding to universal or generic terms? On all these questions, there have ever been, there are now, two zealously warring schools. The writer professes no indifference between them. He thinks one side better than the other,—more true, more rational, and far more religious. Nominalism, when carried fully out, seems to him, but another name for atheism. The question which some have styled a mere scholastic subtlety, we cannot help regarding as involved in all that is most fundamental in divine revelation. The Scriptures seem to have no meaning, if there is not a true humanity,—a true Christianity, as something distinct from a series of facts, or a collection of dogmas. And yet take away revelation, together with the higher thinking it creates in the soul, and who shall dare to say that any of these questions are settled by the independent human philosophy. The schools are now farther from agreement than ever. We may take our own side of these questions. We may claim for it the authority of the highest names in the world and in the Church; and yet there is no denying the fact, that the other views have been maintained by men of as high repute for mental strength and clear intelligence. Aristotle was as profound as Plato; Bacon is as great a name as Cudworth; Locke was as keen a thinker as is to be found in the Eclectic or Ideal schools. If we take then the standard of

human authority, the same thought comes up here again, as well as in the fields of history and science,—*How little we know!* How little we know unless some heavenly truth is thrown in the scales. If there be no revelation, no hope of a revelation, (for the very hope is suggestive of the higher ideas) then might we indeed struggle to maintain what seems the holier truth, but it would be hard, perhaps impossible, to resist that philosophy which makes all thinking but sensation, all knowledge, yea, all faith, but induction, all universal truths but generalizations of phenomena, and all generic ideas but the barest logical names.

We know not whence we came. But whither are we going? Nature shows only a troubled stream of life issuing out of the unknown on the one side of its finite horizon, and losing itself in a still greater unknown on the other. Sombre as such a picture is, it is but an equivalent to the Bible thought as given to us in those passages where the main design would seem to be to represent how little man can know of his future destiny without the clearer representations that the Scripture elsewhere makes. "We spend our years as a tale that is told,"—as a sigh, says the Syriac,—*"like a murmur,"* is the literal Hebrew,—a low, musing, melancholy sound. "Thou carriest them away as with a flood." "As the cloud is spent and gone, so is it with those that go down to Sheol." There comes the same wailing desponding voice from the deeply musing Preacher in Ecclesiastes—"He cometh in with vanity and departeth in darkness, and his name is covered with darkness." This apparent scepticism of the older Scripture is preparatory to a fuller faith. We may regard it as a dramatic representation of what we are, and of what we know, without a farther and clearer revealing. But even in itself it is a better thing than the easy faith of the socialist, or the dry rationalistic belief in what is called—"the dogma of the immortality of the soul." The solemn musings of Moses, the mournful queries of Asaph, are better for us, they are holier, they are nearer to the truth, nearer to the true light, than all the fine reasoning of the ancient philos-

ophers. The melancholy sighings of the suffering man of Uz show a deeper appreciation of the great question than any thing we find in the words of an Epictetus or an Antonine. We may better doubt with Job and Koheleth, than believe with Seneca, or as Seneca believed. These old "men of God" had "that faith which pleased Him," because it ever recognized Him as *their* God, "*the God of the living*," and themselves, therefore, as "*living unto Him*," though how they lived they comprehended not. This faith they sometimes joyfully express, but even the Old Testament despondency, or scepticism, if we may call it so, was more religious, and therefore possessed of a higher dignity, than any modern opinions, however affectedly spiritual, that are not connected with the resurrection of Christ, and the Creed of the Church in respect to the intermediate and future state of the departed.

Whither are we going? Why must we die? It is not saying much when we say, that philosophy can not solve these problems. She gets along very well as long as the question is confined to the present ends of our present being. All is easy as long as she is allowed to talk of physical ends, and how all good is found, and virtue consists, in obedience to nature's laws, or the Author of nature regarded as having no higher purpose. All this is easy, and claims to be triumphant, until the discussion nears the "gates of Hades," and then it is that the great swelling words of this physical ethics dwindle down into a few unmeaning phrases about "the debt of nature," or it mutters forth at last that confession of mystery which the true revelation places at the very door step of all human knowledge. Right here it is, the true unearthly Wisdom begins to utter its voice. "O where shall wisdom be found, and where is the place of understanding?" The response comes to us—"It is not in the land of the living. Sheol and Abaddon say, we have just heard a rumor thereof with our ears."

We would not, however, underrate any light of nature. As proof of a life to come it is worthless; but as leading to

faith by showing the need of a supernatural revelation, it has great value. The metaphysical argument for the soul's immortality leaves every mind just where it left Cicero's; but far otherwise is it with that other branch of the argument which is drawn from the deep sighing of our humanity,—from that universal prolepsis that has created a spirit-world in the mythology of all nations. When philosophy dwells on these, she is, indeed, an aid to faith; but it is only because in doing so she teaches man his darkness, and thus calls out that longing for a better life which ever maketh its inward moan in groanings that cannot be uttered.

“Behold! We know not any thing.
So runs my dream, but what am I?
An infant crying in the night;
An infant crying for the light;
And with no language but a cry.”

“Light, more light,” were the last words, it is said, of the dying Goethe.” We may thank Heaven for such men as the great German poet, if not on their own account, at least for the Church's sake. The involuntary testimony that comes to Christianity from their mournful scepticism, is stronger than many a labored philosophical defence.

“O where shall wisdom be found.” The Scriptures alone give the response. “The gospel has brought life and immortality to light.” The language is peculiar—“*hath made light*,” or illumined. These ideas of another life were of old. They were with the human race from the beginning, not as the offspring of any a posteriori or a priori reasoning, but as coming from that prolepsis before mentioned, which took up the primitive revelation of a Redeemer, or Life-giver, made in the earliest day, and never wholly lost it in all the far off local and mental wanderings of the race. And so among all nations, the thought of another life was in the world, but it was cold, cheerless, ghastly. Read it in Homer, Pindar, and even in Job. It was a dim spectral vision, getting shape rather by its shade than its lustre, until the Christian revelation “made it light” in the Lord, in the glory of his cross and his resurrection.

Thus have we rapidly traced the seven great interrogatories. The conclusion every reader anticipates—not only the exceeding desirableness, but the absolute necessity to us of revelation—of a supernatural, objective revelation. But has even the Scripture solved them? Not in equal extent, some of them not at all, none of them, perhaps, as much as we might desire, were it not that the first lesson of that revelation is docile submission to Him who maketh known to any of his creatures just what, and when, and how, and how much it pleaseth Him.

The Scriptures tell us nothing about our position in space. They disclose to us a mighty chronology, but tell us little, either of our date or our age in its immeasurable series. They reveal to us the aim of our existence and how we have fallen from it. They give a satisfactory answer to the questions *whence* we came, and *how* we came. They disclose to us all we have a right to ask on the question, *whither* are we going, although gratifying no mere curiosity of knowledge in respect to the physical conditions of the world to come. It is in this peculiar reserve that the Bible differs so widely from all spurious revelations. In its revealings the moral is every where predominant over the physical or even the psychological. It will not tell us how spirits live. It assures us of the reality of a state of blessedness, and of condemnation. It lifts a fold of the curtain, now and then, but only the more deeply to impress the moral announcement—"Joy to the righteous, it shall be well with him; woe to the wicked, it shall be ill with him." Beyond the bare mention of these gates of Hades,* it tells us nothing of the passage through which we enter upon the other world, except that there is a Good Shepherd there who will lead us through the dark valley if we but believe on him—one who is there to take us by the hand, and "whose rod and staff shall comfort" us through all that gloomy way. "We know not what we

* Job 38: 17, "Hast thou seen the gates of *Trialmaveth*—the same word used Ps. 23: 4.

shall be, but we shall be satisfied when we awake in his likeness." Even the New Testament keeps the veil over what may be called the psychological condition of the departed. To be with Christ, with Christ in Paradise, is the sum of its announcement for the blessed, as though this were enough for the believing soul, whilst any attempted disclosure of spiritual conditions would give nought but error, encourage no other spirit than that mere conceit of knowledge which, in this world at least, is so much opposed to the true spiritual health.

"Now we see through a glass darkly." "*Now we see things in a mirror shadowly*," as it may better be rendered. It is but the reflections, the images of things that we behold. This is no mere philosophic mysticism. We need not go to Plato's cave for the idea. A similar representation is given in the Scriptures, even the older Scriptures. "Man walketh in a vain show." *Yith hallek*—He goeth about, passeth to and fro—*be-tzelem*, in an image, an umbra. "*In imagine pertransit homo*." Now we see in a mirror shadowly, but then face to face—the very substances of things as distinct from their appearances. "Now we know in part," *ex parte*. The expression may be misunderstood. It has not reference, we think, so much to the amount, or extent, as to the kind of knowledge. It is now piece-meal (*stück-weise*, as Luther has it) partial, inductive, in distinction from the intuitive satisfying vision of reality. It is partial, not in the sense of a few things compared with a great many things, but rather, as *ex parte*, one sided, being the view of things on one side, and that their lowest* or less real side. It is ex-

*The Arabian Schoolmen had an expression, *makateu 'lumure*, by which they denoted the present knowledge. It means the "ends, or off-cuttings, of things"—*sectiones rerum*—the threads that stick out from the lower or wrong side of the tapestry which the great Artificer is weaving above—*exitus finales rerum comparati cum telisque super iugo textorio divinæ voluntatis texuntur*. Vide Willmet Lex. 611. Science is endeavoring to trace the plan inductively from the under side. But turn the tapestry, and the figures, the ideas, stand out bright and clear to the common intuitive gaze. So may it be to the spiritual eye that looks down from the upper position. Those who were here the scientific and the unscientific are now upon a par. Newton has no advantage over the African slave, although in other respects, and for

parte in the sense to which we have before alluded. It is "a knowledge of things;" or, if we may call it, in any sense, a knowledge of God, it is without that other thought, or with but little of that other thought, *His knowing us*; and hence it is put in contrast with the knowing as being known. "Now we know *ex parte*, but then shall we know as we are known." Then shall it be all divine knowledge in the truer sense of the term, even that divine knowledge of which the Christian hopes he has some experience here, but then, full, consummate, perfect, not in the sense of quantity, but of quality and idea; then, no longer in a mirror, but face to face. Its reality will consist in the fact that there will be no knowledge, as now, severed from the thought of God as knowing the knower therein. All will be divine knowledge as distinguished from "the knowledge of things," that is, of things *per se*; no knowledge *ex parte*, as in this world, or divided from that one constant, all pervading, all penetrating, life giving idea. The present inductive knowledge may be very extensive, but still accumulative, and, therefore, ever unsatisfactory and imperfect. The new facts make stale and dead the interest of the old, and yet are so like the old, that they pall as repetitions. It is a continual change of appearances, and motions, and forces, only to find at bottom the same substantial forms of sense and thought. This love of knowledge, as the knowl-

other reasons, he may be spiritually far below one who had here so little of "the knowledge of things." Nature instead of revealing, stands revealed. It is *seen through*; and the scientific interest is gone, or has given place to a higher. We might compare it to a science of tangibilities that had for ages been building up among a race of sightless men. It might be very curious, very extensive even, in its accumulations of facts and generalizations of laws therefrom. It might have reached, as among its highest arcana, some of those proceedings in nature that are now well understood by the youngest child. Still it would be a vast science, a true science, a most interesting science. It might fill many huge volumes of books as "printed for the blind." But let now the new and unknown sense be added, how soon, as science, would it become nullified, be brought to nought, "vanish away"—in other words, wholly lose its scientific interest in presence of the higher vision. The Arabic idea may be supposed to have its germ in such language as that of Job 26: 14. "Lo, these are but parts (*ketsoth*, ends) of His ways; what a *whisper* is heard of Him, but the *thunder* of his power (his mighty hidden power) who can understand." The expression, "*parts of his ways*," may have been in the mind of Paul, and suggestive of his own language.

edge of things, is higher than the sensual happiness, but it has in itself, unsustained, the same element of death. It, too, is a pleasure grounded on a pain, an enjoyment ever conditioned on the uneasiness of a want, a drinking that ever demands a thirst.* It is nobler, we say, far nobler than the Epicurean appetite of sense, but none the less is it a running cistern, "a broken cistern that can hold no water."

We may believe then that the knowledge here put in contrast with the knowledge *ex μέρους*, is not a mere enlargement of the former or a wider field, but something radically different. It is fulness in distinction from flowing change, *το ρεῖον*, finish, perfection, as estimated not by accumulation, but by its nearness to the central divine knowledge, and the perfect satisfaction which it must create in the consciousness of knowing as being known. The writer would take to himself a caution here, lest he be darkening counsel by words without knowledge; he would put his mouth in the dust when he remembers how far his own religious experience, if he have any religious experience, falls below the ideas he is endeavoring to set forth. But he cannot help thinking that the Apostle's language must refer to something else than difference in quantity or extent. So far, at least, we may have some confidence in our exegesis of the knowledge *ex parte* as distinguished from the knowledge face to face. If the explanation sounds mystical, the appeal may be made to the humblest Christian experience. Does not this teach him who is the subject of it, that there is, even in this world, another standard of knowledge than that of extent? Has he not had a few thoughts, a few emotions, that are more to him than all else that goes to make up the sum of his intellectual being—thoughts that he would think, emotions that he would be content to feel to all eternity? If such be the case with a

* Compare John 4: 14, "Whoever shall drink of the water that I shall give him, shall thirst no more forever, *eis ton aiona*; but it shall be in him a well of water springing up to everlasting life—*fons aquæ salientis in vitam æternam*."

poor shadow of earthly experience, often doubted, and sometimes fancied to be but a dream, how much more glorious, both the mode and the reality, in the life to come. Instead of a discursive wandering over the universe, it may be a beatific vision of a few glorious ideas, a rapt gazing on some truth throwing in the shade all other knowledge, an adoring contemplation, an everlasting worship in which the soul is satisfied forever and forevermore. It is difficult now to conceive of this; it is still harder to imagine ourselves satisfied with it, although the Scriptures seem so full of the thought that adoration is not only the highest attainment, but the constant employment of the other life. The difficulty is increased, to the general thinking, by some modern scientifico-theological notions which would transfer to the better world so much of the unrest, or restless action, together with the piece-meal, *ex parte*, fact-accumulating science of this lower inchoate condition. Even Aristotle could see it as a truth of reasoning, an intellectual necessity, that contemplation, θεωρητική, must, in some way, be the highest and ultimate blessedness of the soul,* higher than action, even as an end must be higher than a means, or as motion has its significance, and its value, only in relation to the immovable, or as the highest expression of a force must be found in that energetic and ever energising equilibrium we style a *rest*. The disturbance, or loosening, of such equilibrium is the letting out of its latent power, and so the commencement of its waste. *Rest* is not *inertia*, but rather its opposite. The latter is the utter absence of power, a mere negation: the other the intensest form of energising. A static is a stronger thing than a dynamic; and so we might even venture to say that, though God creates both force and motion, and neither could exist but at his will, the highest energising of the Deity in nature would be the quiescence of the universe. Thus also in the better life,—contemplation may be the soul's highest energy, adoration, reverence the loftiest exercise of spiritual power.

* Nicom. Ethic. x. 7. 6.

And so, in some sense, although in a different and much lower sense, may it be true of the Church on earth. Great bustle, or "great movements," as they now are called, may be but the spending of force. In this contemplative energy, this holy rest, there may be not only the deeper inward life, but the full fountain of the highest outward activity for the subduing of the world.

In respect, however, to the future state of the blessed, the Scriptures do certainly seem to countenance some of the ideas we have been laboring to set forth. Thus much may be said with confidence, that the opposite, or more popular view of movement, of ever unfinished, ever restless progress, cannot be made out from any fair interpretation of the divine word. On the other hand, *rest*, assurance, perfection, that is, finish, in a word, blessedness,—the blessedness of contemplation, the rapture of unwearied adoration, although we cannot now see how it could be unwearied,—these are the prominent Bible ideas, and its outward imagery is in harmonious correspondence. The Paradisaical life, or the Heavenly life, is not the study of astronomy, or of any of the outward sciences, neither is it psychology, or the investigation of the mind's capacities, but the beatific vision of the Divine perfections, "the beautiful, the right, the good," as seen in themselves without the mirror of scientific or historical induction. "Whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away." We know that the primary reference of the Apostle here, was to the peculiar *gnosis*, or gift of knowledge, on which some prided themselves in the early Corinthian Church. But the whole closing language of this wondrous chapter has a remarkable air of universality. We must, therefore, regard it as including knowledge, or science, in its wider sense, "the knowledge of things" as that in which men have ever chiefly gloried. Of such knowledge it is said, not that "it shall vanish away," or utterly cease, which is a wrong translation, but that it "shall be made vain," (*καταργηθῆναι*;) nullified, made of little or no account, in a word, *deposed*, put down in a lower or subordinate sphere; or, as it is better rendered in a verse below,

"put away," as Paul "put away childish things." Now here, in our fallen perverted state, it is the great thing; then shall it be reduced to its true inferior rank, so that, in comparison with its former false assumption, it may be said to "vanish away."

The Bible does, indeed, speak of serving God in the glorified state, and this might seem to favor that idea of restless action which is so popular, but the careful reader will note the peculiar nature of this service. It is the service of worship. Such is ever the significance of the term employed, as used in the New Testament Greek. It is the service of worship, not of discursive thought or action. It is no longer *δουλεύω*, but *λατρεύω*. His redeemed "servants serve Him day and night," but it is "in his temple." It is temple service, however tedious and monotonous that may appear to our present modes of thinking. It is temple service, adoration, praise, thanksgiving, halleluias, forever and forever more. No satiety, no wandering curiosity, no search for variety either in worship or in knowledge. The hymn, the liturgy, the ineffable *Te Deum*, goes on forever. "They cease not saying, Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty, who was and is, and is to come." All is constancy, immutability, *rest*. Such are the leading ideas of the Scriptural language. The soul has passed through its physical state of growth, of peril, and probation. It is among the finished works of God. Fully redeemed, at last, from all change, from all wandering, "it goeth out no more." In the absorbing unwearied adoration of its Creator it has attained a *perfection* which is far better than progress, or any imagined amount of an ever imperfect, ever changing knowledge of changing things.

Such, we think, is the ideal impression conveyed by the Scripture imagery. Even when it comes in nearest accommodation to our present conceptions, there is still the same prominence to these thoughts of blessedness, adoring rest, in a word *perfection*, in distinction from an ever *imperfect*, and, therefore, ever unsatisfying, progress. It is a state in these respects most unlike the present; for its highest neg-

ative description is given in the fact that "the former things have passed away." "Who are these arrayed in white robes, and whence came they? These are they who have come out of great tribulation, who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb; therefore are they before the throne of God and they *serve him* day and night in his temple. And He that sitteth upon the throne shall have His tabernacle among them. They hunger no more, they thirst no more." It refers to intellectual as well as to other thirst, for it says—"The Lamb shall feed them, and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes." And again—"I saw a new heaven and a new earth, and I heard a great voice from out of heaven saying, behold the tabernacle of God is with men, and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither mourning nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things have passed away." "For the old things," says the quaint old Version of Tyndale, "the old things are gone." The language would seem to denote something more than merely another story of existence, raised a degree higher, to command a farther view of the same or similar objects. "The old things are gone." They may still lie far away in the remote back ground of memory. Some such view seems actually necessary to preserve the conscious identity of our continuous life. We may hold to all that has been said, and yet be far from the reverie of any mystic absorption, or transcendental change in the law of our ever finite being. The knowledge of these may still remain, although the new light of eternity has risen upon it. The saints know that "they have come out of great tribulation." They are in the satisfying mansions of their Father's house. "They hunger no more," either for bread or knowledge; "they thirst no more." Yet do they well remember that "far country," and the "mighty famine" that there once prevailed. They know the price that was paid for their redemption. There is still a knowledge of "the old things," but it is as of "things that are gone." Gone the probation;

gone the incertitude; gone that knowledge of shadows we now call science, or at least thrown far in the back ground. The Koran has a grand passage which we venture to quote in this connection, because the thought seems to have come to Mohammed from the Scriptures, and especially from some knowledge he may have had of the language of Paul. He represents the faithful as rising from their graves in the day of the resurrection. They lift up their heads after their long sleep, and their first words are, "the shadows are gone, truth has come."* The piece-meal *ex parte* knowledge has given place to the perfect, the changing to the fixed, the phenomenal to the substantial, the shadowy to the real, the temporary to the eternal. "The old things are gone." For now, whilst in the nursery chamber, we see as in a mirror shadowly, but then face to face. Are we merely putting one philosophical conceit in the place of another? Are we indulging in the vain glory of an empty mysticism whilst declaiming against the pride of knowledge? To the Word and the Testimony. St. Paul heard that which was ineffable; the Scriptural images represent the same. We cannot pretend to understand it; we cannot presume to interpret it; but this may we venture to say, it must be something transcending our present knowledge, not only in degree, but in kind; it must be something which is not a higher continuation, but above, and distinct from, any attainments we may here make, either in science or philosophy. "Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, it hath not entered into the mind of man to think, what God hath prepared for them that love him."

On the question, who we are? it may be said, as before, the Scripture gratifies no mere curiosity of knowledge. Yet still it does distinctly intimate to us, that we are in a great scale of ascending being—"Angels and Archangels, Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers." It speaks of a Heaven above the Heavens, and of a third Heavens,—whether astronomical or spiritual, we cannot say.

* Koran 17: 83.

Whether they are local, and, if local, where, we cannot say; Paul could not say. In this respect the Scriptures do give us more than science, or rather they give us that about which science is utterly silent. Still it might be said that notwithstanding such intimations of orders of being, the Bible leaves our own rank, our own true value, as much undetermined as does our human knowledge. Not so. It does give us our position, but by a mode of measurement which natural knowledge would never have discovered. The thought has been already alluded to; but it may be well here to present it in a fuller and more distinctly reasoned statement. We may say, then, that there are two modes of estimating value. The one may be called the comparative or *quantitative*, in a word, the physical, the other the intrinsic, the religious, in a word, the supernatural. The first finds the value of each thing, spiritual or dynamical, by its ratio in the scale of *all* being viewed as matter of amount. The being of any thing, in its most general estimate, is made up of three main elements—space, power, thought,—what it occupies, what it does or feels, what it knows. These are all matters of amount, or quantitative estimate, and the ratio they bear to all other occupied space, all other doing, and all other thinking in the universe, is the numerical or quantitative value. But even mathematics will teach, that this can never give to us, or to any thing else, any constant, intrinsic value, as long as the universe may be conceived of as a varying measure of indefinite enlargement. The rank of man on one scale, may be that of the insect on another. It is the whole that has any real value in this mode of reckoning, and even that may be ever changing. Science can only talk of wholes, and of parts in their relations to wholes. To this whole, all that is individual, or even partial, must ever be sacrificed. As zoophytes and reptiles have made way for man, so man must make way for some higher development of physical being. We are only links, means, steps in progress, to be cast away when this progress rises above our own level, as it speeds onward relentlessly to some other

temporary maximum, or sweeps round again in some cycle of degeneracy, preparatory to some necessary minimum, where physical being begins *de novo*, to run again through the same valueless series of gas, liquid, solid, plant, worm, fish, mammalia, homo, forever and forever more. All is transit. There is no other value here except numerical ratio, and this is ever changing.

In this thick night of nature, revelation comes to our relief. It finds us in this sea of incertitude and infinity. It does nothing to gratify the speculative curiosity by determining our scientific latitude. It has a far higher aim than that. It does not attempt to console us by determining the bounds of this quantitative estimate, and so letting us know how we stand *in the whole of being*. It does not sum up our accountability in that way. It does not make sin and righteousness flowing quantities in a vast scheme of political economy, with its table of values and accountabilities rising and falling with some actual or supposed extent of a universe to be governed. It does not thus measure the divine law, its ineffable sanctions, its incalculable penalty, its priceless expiation. There is no such language in the Scriptures, no such thoughts in any way expressed. But it does reveal another and more precious rule of value. This is not our ratio, arithmetical or geometrical, to any numerical whole of being physical or spiritual. It is the moral ratio of our nearness to God, the centre of all being, and the strength of that faith in the God-man Redeemer through which it is effected and made sure. Here is an intrinsic, a constant value for each moral and rational agent. His thought of God, his faith in God, his love to God, is the measure of his place and his worth in the universe. Nothing outside can affect this value. Ages may sweep away, worlds may be created and destroyed, the universe may expand or diminish, its bounds may be regarded as barely enclosing what was seen by the earliest human eye, or they may swell beyond all that the modern astronomy has ever dared to imagine; still there is the same unchanging value,—the same to the finite creature

whom it estimates, the same to the Eternal Mind that alone is capable of making the estimate. The soul that truly believes in Him, that loves Him, must be nearer to Him, and He is nearer to it, than to the most exalted being in the universe (exalted physically and intellectually we mean) that has less of this faith, or none of this faith, that alone "pleases God," and unites to Him. And so must the believing soul feel it to be. There may be ranks of being physically and intellectually above it, far above it. Still would it love to contemplate such exaltations of ascending intellectualities, or ascending powers, even though its own place in the great scale is physically depressed by it. It should love it, and would love it, because it brings glory to its Maker. Paradox as it may seem, it is itself made morally greater and higher by the very position that enables it to see its physical lowliness. The more humble its own place, the more glorious appears the transcending height of the divine Heavens to which it looks up through this vision-aiding valley of humiliation. This is the transcendental arithmetic of the New Testament: "The last shall be first, and he that is least among you all, the same shall be great." Such is the Bible calculus. The believers' value is not disturbed by any computation that measures him by the outward universe. Be this greater or smaller, younger or older, it matters not. His longitude, his place in being, is not geocentric, or heliocentric, or kosmocentric even, but theocentric. Its central sun is the *πατήρ τῶν φωτῶν*, "The Father of Lights." It suffers no change or parallax, because it is not determined by any varying outward observation, but by its relation to Him to whom also, in a still higher sense, "there is no *parallage*," or shadow of turning.*

And this is the peculiar glory of the divine revelation. It is itself the great supernatural fact of facts. It is God the Infinite seeking and finding us. Divine knowledge comes down. It is not any department, however high, of

* Jas. 1:17.

learning and science. It is not an upper story of any natural knowledge, or into which we mount from any vantage height of natural knowledge, but a different and separate sphere of thought. We do not ascend to it from "any heaven reaching hill" of philosophy, but it comes lowly down to us, sent from God himself. "We rise," it is said, "through nature up to nature's God." This may be true enough, but even then it is only nature's God it finds—"the Eternal Power and divinity," the Supreme Cause,—it may be, the Supreme Intelligence, as an intelligence of natural things. Nature, too, and this is what Paul intends, may keep us in mind of the unseen when revealed to us, or it ought to have kept us from losing such a revelation of the invisible when once made to us. But it goes no farther. Without another revealing to the hearts and minds of men, "nature's God" remains the God of the universe, the God of wholes that knows not the parts, except as comprehended in this universal impersonal relation to a mighty organic totality. At the utmost it reaches but to those first words of the Creed that are little or nothing to us, severed from what follows. "I believe in God—in God omnipotent." Natural knowledge may say this. "I believe in God all-knowing." To this extent also may it go. Beyond, it is the "unknown God." "I believe in God the Father." Here breaks in a voice from Heaven. It is a Father's voice, seeking the lost, calling to the lost, saying to us, as it said to the first man—"Adam, where art thou?" No man hath known the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals him. It is no longer, as has been said before, simply a belief *in God*, in a God, but in *our God*, the Father, and nearer still, "the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." And then, nearer and nearer still, draws on the wondrous chain of supernatural truth reaching from the Infinite all the way down to our finite humanity, and which is so simply yet sublimely set forth in the earliest and most catholic symbol of the Christian faith,—the incarnation, the miraculous conception of a Virgin mother, the Redeemer's law-fulfill-

ing life, his atoning death, the descent into Hades, the rising again from the dead, the ascent into Heaven, the right hand mediatorship, the coming at the judgment day, —the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting.

Here is divine knowledge. How scanty, some might say, especially as compared with the rich disclosures of natural theology! A few positive dogmas, or facts, with little or nothing of that inductive connection out of which we might construct a science or a philosophy! As knowledge, as mere knowledge, it may indeed, in one sense, be said to be but little; but O how precious! What would earth be without it? We need not ask where would be our hope of salvation? But what would become even of those things the world esteems highest, should this truth be withdrawn, or go out in a night of final, hopeless, unbelief. Philosophy, poetry, science, art—they boast, sometimes, of sustaining revelation, but where would they be a few generations after such a cloud had settled over our world? They were fast crumbling when Christianity came; what reason have we to expect that the highest mountains of human thought would escape submersion in that deluge of secularity, sensuality, and selfish ferocity, that would succeed the total eclipse of all belief and all knowledge that connects itself with the heavenly and divine?

But it is knowledge after all, some might say—or rather, what is there to prevent this from becoming mere knowledge, mere dry dogmas? Our space will only allow us to present briefly two preventive thoughts. The first is the great preciousness of this truth simply regarded as a revelation from God the Infinite. Were it but a father's voice calling unto us and saying, "Look unto me ye lost and be ye saved;" had it simply contained the announcement, "above you is the God of old, and underneath the everlasting arms;" had it barely told us, there is a great Saviour and a great salvation; or had it given only the general assurance, "in my Father's house there is bread enough and to spare;"

it would have been enough to give it this high position, not only as casting all other knowledge in the shade, but as making it something more than knowledge, even an "inborn, *ingrowing* Word," a *living truth* to the souls that truly received it.

The other thought is, that the true way to prevent these articles of the Creed from becoming mere scientific symbols, is to nourish in the soul a personal love for the divine personal medium through whom they are brought to us—Jesus the God man, Son of God and Son of Man; Jesus our Elder Brother, the great bond of union between the finite and the Infinite. The love of Jesus,—without it, all theology is but a *gnosis*, a philosophy. The name of Jesus—it is "as ointment poured forth." It is the preserving unction of all religious ideas. The Christian life, it is the life in Jesus;" the blessed dead, "they sleep in Jesus;" all precious truth, it is "the truth as it is in Jesus." Well may we "count all knowledge but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Jesus"—"the chief among ten thousand and the one altogether lovely." "Whether there be prophecies, they shall cease; whether there be tongues they shall fail; whether there be knowledge it shall vanish away"—all knowledge that is not transfused and vivified by love. "For now abideth faith, hope, charity,—these three,—but the greatest of these is charity."

T. L.

ART. III.—THOUGHTS ON THE CHURCH..

SECOND ARTICLE.

CAN a sect be *evangelical*, which refuses to accept the Apostles' Creed as the fundamental symbol of its faith? The question is simple, clear, and important enough, one would suppose, to command some respectful attention. The point is not, whether other symbols may not be worthy also of regard in their place; but whether any form of belief, written or unwritten, can be considered evangelically sound and orthodox, which does not start in this plain rule, and grow forth from it as its normative ground and type. Can the Augsburg Confession, for instance, or the Westminster Confession, or the Heidelberg Catechism, be of greater symbolical authority at any point than the Creed, for the determination of the true and proper sense of Christianity; so that the last may be lawfully required to bend to any of the first, instead of its being held necessary that the order of subordination should fall the other way? In the relation here between the older confessionalism and the confessionalism of later times, which is to be considered first and which second; which must be taken for the foundation, and which for the superstructure, of the Christian scheme of faith? And so in regard to any unwritten judgment or conception of Christianity, which may be cherished in any quarter as a favorite sectarian phase of what is counted evangelical religion; the point for consideration comes up always in the same form. Can any such conception ever be allowed rightly to take precedence of that view of Christianity which is set before us in the ancient Creed, and which was received by the whole Christian world in the beginning, as the necessary, and only legitimate expression of what the Christian religion is in its first constituent principles and facts? Can any confessionalism,

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in one word, written or unwritten, disown the Creed, ignore the Creed, make no conscious account of the Creed practically, as the basis of its opinions and teachings, and yet be, at the same time, evangelical, that is, answerable truly to the life and spirit of the Gospel? Can a Christian teacher, or a body of Christian teachers, occupy this position of broad indifference, or full antagonism, to what was held universally to be the absolutely binding *regula fidei* in the first ages, and yet deserve to be honored, notwithstanding, as sound in the faith and biblically orthodox?

With many in this incongruous predicament, we know, a ready and convenient escape from all difficulty is felt to be ever at hand, in the trite sophism which pretends to fall back at once on the Bible as the last rule of all right Christian belief. Here all our unchurchly sects fancy themselves to be planted on impregnable ground. They find it perfectly easy to stand forward with their diversified schemes of opinion, regardless of all primitive confessions and creeds, and to challenge the respect of the world for them as evangelical, on the simple ground of their having been drawn directly from the Scriptures and from no other source. Whether their schemes may agree strictly with the Apostles' Creed, they have not felt it necessary at all carefully to inquire; they have, on the whole, a sort of instinctive apprehension that they do not; but to what can that amount, in a case which confessedly refers itself at once to the higher rule of the Bible, to which every rule besides, it matters not how old, must be required of course to bend and yield? If there be any discrepancy between their faith and the proper historical sense of the Apostles' Creed, they are sorry for it; but it cannot be helped; they at all events, follow the Bible; and in such case, it is plain to see that if the Creed is not with them, the Creed must be wrong. With the ordinary sect spirit, setting all logic at defiance in this transparently stupid style, the less discussion one may have the better. We write for the thoughtful only; and such surely do not need to be told, that this pretended setting up of the Bible against the

Creed is a hypocritical sham of the poorest order, and nothing more. The question, as one would suppose any child might be able to see, regards not at all the authority of the Bible, but wholly and exclusively the interpretation of the Bible, the true and proper construction of what is to be considered its actual sense. It is not, as is sometimes shamelessly pretended: Must the Bible yield to the Creed, or the Creed to the Bible? but something very different indeed, namely this: Must the sense of the Bible as outlined in the Creed be regarded as its true sense, or may some other construction, some radically different way of understanding it, be allowed at pleasure to set this outline aside, and to make it of no force as a standard of Christian faith? Whether it be pretended to supersede the authority of the symbol in this way by a new written formulary, or by an unwritten scheme of Christianity professedly drawn fresh from the Bible, signifies nothing; all comes to the same thing in the end. In either case, it is the confessionism of the Creed contradicted and opposed by another confessionism, another theory of the Gospel, cast in a different mould and bearing a different type; and the only point to be settled is, which should be allowed to prevail over the other and to carry with it the highest authority, as a key for opening the full and proper sense of God's word. That the opposing interest should in any case affect to be ruled by no confessionism whatever, and claim to be the direct voice of the Bible, would seem not to improve its position certainly, but to throw it rather into the worst possible form. A sect or party then, or it may be with just as much reason a single individual, is found setting up what after all can never be any thing better than a mere private opinion against the testimony of the general Church, spoken through ages; and gravely asking all mankind to be well assured that such private opinion is the veritable doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, which has a right, therefore, to be heard with implicit trust, in opposition if need be to all other professions of faith made since the world began. Simply to state the case, is to ex-

pose it. It is not easy to conceive of any pretension more outrageously absurd ; and yet, strange to say, the spirit of it meets us on all sides, forming, one may say, the reigning tone and temper of a very large part of our American Christianity at the present time.

Again we ask : Can any system of religion which thus sets up—not the Bible really—but its own construction of the Bible, in opposition to what is exhibited as being the true sense of the Bible in the Creed, in opposition to this form of sound words in which the Church has seen fit to express its apprehension of the fundamental truths of the Gospel from the beginning—can any such system of religion, we say, deserve to be acknowledged as evangelical and orthodox ?

We have a number of religious denominations in the modern Puritan world, which arrogate to themselves the title *Evangelical* as preëminently their own, for the very reason, as it would seem, that they agree in repudiating the churchly theory of Christianity presented in the Creed, as being in their mind contrary to the proper genius of the Gospel, and choose to substitute for this another and different theory altogether, extracted immediately, they pretend, from the Bible itself. However much they may differ among themselves, on other points, they are all happily of one and the same way of thinking here. They stand on the common ground of Puritanism as opposed to the old Catholic doctrine of the Church and the entire theology of the Apostles' Creed. Over against all this, they parade what they call the authority of the Bible, in other words, a general scheme of religion which they declare with great confidence to be the only true sense of the Bible ; and thus will have it, that this new rule of theirs shall be taken for the test of evangelical character the whole world over, so that whatever in any age or country is found not to agree with it, must for that very reason, be condemned, as contrary to true godliness and sound faith. Can any such pretension, we ask, be allowed to hold good ? Most certainly not ; unless we choose to turn all confessionalism into derision.

Here surely we have a right to join issue boldly with the whole system of unchurchly Puritanism, and to put it solemnly on its own apology and defence. Its points of difference within itself, are indeed of only minor significance; what it needs most of all is the vindication of its general or main cause, the position, namely, by which it stands arrayed as a whole against the primitive faith of the Christian world. Take it, for example, in the form of some one of its manifold religious "persuasions"; let us say, the wide spread numerically powerful sect of the Baptists. They reject infant baptism; a serious matter of controversy between them and other sects of like Puritanic mind; but this is not the beginning of their error, the deepest and most comprehensive form of their heterodox faith. To reach that, we must go back of all such heads of sectarian dispute, to what is in fact common ground for the disputing parties, their want of faith in the Church, their state of full opposition in this view to the Creed. The Baptists are heretical, because they are thus at variance with the foundation symbol of Christianity. Here, first of all, they are bound to give account of themselves before the tribunal of the Christian world. Other points, so far as they are concerned, mean nothing, are in truth mere impertinences and irrelevancies, till this root issue be fairly met and settled. As it is a matter of small moment what Unitarians may hold on other topics of theology, while they refuse to own the doctrine of the Trinity and the proper divinity of Christ; so is it also of little consequence what may be thought of the economy of the Church, at other points, its sacraments and forms of worship, its prerogatives and powers, by those who call in question, or at once deny, the very being of it, as it is made an article of faith in the Apostles' Creed. Why should breath be spent in discussing the question of infant baptism, where the whole conception of the Church giving it significance is quietly disowned as an antiquated superstition? Let the controversy fall back on this point, the true idea of the Church, as its proper beginning. The Baptists call themselves even

gelical and orthodox, because they follow, as they tell us, the rule of the Gospel, in distinction from every other rule. We charge them with heresy, and pronounce them unevangelical and unbiblical, because they follow in reality only their own arbitrary and partial interpretation of the Scriptures, and refuse to find in them the sense in which they have been read by the orthodox faith of the Church through all ages. They are in broad conflict with the original symbol of Christianity, requiring the world to receive instead of it their own spiritualistic glossary everywhere, as the only sure and sufficient medium for getting at the true sense of God's word. Shall we be expected to yield to any such barefaced arrogance as this? No. The Baptists are neither evangelical nor orthodox. A main constituent of the Christian faith, one whole side indeed of the mystery of godliness as it was held by the universal Church in the beginning, finds no place in their system of belief. Their religion is not in the Bible, because it agrees not with the original *regula fidei* set before us in the Creed.

And so with Puritanism in general. Its cause here, as we have seen, is throughout the same. In discarding the old doctrine of the Church, in making Christianity to be a full and complete fact on the outside of the Church, it sets aside really the mysteries of the Church altogether; and by doing so brings in actually what must be considered a different Gospel from that which is preached by the Apostles' Creed, and which was held by the whole Church in the beginning to be the true glorious Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ. Is this to be evangelical? Is this to be orthodox, and sound in the faith as it was once delivered to the saints? Let the representatives of unchurchly Puritanism, who are never weary of repeating their stale insipidities on the subject of the Church, look this accusation fairly in the face, and meet it with some manly and honest answer if they can. It is high time, indeed, that attention were fixed more than it has been upon what must be held to be, in this whole controversy with Puritanism, the grand first matter in debate. The defenders of the interest should

be required first of all to come to some positive explanation of their own posture toward the original faith of the Christian world, as we have it expressed in the Creed. Till this be done, it is idle to talk with them on other points. Where there are no common premises, there can be of course no common conclusions, no such conclusions at least in one and the same sense. To what can it amount to argue sacramental questions, points of ecclesiastical polity, Church topics of any sort, with men who have yet to learn, or who at any rate do not feel themselves bound to acknowledge, "what be the first principles of the oracles of God," as these were supposed to be settled in past ages by the old Catholic standard of the Christian faith? If we are to have any argument at all with such men, it should be made to fall back at once to the beginning. All that we can do properly, is to charge home upon them the practical heresy of their whole theological position. Let them set themselves right with the Creed, before they pretend to dogmatize in any other direction.

The doctrine of the Church, we have seen, is not in the Creed in any merely outward and mechanical way. It appears there as a necessary part of the general mystery of faith, being absolutely required, just where it comes into view, to carry forward the significance and power of the Christian salvation, from what goes before to what follows after; being nothing less in truth than the connecting link between the mission of the Holy Ghost, and the full course of grace subsequently in the experience of believers. In this view, the article could not be dropped from the system, nor transposed in it to any different place, without marring its organic completeness throughout; as on the other hand the article itself, so torn from its connections, could no longer retain its own proper meaning as an object of faith. So it is indeed with all the articles of the Creed. The symbol is not so much a number of separate acts of faith brought together in a common confession, as one single act rather compassing at once the whole range of the new

creation from its commencement to its close. It has to do with its successive points, not as disjointed notions merely, but as concrete forces belonging to the constitution of a common living whole. Its articles are bound together thus, with indissoluble connection, from beginning to end. To believe any one part of it in its own sense, is implicitly at least to believe every other part; for the truth of every part stands in its relations to the whole system in which it is comprehended, and if it be not apprehended in these relations it cannot be said to be apprehended and believed in its own proper sense at all. In this way it is, that the article of the Church in the Creed is conditioned by the sense of the formulary at other points; as these other points are conditioned also by it again in their turn. There can be no true faith in the resurrection and glorification of Christ, and none in the consequent sending of the Holy Ghost, where it is not felt necessary to follow out still farther the objective progress of the mystery, and say: "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church;" and so, on the other hand, there can be no true faith in the Church, where it is not perceived to be the necessary outbirth in this way of these glorious antecedents, leading on to it, and making room for it in the world. It is not any and every way of owning the Church that can be said to satisfy the requirement of the Creed; as it is not enough for it either to own in any and every way the mission of the Holy Ghost.

The whole Creed carries with it thus from beginning to end an import, which accords in full with what it makes the Church to be in the order of salvation; and its articles can be rightly uttered, therefore, only as they are taken in real correspondence with this view. In other words, the theology of the symbol is churchly throughout. Its positions all hold only in that order of grace which involves the conception of the Church as the necessary fruit of its presence in the world. Sundered from this order, they cease to be altogether the objects of faith they are made to be in the system, and become instead mere matters of speculation and opinion. Hence it is, that the difficulty of Pu-

ritanism with the Creed is not confined by any means to the article of the Church itself, but extends to its universal form and structure ; so that even when any of its propositions may seem to be readily received, it is still always with some want of entire complacency in the particular way in which they are here articulated and spoken. Left to itself, Puritanism would choose to utter the same truths always in a different manner and with a different tone. To its reigning habit of theological thought, the organization of the Creed must ever appear to be unnatural and defective. Its own construction of Christianity may embrace, to a certain extent, the same christological and soteriological positions and terms ; but they will be found to have not just the same meaning ; there is a difference always in their drift and scope. Puritanism may lay great stress on its orthodoxy, in owning the doctrine of the Trinity, the true and proper Divinity of Christ, and the Atonement wrought out by his death ; and yet see no necessity whatever for carrying out all this to the issue which is ascribed to it in the Creed. It may acknowledge the Remission of Sins and the Resurrection of the Dead ; and yet see no dependence of either one or the other mystery on the supernatural constitution of the Church. But this is not to hold these articles in the sense of the Creed. The confessional concord in such case is in outward sound only, and nothing more. The orthodoxy of the Creed moves, from its first article on to its last, in that method of faith which requires and implies in its proper place the presence of the Holy Catholic Church ; and no point belonging to it can be held answerably to its general and only true sense, except as it is held in this way. No Gnostic apprehension of Christ's person, no merely spiritualistic view of his work of redemption, can satisfy its demands even in part. All must be taken in the form of an actual history, completing itself in the Church, "which is his body," running its course here as an order of grace in distinction from the order of nature, on to the glorious resurrection of the last day. So with all the benefits of the Christian salvation. They

are, in the view of the Creed, fruits of the Spirit, which are to be found only in the Church, the home of the Spirit. The life everlasting proclaimed by the Creed is a mystery, that depends wholly on the process of the new creation in Christ, which is here exhibited as the object of the Christian faith; and in this way it has place only within the economy of the Church, and can be truly believed therefore only under such view. The remission of sins, in the same way, is regarded as holding in the Church, and not on the outside of it. Men may dream of its being elsewhere; may take it for something that is possible in the general relation of man to his Maker; may claim to be evangelical and spiritual, just because they conceive of it in this spiritualistic way, and make it independent of all sacramental forms and limitations. But no such notion of the remission of sins amounts to what the article means in the Creed. There it is a mystery conditioned by the more general mystery of the Church; it comes through the obedience of faith yielded to this heavenly constitution, and finds its proper symbol, its real signature and pledge, in the sacrament of introduction into the Church; which is for this reason also the sacrament of regeneration, serving to translate its subjects from the power of darkness into the kingdom of God's dear Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins. Hence the form given to the article in the Nicene Creed, "We confess one baptism for the remission of sins," adds nothing in fact to the sense of its shorter expression. To believe in the remission of sins at all in the sense of the old Christian faith, is to believe that it comes through baptism as the door of entrance into the Church.

As the Creed is constructed within itself, in the way now stated, on a theological scheme which is peculiarly its own, and which determines the true sense of it at every point, requiring all its articles to be understood in one manner only and not in another; so it is easy to see, how it must in this way also draw after it a corresponding con-

struction of all Christian doctrine beyond itself, imparting to it in like manner the power of its own principle and life. By its very conception, the formulary is archetypal and regulative for the whole world of Christian truth. It does not pretend to exhaust the necessary topics of divinity; it leaves room for a broad field of confessionalism beyond itself. But still, if it be indeed what it claims to be, a true scheme of what are to be considered the first principles of the oracles of God, it must necessarily rule the order and shape of all such additional belief throughout; in such way that no doctrine or article of faith shall deserve to be counted orthodox, except as it may stand in the bosom of the same scheme, growing forth from it, and carrying out the scope of it in a natural and regular way. All later confessionalism, to be genuine and valid, must have its genesis or birth from the Apostles' Creed, must refer itself to this as the real matrix of its growth and development. There must ever be a wide difference thus between a system of thought in which this order of faith is acknowledged and observed, and a system of thought in which it is disowned and disregarded; the theological system of the Creed and a theological system made to rest on any other basis; theology in the churchly and theology in the unchurchly form. A difference not confined to the immediate topics of the Creed itself, but extending through these to all topics; a difference not so much turning on single outward propositions, (though on this also to some extent,) as it is to be measured rather by the inward life of such propositions, the way in which they are understood, their spirit, their general purpose and aim. No Christian doctrine can be held under exactly the same form, within the system of the Creed, and on the outside of this system. Thus it is, that the authority of the symbol reaches out to all points of faith, and pervades with its presence the whole range of evangelical truth, making it necessary for every theological article to be held in full conformity with this fundamental rule, in order that it may have a right to be considered orthodox and true.

It is not enough, for example, to acknowledge the prophetic, priestly, and kingly offices of Christ, if they be set in no union with the true apprehension of his Mediatorial Person. It is not enough to maintain infant baptism, if we refuse to own at the same time the relation which the sacrament is made to bear in the Creed to the remission of sins. It is not enough to confess the inspiration of the Scriptures, if it be not with faith first in the Church; as though without such an apprehension of the Christian mystery as leads immediately on from Christ's glorification, and the sending of the Holy Ghost, to this great fact, it might be possible for any one, leaping over it as it were, and having no sense of its presence, to come in some other way altogether to firm faith in the Bible, as God's infallible word, and so through this afterwards to a full and complete scheme of evangelical religion. The Bible, great as it is in the scheme of Christianity, could not be substituted for the Church, in the place assigned to it as an article of faith, in the Creed, without violence to the whole order and sense of the Creed. In the view of this archetypal symbol, it comes rightly for all real faith, not before the Church, but after it. It is not the principle or beginning of Christianity, though it be truly its rule. It shines as a light from heaven *in the Church*, and was never intended to be a sufficient and final light for the world, as such, on the outside of the Church. Rationalism, Naturalism, Humanitarianism, of all shapes and types, taking it in such wrong view, however much stress they may affect to lay on its authority, never receive it truly as God's word, have no power to understand it, and in their use of it make it for themselves, as a matter of course, a mere *ignis fatuus*, all the world over, "blind leaders of the blind." It would be an appalling spectacle, only to see in fact what an amount of actual infidelity—disobedience to the faith—is sheltered in our time beneath the specious plea of honoring the Bible in this false way.

Take again the doctrine of justification by faith. It is not expressed in the Creed. This of itself makes nothing

against it; for the Creed does not pretend to set forth all Christian doctrines; it is an outline simply of what Christianity is in its primary, fundamental facts; leaving room for much to follow in the way of confessional superstructure. It is enough, if the doctrine before us be in the symbol by implication. But this at once serves, as we may readily see, to limit and define at the same time its proper conception. To be true at all, the doctrine must be held in union with the general system of the Creed, and not as something independent of it, and bearing to it only an outside relation. To conceive of justification by faith as a thing having no connection whatever with the objective world of grace brought into view by the Creed, a thing pertaining to the general idea of man's relations to God in the order of nature, instead of being bound in any way to the mysterious organization of the Church—the common error of the Puritanic mind—is to turn the doctrine into a fiction, which contradicts the symbol, and virtually sets aside its authority, bringing in indeed a new scheme of Christianity altogether. There can be no true faith, in the view of the Creed, which does not begin by owning and obeying the mystery of godliness proclaimed in its own articles; no true justification, which does not come from being set thus in real communication with the objective righteousness of Jesus Christ, as the power of a new creation actually present in the Church. No wonder, the theory which makes justification by faith to be a mere abstraction, and that also which resolves it into justification by fancy or feeling, find little or no satisfaction in the old Christian confessions. Their theology here, most assuredly, is not the theology of the Apostles' Creed.

What we have said, may be sufficient to show, how deep the distinction is between the churchly and the unchurchly schemes of theology, and how far in the end it is found to run. It regards not some points only, in the case of which there may be direct and formal opposition, but serves to qualify, in a very material way, the sense of all

points. No article, either of the Creed or of theology in general, can be just the same, for one who owns the old Catholic idea of the Church, and for one to whom that idea has come to seem an empty fiction. Doctrines appear under different relations, and so under different aspects, as apprehended from the one stand-point or from the other; and even where they may seem to have the same sound, are still felt some how to carry with them always a different signification and force.

Let any one compare, in this view, the theology of the old Church Fathers, with the theology of modern New England, in what is commonly regarded as its most orthodox form. How the two methods vary continually from one another, hardly ever presenting the same topics in the same way! The Trinity, the Incarnation, all Christ's offices and acts, the authority of the Scriptures, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, regeneration, justification, and sanctification, faith, hope, charity, the resurrection, and the life to come—all are made to have a meaning in the one case, which is not just what they are felt to mean in the other. The two schemes are not strung on the same key, and they sound accordingly no note in common. Each has its own christology, its own soteriology, its own eschatology; in one word, its own whole atmosphere of thought, and habit of faith, so sharply defined and strongly marked, that it is impossible to avoid some sense of embarrassment, some feeling of strangeness, in passing out of one into the other. For one brought up in the Puritan habit of religion, it requires a new education, to be able either to understand or appreciate properly the Christianity of the ancient Fathers; as on the other hand we may be very sure, that any one of these returning to the earth would need to undergo a full revolution of thought, before he could feel himself at all at home in the bosom of Puritanism, or find in it any aliment whatever for faith and piety. We have in the case, in fact, two Christianities, two radically different schemes of religion, two whole systems of divinity that never move in exactly the same line.

So much hinges on this great question of the Church, which to the view of many seems so far away from the true-central life of the Gospel. In comparison with it, as we have said before, the ordinary points of denominational controversy, the shibboleths that divide one unchurchly sect from another, are only of partial, superficial interest. Such sectarian confessionalism, with all its differences, holds notwithstanding for the most part in a common system or scheme of faith, and rests in substantially the same general conception of Christianity. To pass over from one branch of it to another involves no violent revolution. It is simply to go out of one compartment of a wide and spacious mansion into another. The mansion remains still the same. But the question : Church or no Church in the old Catholic sense, is of a widely different nature, having to do with the very consciousness of religion itself, and determining its universal order, method, and form. Its home is in the depths of Christianity, far down beneath the issues from which spring the ordinary divisions of denominations and sects.

In view of such a generic difference holding between the two systems, the churchly scheme of Christianity and the unchurchly, the theology of the Creed and its opposite—a difference which lies so deep and reaches so far—it becomes a matter of peculiar interest to determine precisely what its whole character signifies and means. In one case, as we have seen, the Church is taken to be an essential constituent of the mystery of godliness, while in the other it is considered an arrangement belonging to it only in an outward adventitious way. Here we get back to the last sense of the Church Question; which is found to be at the same time strangely implicated with the right construction of the Creed, conditioning in truth the way in which all its articles are to be understood. For not only does the Creed affirm the doctrine of the Church, making it a necessary part of Christianity, and so a necessary object of faith; but it throws the entire scheme of Christianity into

such a shape and form, from first to last, as imperatively requires the doctrine in this sense, and cannot be satisfied without it. The Creed is constructed throughout, both in its antecedent and consequent articles, on that view of Christianity which involves the idea of the Church in the form now stated, and makes it necessary for it to come into view just where it does in the onward flow of that good confession. This does not imply, however, that the Creed starts from the idea of the Church as its own proper principle. That which is the first question in regard to the doctrine of the Church itself, namely, what place is to be ascribed to it in the conception of Christianity, is not just the first question in regard to the theological system in which it is comprehended as a necessary article of faith. When we have said, therefore, that the Church is made in the Creed to be of the essence of Christianity, and that all the articles of the symbol are so framed as to shut faith up to this conclusion, and that it leads on thus to an entire theology of answerable form and complexion throughout—it remains still to ask: What then is that peculiarity of doctrine in the Creed, that distinguishing quality of faith, back of its doctrine of the Church, which calls this forth in its order, gives to it all its force, and imparts what we call a churchly character to the universal scheme of religion into which it enters as an organic part? What is the root or beginning of the broad difference, which reigns between the Catholic Christianity of the first ages and the Puritanic Christianity of modern times, between the theology which breathes the spirit of the Creed and the theology which breathes a different spirit, between the churchly construction of the Gospel and the unchurchly? It is not easy to conceive of a theological inquiry more interesting than this, or more worthy of being followed out with right study to a right answer.

Were we called upon to give in a word the distinguishing peculiarity of the Creed, in the view suggested by the inquiry, we should place it in the *historical* character it as-

signs to the Christian salvation, regarded as a supernatural process of grace, in opposition to every scheme which resolves it into a matter of mere speculative thought. Its doctrine of the Church falls back on its doctrine of Christ; and this is made to include, from first to last, the conception of a real union between the divine and the human, the life of God and the life of man, in the person of the Mediator, carrying along with it the work of redemption, as the process of a new creation in the bosom of the old, onward to the end of time.

In the Creed, as in the New Testament, Christianity has its last ground in the mystery of the Ever Blessed and Glorious Trinity; which is exhibited as an object for faith, however, not so much in the light of a doctrine, as in the light of a fact, opening the way for the revelation which God has been pleased to make of himself through the mystery of the Incarnation. This forms, accordingly, an act of self-manifestation on the part of God, by which he is to be regarded as coming into the world in a sense in which he had not been in it before, for the purpose of redeeming and saving men from their sins. The Word became flesh. That is the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ; and power to own and confess it, not as a dogma merely, but as a simple historical fact, is the beginning of all faith in the proper evangelical sense of the term. The beginning of all heresy, on the other hand, lies in the open or virtual denial of this great mystery. Hence St. John's memorable touch-stone for distinguishing true Christianity from that which is spurious and false. "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh," he tells us, "is of God; and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is that spirit of antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come; and even now already is it in the world." The spirit of antichrist, in this way, is the rationalistic temper of the natural mind, which substitutes for the mystery of the incarnation in its proper form a mere notional construction of Christ's person, in which, after all, no real

historical union of the divine nature with the human is allowed to have place; setting up thus in opposition to the true Christ a false shadowy image, a mere spiritualistic phantom, which is made to counterfeit his name and usurp his place. Over against all such rationalistic spiritualism, the Creed makes full earnest with the criterion of St. John. It takes up and carries out in its own simple, historical way, that notable confession of Peter: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God;" in reference to which our Saviour said: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven." The merit of Peter's faith stood in its power to break over the natural order of the world, so as to see and acknowledge in the person of Christ, there actually before him, the presence of a new and higher form of existence, joining the nature of God with the nature of man in a way transcending all common understanding and thought. Thou, Jesus of Nazareth, it could say—whom we know to be in all respects a real man like ourselves, and no spirit merely in human show—Thou, the Son of Mary, art at the same time the Son of the Most High God, and as such the Messiah, the true Saviour of the world. Such precisely is the confession, which forms the burden of the Apostles' Creed. Its theme may be said to be throughout, "Christ come in the flesh." In that fact, the objective mystery of godliness (1 Tim. 3: 16), it sees the whole fulness of salvation, the entire economy of redemption; and it lays itself out, accordingly, to set it forth in its necessary conditions and consequences, under a purely historical view, as the proper substance of Christianity, the one grand object of all true Christian faith. So apprehended, the Gospel is in no sense theoretical, but supremely practical. It is the presence of a supernatural fact in the world, confronting men under an outward form, carrying in itself objectively the powers of the world to come, and challenging actual submission to its claims in such view as the only way in which it is possible to be saved. Faith has to do in the case, first of all, not with

any doctrines which may be supposed to flow from the fact, but with the fact itself as a simple matter of history; the history being, however, at the same time supernatural, out of the whole ordinary course of things in the world, and requiring; therefore, a very different kind of belief from that which is needed to take up the facts of history in its common human form. It is a great thing—too great for the reach of mere natural thought—to believe truly that Christ has come in the flesh; that Jesus was no mere man attended by the extraordinary inspiration of the Almighty, according to the old Ebionitic view; and yet no mere shadow either, according to any of the old Gnostic theories; but that in him the Word became actually and enduringly incarnate for us men and for our salvation.

On this supernatural fact, the Creed fastens its whole attention, referring it to its necessary origin, and following it out steadily to its necessary results, all in the way of simple historical apprehension and conception. Christ, the Son of God, we are required to believe, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man. He suffered, died, descended into hades. But it was not possible that he should be held under the power of death. He rose again; he ascended on high, leading captivity captive, and having all power given unto him in heaven and in earth. All this served only to prepare the way for his kingdom in the world, through the mission of the Holy Ghost, his great ascension gift, and the constitution of the Church, which is declared by St. Paul to be his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all, and with which he has himself promised to be present always to the end of time. In the Church, accordingly, as distinguished from the natural constitution of the world, the new order of grace brought to pass by the victory of Christ over sin, death, and hell, runs its course from age to age, in the salvation of all true believers. "We confess one baptism for the remission of sins; we look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come."

The peculiarity of the old Christian Creeds, is their way of grasping and following out the historical realness of the mystery of the incarnation, so as to make full earnest with the objective, continually enduring character of the new order of life it has served to bring into the world. In this respect, it falls in with what appears to have been the reigning tone of the Apostolic preaching, as we are made acquainted with it in the Acts of the Apostles. The same peculiarity runs through all the theological literature of the Ancient Church, as it entered also into its universal life. The object of faith is made to be always Christ in the flesh, Christ coming into the world, working, dying, rising again, conquering, reigning, carrying forward his kingdom in the most real way to the end of time. The whole Gospel is regarded as being in this way a *mystery*; not in the sense of an unfathomable, incomprehensible doctrine merely, but in the light of a fact not resolvable into the ordinary constitution of the world, which has nevertheless at a certain time entered into it, from the depths of eternity, under the most actual form, serving to bring out the inmost purpose of God in reference to man; the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3: 16); the mystery hid from ages and generations, but now manifested to the saints (Col. 1: 26); the mystery which from the beginning of the world was hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ, to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord (Eph. 3: 9-11); the mystery of grace, which was given us by God's purpose in Christ Jesus before the world began, but is now "made manifest"—the purpose having passed into supernatural act—by the "appearing" of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel; which in such view is nothing more nor less than his own glorious advent into the world creating and bringing to pass what it serves thus to reveal (2 Tim. 1: 9-10). Such

an apprehension of the Gospel involves, and draws after it necessarily, the old Catholic idea of the Church, as it is presented to us in the Creed.

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All heresy, so far as Christianity is concerned, starts in the form of unbelieving opposition to this mystery, refusing to see and acknowledge in Christ the objective, abiding presence of the new creation—the world of grace in full parallel with the world of nature—under its own proper historical character and form. Wherever it may end, it is sure to begin always, consciously or unconsciously, in a wrong view of the Incarnation. It does not lay hold of the fact, with any just sense of its terms and conditions, so as to be borne along by the outward authority of it in its own direction—the only true conception of faith; but turns it rather into a mere matter of speculative contemplation, by which it comes to be at last nothing more in truth than a thought or notion in the mind itself, substituted for the fact it pretends to believe. The mind thus does not pass over really into the objective sphere of the christological revelation, as it is in its own nature, but remains rationalistically bound all the time to its simply natural order of existence, fetching the mystery down to this, as it were, instead of rising above it by its means. The result is such a separation of the natural from the supernatural in Christ, and so in Christianity throughout, as will not allow them to come to any organic, abiding, and truly historical union whatever. Broad exemplifications of this false way of thinking we have in the strange dreamings of the old Gnostics, and afterwards again in the more subtle errors of Nestorius and Eutyches, by the coming round in opposite directions to the same end—such a sublimation of Christ's divinity, as left no room for the conception of his true and proper humanity in one and the same person, and served thus to transfer the entire mystery from the region of real outward history to the region of unreal inward imagination and fancy. These ancient heresies have been long since surmounted and condemned by the orthodox theology of

the Church. But the spirit that gave birth to them, which is nothing else than the natural indisposition of the human mind to confess that "Christ is come in the flesh," still lives, we may be sure, and will continue to do so, and to make itself felt as a "false spirit," to the end of time. It is a spirit too, which may be readily recognized always, by being brought into comparison with what we have just found to be the true spirit of Christianity as it breathes in the Creed. The distinguishing peculiarity of the Creed is its sense of the actual, the objective, the outwardly historical, in the mystery of the Word made flesh, the regard it has throughout to the enduring realness of the new creation brought to pass in the world by Christ Jesus. Any system then which refuses to conform inwardly to this rule of faith, must be distinguished in the nature of the case by the opposite principle, a tendency, namely, to look away from the objective realness of the new creation in Christ, and to substitute for this a mere theoretical apprehension, by which the mystery is lifted out of its own necessary historical conditions, and made to resolve itself at last, more or less, into a scheme of doctrinal abstractions.

In this way we reach what must be considered the fundamental difference, between the churchly and the unchurchly schemes of Christianity, the Catholic order of faith and the Puritanic, the theology of the Creed and all theology besides.

Here it is then, that the full theological significance of the doctrine of the Church comes finally into view. Entering as it does organically into the construction of the Creed, it becomes necessarily a test or criterion by which to determine the quality of all Christian belief, as either corresponding or not corresponding with the proper sense of this symbol. The idea of the Church presented in the Creed is inseparably joined with its general conception of the historical nature of Christianity; proceeds with necessary development, we may say, from its way of looking at Christ's person and work. Not to see the force of the ide

then, and to have no sense of its necessity, is to stand as a matter of course not in this habit or method of faith at all, but in some other form of belief altogether; which, in such case, cannot fail to labor under the general christological defect, that is found to characterise necessarily any theological system bearing a different type from the Creed. An unchurchly spirit, in other words, is in reference to Christianity always to a greater or less extent, a Gnostic spirit, tending to sublimate the true historical character of the Gospel into a spiritualistic abstraction, and causing it to become thus a doctrine or theory rather than the presence of a perpetual fact, a subject of opinion rather than an object of faith. The charge, we are aware, is serious; but it is not made lightly or at random; the truth of it is easily established, we think, both from the nature of the case itself, properly understood, and from actual observation.

It matters not, that those who are under the power of this spirit may profess, and believe themselves really to hold, sound christological views according to the standard of the Creed, rejecting and condemning the heresies which struck at the true constitution of Christ's person in the first Christian ages. The soul of an error is not so much bound to its first outward forms, that it must necessarily die and pass away when these come to an end. It may migrate into new bodies, and thus walk the earth as before. Particularly must this be the case with the error now before us, which St. John declares to be the root or salient point of all contradiction to the great mystery of godliness revealed in Christ, and which cannot fail in such view, therefore, to make itself felt as long as this contradiction shall last, counterfeiting the mystery, and setting up its own mock image, (the "mystery of iniquity" shall we call it?), in its room and place. Conquered in one form, it may be expected to appear still again in some other form, more refined it may be and plausible, but involving always in the end the same sense. It is not enough to confess that Christ has come in the flesh, in the terms of the Creed—"conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin

Mary"—if the confession break down afterwards with any part of what necessarily follows from this fact, as we have it carried out in the same rule of faith. For the objective realness of any fact includes its necessary connections, its historical antecedents and consequents, no less than the naked fact itself; and to be believed at all truly—to be apprehended as a reality and not as a mere dream or fancy—it must be so believed that these shall be owned and acknowledged at the same time. To deny the supernatural birth of Christ on the one hand, or to call in question the truth of his resurrection on the other, would be to turn the whole mystery of the Incarnation into a myth, though it were pretended never so strongly in the same breath to accept it as true. And so with the points that follow in the Creed; if indeed they *do* follow in the actual order of the mystery itself, as they are made to stand forth consecutively here in the order of faith. They must be believed, in order that there may be any full historical faith in the advent of Jesus Christ into the world; and not to believe them, is virtually to make such faith null, by turning its object into a Gnostic fiction, whatever pains may be taken to use at the same time, as far as they go, the old orthodox terms in reference to Christ's person. In the system of the Creed, the article of the Church is made to stand prominent among these points; and the assumption is, of course, that the coming of Christ in the flesh, regarded in its proper historical view, leads on to this in the way of necessary consequence, just as really as it draws after it his glorification at the right of God and the mission of the Holy Ghost. Not to have faith in the Church then—not to have any sense of its historical necessity in the general mystery of Christianity—as it implies in the first place a different conception of the Gospel from that which is presented in the Creed, involves also, in the second place, necessarily, a want of harmony to the same extent with what we have seen to be the distinguishing peculiarity of this old rule of faith, the stress, namely, which it lays throughout on the historical realness of the Incarnation. As the christology

of the Creed, the way in which it looks at Christ's person and confesses his coming in the flesh, involves in the end the idea of the Church, it follows, as a matter of course, that those who can feel their faith complete, their religious system round and full, without it, must have the mystery of the Incarnation before their minds in some different way. From the nature of the case thus the unchurchly spirit, not falling in fully with the sound christological sense of the Creed, is found to carry with it always some portion of the leaven of Gnosticism.

It requires only small observation, to verify this conclusion in actual life. The unchurchly spirit prevails largely in the religious world at the present time, under all imaginable varieties of form; and it is easy enough to see, that just in proportion to its power, it is everywhere a spirit unfavorable to a sound and just apprehension of the mystery of the Incarnation, regarded in the historical light of the Creed. Its tendency is universally towards such a spiritualism here, as goes finally to remand the mystery from the world of fact into the world of fancy, causing it to dissolve thus into thin air. In one direction, this amounts in fact to an open giving up of the higher nature of Christ altogether, as among Socinians and Unitarians; in which case, it is especially worthy of notice, how completely the idea of the Church is made to perish at the same time. Infidelity in such form may pretend still to honor Christianity, and to make high account of the Bible; but it can never be churchly. There is an inward contradiction plainly, between its rationalistic doctrine of Christ and the old Catholic doctrine of the Church. The first does not lead over in any way to the last, (as in the Creed) but excludes it; showing that there is a natural affinity thus between the want of faith in the Church and the want of faith in Christ. But the spiritualism which is opposed to a just view of Christ's person may take another form; not denying his higher nature, but on the contrary so exalting this in thought as to sink out of sight more or less the historical verity of his lower nature; and it is in this character more

particularly, that it claims attention and observation, as going hand in hand with the unchurchly spirit in the modern religious world.

Of this we have a striking example in the history of the Quakers. Their Christianity was from the start unchurchly in the lowest degree—owning no dependence on outward ministrations, outward sacraments, outward ordinances and arrangements of any kind. It repudiated in fact the universal conception of the Church in the old Catholic sense; while it professed, notwithstanding, the highest veneration for Christ, and affected to make more of his supernatural presence and power than the whole Christian world besides. But it is easy enough now to see, that this pretension was vain; and that what the system honored in such view was not so much the real historical Christ of the Gospel, as a Gnostic fiction rather made to bear his name. With the progress of time, the error has worked itself out more and more into view—its sublimated conception of Christ resolving itself into the “inward light” of mere natural reason—until it seems ready now at last to fall over into the arms of open infidelity.

In the case of other unchurchly sects, the want of a sound historical sense of the mystery of the Incarnation, is no less certain, although it may not be so immediately and broadly apparent. One general evidence of it is found in the simple fact itself, before noticed, that they have so little complacency in the Creed; as feeling it to be in some way opposed to their own habit of thought, not merely in its doctrine of the Church, but in its whole theological construction. The symbol has for them a certain peculiarity throughout, which is felt to be mysteriously interwoven with the presence of this article in its place, and for this reason it is not to their taste. But what this peculiarity is we have now seen. It is nothing more nor less than the objective, historical light in which the fact of Christ's coming in the flesh is made to stand in this ancient rule of faith, imparting a corresponding character to its whole conception of Christianity. Out of this way of believing

in the Incarnation, grows forth its doctrine of the Church, and also its general churchly bearing and tone. Want of sympathy thus with the ecclesiastical spirit of the Creed, is in truth want of sympathy at last with its christological spirit. In having no taste for the formulary then, those unchurchly sects show themselves in full proportion to their unchurchliness, estranged from its historical apprehension of the Christian mystery, and so under the power of a faith which must ever be, as differing from this, more or less Gnostically spiritualistic in its character. This is the true secret at bottom of their silent prejudice against the Creed, as it serves to explain also the true nature of their bad understanding generally with the Christianity of the first ages.

Still farther practical proof, ample and full, of the charge here preferred against the unchurchly spirit, as it reigns among Puritanic sects of the better class, is to be found in the prevailing character of their entire theology and religious life. The Church system of the Creed, we have already seen, not only rules the sense of its own articles throughout, but reaches through these to all Christian doctrine and practice, producing a style of Christianity which is very different from all that may exist under any other form. The principle of this difference, it now appears, is not just the doctrine of the Church itself in the form in which it is here made to be a necessary part of the Christian faith, but the Christology which lies behind it—the peculiar way in which the coming of Christ in the flesh is here apprehended and confessed. This it is—this historical apprehension of the great fact of the Incarnation in distinction from all Gnostic spiritualism—that calls out the article of the Church, among other mysteries, in its place, and communicates a churchly spirit at the same time to the whole symbol, and to the universal religious system also into which the symbol naturally runs. It follows, therefore, that all religious thinking which is not ruled by this spirit must stand, so far as that is the case, in a view of the Incarnation, which fails to make full earnest with the objective historical realness of the fact in the way of

the Creed; the result of which must be a certain tinge of Gnosticism, extending in the end to its whole scheme of faith. The peculiar genius of the unchurchly system of Christianity in this way, as distinguished from the theological spirit of the Creed, will be found on examination to penetrate every part of its doctrinal and practical life. Any such examination, however, would amount to a comparison of the system in its details with the opposite form of Christianity, a comparative view of the Catholic and Puritanic schemes of religion in particulars, such as we have no mind to enter upon at the present time.

Lancaster, Pa.

J. W. N.

ART. IV.—BAPTISM.

A Disputation concerning Baptism, by ANTHONY WALEUS, Doctor and Professor of Theology in the University of Leyden, A. D., 1724.

CIRCUMCISION was unquestionably deemed of immense importance—so much so, that the LORD sought to slay even Moses because he had neglected that rite with regard to his son, (Ex. 4: 24).

And can we suppose that Baptism may now be neglected with impunity by a Christian parent? It certainly claims at his hands the greatest regard.

In the early days of the Reformation, it was highly thought of—a result of the intelligent and correct views of it, that were then entertained and advocated, as may be seen in the subjoined specimen, which the reader is confidently assured, will amply repay perusal.

Lancaster, Pa.

I. S. D.

DISPUTATION CONCERNING BAPTISM, BY PROFESSOR WALÆUS, OF
LEYDEN.

Those things having been explained that go to constitute the common nature of sacraments, it remains that we sub-join some things, as much as the manner of our institution requires, that pertain to both the sacraments of the New Testament.

Of these sacraments Baptism is the first, which, on that account, is called the sacrament of our regeneration and of our initiation into the Church; whence also the doctrine of baptism (Heb. 5: 2) is reckoned among the first principles of Christianity after repentance and faith, and the whole practice of the Apostles, shows baptism always to have been used with the introduction itself into the external Church through the profession of faith and repentance, for a sign of the same thing.

To proceed, therefore to its explication, βαπτω and βαπτίζω whence βαπτισμος, properly signify to tinge and wash, of which signification Luke 11: 38, is a manifest example; and thence, also the Pharasaic washings of cups, brazen vessels and tables, are called baptisms, (Mark 7: 4,) and the ceremonial washings of the Old Testament (Heb. 9: 10). Indeed that word is wont to be taken metaphorically for a plentiful effusion of spiritual gifts or a vehement immission of sad circumstances and griefs.

The distinction, taken from Tertullian himself, hence arose between the baptism of the flood or of water (from Matth. 3: 11), of fire or the Spirit (from Acts 1: 5), and of blood and martyrdom (from Mark 10: 38). To these, others add the baptism of light or doctrine (from Acts 18: 25), because the preaching of the word pours light upon the understanding of man and lustrates and illustrates his mind with its own light.

To us, however, it properly belongs to treat of the baptism of the flood or of water. That it may be compendiously and orderly done, let us treat, 1) Of its efficient cause. 2) Of its matter and form. 3) Of the end and effects; and in fine, of its subject, together with certain adjuncts.

The principal *efficient cause*, or the institutor of this sacrament, is God himself, as is manifest (from Matth. 21 : 25), where the baptism administered by John, is said to be from heaven and not from men ; and the Baptist himself testifies (John 1 : 33) the same to be God who sent him, that he might baptize with water, who said to him, on whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining, he it is who baptizes with the Holy Ghost.

We hence gather that that formula of baptism which Christ presented to his disciples (Matth. 28 and Mark 16) did not contain the first institution of baptism, but its extension to all nations and more strict mode of administration.

For we have concluded, with the Reformed Churches, that the baptism begun by John and continued by the Apostles from the command of Christ is altogether the same, although some variety may be observed in certain circumstances.

Variety can be observed in it, because that strict form in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is not narrated as having been observed, if you consider *το ρητον*, (just what is said), although no doubt can exist but that John sealed that doctrine with his baptism, which unfolded the same divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and more distinctly the office of Christ, *θεωδρωπον*, (Godman), as is manifest from Matth. 3, likewise John 1 and 3, where a summary of his discourses is contained.

And in the next place, because John commanded the person about to be baptized to believe in Christ, who was about to come and complete the work of our redemption (Acts 19 : 4), whereas we baptize in him, who died that we might die with him to sin, and rose again that he might raise us up with him to a new life—as Paul explains it, (Rom. 6 : 2, and thenceforth).

In all other respects, the same benefits of Christ were sealed in each ; for, as the baptism of John was the baptism of repentance and of the remission of sins, (Mark 1 : 4, Acts 19 : 4,) so also, our baptism signs the remission of

sins and the gift of regeneration, as will hereafter at greater length be proved.

The *ministering cause* of baptism is the servant or pastor alone of the church, as all the examples which exist in the whole New Testament evidently evince, and the very command of Christ (Matth. 28 : 19), *Teach all nations, baptizing them, &c.* For as the seals of princes are not wont to be appended to edicts except by those who have been prepared for that purpose by public authority, so no one can lawfully confirm the publicly announced doctrine of the Gospel of God unless he has been called by a special calling and prepared for these things. Hence they are called the heralds of God, and ambassadors and servants of Christ, also, peculiarly, stewards of the mysteries of God. (1 Cor. 4 : 1, and 2 Cor. 5 : 20.)

We, therefore, acknowledge no necessity so great that private persons, whether men or women, can in this sacrament of baptism assume to themselves that which Pontificians themselves and Lutherans, in no case of necessity, permit in the sacrament of the Supper, since no necessity ought to dispense against the institution of Christ. But God himself alone is wont and able to supply the defect of ordinary instruments ; either by substituting other extraordinary instruments, as some judge to have been done, in the example of Philip (Acts 8) and Ananias (Acts 22) ; or by claiming to himself the whole internal action without instruments, as, in those who died uncircumcised before the eighth day, also in the robber crucified along with Christ: and, opponents acknowledge it to be done in all the adult faithful, who, hindered by some unblameable necessity are not able to procure external baptism except by desire.

Moreover, although all members of the orthodox Church should labor by every mode not to seek baptism for themselves or their children, except by the Pastors of the orthodox Church, lest they should seem to have communion with heresy and with the unrighteous works of darkness, nevertheless, if any have been baptized by heretics who

use the whole form of baptism and do not directly overturn the very fundamental dogmas of baptism, we deny that their baptism should be reiterated by orthodox pastors. But, of others who directly deny these, or change the form of baptism, the ratio is different, (*alia est ratio*), as was adjudicated in the Nicene Synod concerning the Paulianists, for in this case true baptism is not repeated, but, that which is true and genuine in the Church of Christ is substituted in the place of what is false and null, conferred by that which is not a Church.

The *essence* of baptism consists in its legitimate *matter* and *form*. But since the matter is either external and visible, which is wont to be called the sign, or, internal and invisible, which is said to be the thing signified—we must treat a little of each.

The *external matter* or *sign* here, as in all sacraments, is twofold, to wit, that which is substantial and that which is ritual. The substantial, by the consent of all, is water, as is to be seen (from Matth. 3: 6, Acts 10: 47); and hence those things are plainly superstitious and to be classed among *εθεροθρησκειας* (feats of will worship) which are adjoined to this matter by Pontificians, such as salt and oil—which from a *παρομοια* (ridiculous imitation) of Jewish sacrifices, have been transferred hither; also spit, tapers, (*cerei*) and like things, which were in common (*mutuo*) taken from the miracles of Christ, or the rite of the primitive Church that was wont to assemble in vaults (*cryptis*) or by night: because, nothing may be added to or taken from the commandments of God, (Deu. 12: 32); and, in vain is he worshipped by the commandments of men. (Matth. 15: 9.)

The numerous questions, moreover, which are here wont to be agitated by scholastics, are foolish: whether it is lawful to use for baptism any other than common water, such as lye, urine, boiled waters or distillations, also wine, vinegar, fine gravel too, or sand; for as many things are rashly defined by them here from the hypothesis of the absolute necessity of baptism, so we read that no water except that which is common was consecrated and

used for this sacrament by Christ and the Apostles—and, accordingly, since they want command and promise, they cannot be used from faith (*ex fide*)—and so we see both John to have preached at Ænon because much water was there, (John 3: 23) and Philip not to have baptized the Æthiopian already believing, before they had come to a place where was water (Acts 8: 36); and truly since nothing is more common than water, so that it has even passed into a proverb, cases of this kind (necessity) can very seldom arise.

The *ritual sign*, or that which is ceremonial in this sacrament is baptizing or washing in the name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as expressly commanded (Matth. 28, Mark 16); whence it is called the *washing of water by the word*, (Eph. 5: 26), and the *washing of regeneration*, (Titus 3: 5), and the *putting away of the filth of the flesh*, by the Apostle Peter, by a metonymy of the effect, (1 Peter 3: 21).

Whether baptism should be administered by a single or trinal mersion, we always accounted a matter of indifference in the Christian Church, since no express command exists of that, as also whether immersion even, or aspersion indeed be used; since no express command of it exists, and examples of aspersion can be found in the Scriptures no less than those of immersion; for as Christ (Matth. 3) went into the water and came up out of it—also the Æthiopian (Acts 8), so many thousands are said to have been baptized in one day in the city of Jerusalem (Acts 2), also many in private houses (Acts 16 and 18, 1 Cor. 1: 16), where an entrance of this kind into the waters could scarcely be—which rite baptism in the cloud and in the sea also favors, of which Paul treats (1 Cor. 10), and the word *παντισμῶν*, that is, of aspersion which is used of the blood of Christ for the abolition of our sins, (Heb. 9: 14).

And here, therefore the additaments of Pontificians are superstitious, to wit, the figuration of crosses and the use of exorcisms, since there are no vestiges of them in sacred Scripture, and each is taken from a depraved imitation of the ancient Christians who were conversant with the Gentiles: for, as the Gentiles, when they were converted in this

manner, renounced Satan and the worship of idols, so also they used the figures of crosses, to show that they thenceforth gloried in the cross alone of Christ, which, although it can perhaps be excused in them on account of ecclesiastical usage in the beginning, ought not to be retained, in certain Reformed Churches, without any benefit or fruit.

The internal matter, or the thing signified in this sacrament, is also twofold, either answering to the external substantial sign, or answering to the external ritual sign.

Our purgation from sins through the blood and Spirit of Jesus Christ, answer conjointly to each external sign. For as the blood of Christ washes us from our sins (Apoc. 1: 5), since by the power and merit of the death of Christ, we are freed from our sins, so also the Spirit of Christ cleanses us from our sins, since he applies to us the merit of the death of Christ and his own efficiency delivers us from the kingdom of sin; for these two benefits of Christ are conjoined by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 6: 2), *but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God*, whence also (Eph. 5: 26), the Apostle says, *Christ gave himself for the Church that he might cleanse it with the washing of water by the word*; and (Titus 3: 5), we are said to be *saved by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour*.

The form of baptism, wholly (*ολως*) considered, consists in that sacramental union which exists betwixt the sign and the thing signified; for although its own form, both of the sign and the thing signified too, is peculiar, as is manifest from the foregoing (*antecedentibus*), nevertheless this single (*singularis*) form of the parts puts on the ratio, (*rationem*), as they say, of the matter signified, when it relates to the whole—as is wont to be done in integral parts.

This sacramental union of the sign with the thing signified is not a real and subjective conjunction, as some stream, but only *σχετικη*, or relative, consisting in that mutual respect, by which the sign puts and seals the thing signified to him who believes, and the thing signified, by the prin-

principal cause, is furnished and offered under the condition of faith and repentance.

For, neither is the blood really or corporally in the water of baptism, nor does the Spirit of Christ, although by his nature he is every where present, subjectively inhere in the same, nor is cleansing from sins effectively accomplished by the external washing of water, since that is purely a divine virtue, of which no creature by itself is capable; but, Christ himself, by the efficiency of his Spirit, unites us the more with himself and communicates to us his benefits acquired by virtue of his death, as he is wont to do that by his simple word: indeed, by so much the more efficaciously he does that in the legitimate use of this sacrament, by how much the more singularly, and in truth through two senses, to wit, hearing and seeing, the things signified here are proposed: and accordingly both our faith is the more strongly exalted and rendered active, and also it hence comes that external baptism is perspicuously distinguished by Scripture from that which is internal in this operation—and the administering cause from the principal, as can be seen (Matth. 3: 11, and 1 Peter 3: 21, &c.)

Foremost of all, therefore, we reject the opinion of Pontificians, who would have these external signs confer grace, *ex opera operato*, as they speak, only the bar (obex) of mortal sin may not be placed in the way, a restriction that is foolishly placed by their hypothesis, since even infants before they were regenerated, were all obnoxious to mortal sin, and adults not yet renewed, are as yet, necessarily, under the kingdom of sin—unless they say, either that original sin, or the kingdom of sin, in man, is not mortal—contrary to their own principles, and to Scripture, which testifies that a man who has not been born again cannot see the kingdom of God, (John 3). And, in the next place, the absurdity of this opinion is hence manifest since Scripture has opened to us no way of saving grace or of communion with Christ, except through faith. *For the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth*, (Rom. 1: 16), and Christ dwells by faith in our hearts,

(Eph. 3: 17). Nay, *without faith it is impossible to please God*, (Heb. 11: 6).

We reject also the opinion of certain Ubiquitarians who bind the regenerating efficacy of the Holy Spirit so to the external water that either it is in the water itself, or at least cannot inchoate regeneration except in the very act of baptism: for this conflicts with all places of Scripture in which faith and repentance and, accordingly, both the beginning and the seed of regeneration in the persons to be baptized are previously required: for the efficient cause cannot be posterior to its effect.

Nor does the exception of some among them avail any thing in which they so distinguish the baptism of adults from the baptism of infants that they concede the baptism of adults to be the sign and seal of regeneration received, but maintain the baptism of infants to be the instrument of the regeneration that is to be begun. For besides that no foundation in all Scripture for that difference appears, which recognizes baptism of but one kind—these places also themselves (Rom. 6, Gal. 3, Eph. 5, Tit. 3, &c.), which they adduce for their opinion, treat properly and immediately of those who were already adult and who had been baptized at an age certainly adult, as that is manifest from these very places.

The *efficacy* of baptism we therefore do not bind to that moment in which the body is washed (tingitur) with external water, but in all who are to be baptized we pre-require with Scripture faith and repentance—at least in the judgment of charity—and that, as well in federated infants in whom we contend the seed and spirit of faith must be placed by virtue of the divine benediction and the evangelical covenant, as in adults in whom an actual profession of faith and repentance is necessary. And, then, as seed cast into the earth does not always in the same moment receive increase, but when rain and heat from heaven supervene, so, neither is the word nor the sign of the sacrament always efficacious at the first moment of itself, but at that time at length when the benediction of the Holy Spirit comes.

Many baptized in infancy demonstrate that, since they nevertheless live wickedly for a time, likewise many adult hypocrites, who sometimes long afterward at length seriously repent. Augustine, indeed, concerning the baptism of heretics universally pronounces: "Although with heretics and schismatics there is the same baptism of Christ, nevertheless it does not there operate the remission of sins because of the vileness of discord and the wickedness of dissension, but the same baptism then begins to avail for the acquittal of sins when they come to the peace of the Church—not that that baptism is disapproved of as alien or other, or, that another is given, but that the same itself which without, on account of discord was operating death, within, on account of peace operates salvation." That in some truly, as in Simon Magnus, and other reprobates, it never has this effect, we think should be referred to the judgments of God, hiddenly just and justly hidden; because, not the sons of the flesh, but the sons of promise, are reckoned in the seed (Rom. 9); for although they who are passed by are not worthy, the remnant, nevertheless, in themselves are not worthy that in them the work of regeneration should be begun and perfected.

When, therefore, we say that the proper efficacy of baptism consists in sealing, we signify two things: In the first place, the greater certainty of the promised grace, and of that which is confessed, or which is to be confessed by the principal cause: In the second place, the confirmation and increment of the same. Since, however, that promise is not absolute, but conjoined with the condition of faith and repentance, it follows that the grace is not sealed except to those who believe and repent, and accordingly, also, not unworthily using the signs, as the Apostle speaks, (1 Cor. 11: 29).

In this respect we truly concede that the sacrament, as well as the other also, is even exhibited of the thing promised, because, in the legitimate and worthy use of this sacrament, these things which are promised are not only offered by the Holy Spirit to the faithful, but are even them-

selves exhibited and confessed, since God is veracious in the obsignation of his promises, and our sacraments are not appendages of the letter which kills, but of the Spirit who vivifies.

The uses, moreover, and effects of this sacrament are many and very great: for as many of us as have been baptized have put on Christ, (Gal. 3: 27); we are baptized for the remission and washing away of sins, (Acts 2: 38 and 22: 16): It is the washing of regeneration, and the answer of a good conscience by the resurrection of Christ, (Tit. 3, and 1 Pet. 3): By it the old man is crucified and buried, and the new man is made alive, (Rom. 6: 3, 4, 5, 6): and, finally adoption itself is ascribed to it, and salvation, (Mark 15: 16, and elsewhere).

Besides these primary uses, there are also others which are secondary, to wit, external insertion into a particular visible Church, (Acts 2: 41): Conjunction of the members of Christ among themselves and in one body (1 Cor. 12: 12): and, from these, the consequent signification of our profession, and our distinction and dissociation from all the other assemblies of the unbelieving.

Nor truly are these uses and effects of baptism to be restricted to the remission and washing away of sins committed before baptism, or to reception into grace which at first is promised to the believing, as Pontificians desire who, for the deletion of mortal sins, as themselves speak, committed after baptism, have excogitated another sacrament, to wit, that of sacerdotal penitence and absolution, called by them the second plank (tabula), by which, first grace having been lost, it is necessary we should escape afresh from shipwreck.

For although we willingly confess that sins committed even after baptism are not otherwise remitted than to those who repent and believe, just as those which had been committed before baptism, we nevertheless deny that on that account there is need of some new sacrament for the reparation of this benefit since, in all the New Testament, sacred scripture has known no other sacrament of penitence and the remission of sins save that of baptism.

But, as themselves confess, that ordinary penitence and Dominical praying, along with the remembrance of baptism, suffices for daily or venial sins ; so, we assert that extraordinary excitation of penitence and faith, with reference to that covenant which at first was sealed to us by baptism, suffices even in sins extraordinary and more aggressive : even as, if a wife has violated the faith of wedlock, to reconcile the husband to the wife, there is no need of a new marriage or new pledges of matrimony, but a serious repentance of the deed, along with confirmation of the old union, suffices.

This perpetual efficacy of baptism, not only the nature of the new covenant ratified by baptism attests to us, as also the perpetuity which is described to us (Isaiah 54 : 10, Heb. 8 : 12, and *passim* elsewhere), but likewise the example of circumcision by which, if you consider the substance, the same covenant was confirmed : and yet at this time the penitence of the remission of sins, subsequently occurring, as Pontificians also confess, was not a sacrament ; but only the one seal of circumcision sufficed to seal to the penitent perpetual righteousness of faith and circumcision of heart.

The frequent custom of sacred Scripture testifies to this same thing ; since from the use and remembrance of baptism it takes arguments by which those who have already been baptized as to the absolution of the old man and his lusts afterward rising up again and showing themselves (*sese prodentium*), and as to the perpetual vivification of the new man, as you can see (Rom. 6 : 2 ; 1 Cor. 12 : 12 ; Gal. 3 : 27 ; Eph. 5 : 26, 27 ; Col. 2 : 12, &c.) ; so that, not only is the beginning of salvation referred to baptism, but even salvation itself and eternal life, (Mark 16 : 16, Peter 3 : 21, and elsewhere).

Nay, it is truly absurd and impious to propose to a man already faithful and baptized any other satisfaction, or any other than the merit of Christ for the remission of any sin, or any other propitiation or reconciliation to God, than through that blood which cleanses us from all our sins (John 1 : 7), of which blood that fictitious penitence of Pon-

tificians is not the sacrament, but baptism—as has been before demonstrated.

Having finished these things which were briefly to be spoken, concerning the causes and effects of this sacrament, it remains that we pass to its subject, and adjuncts, a few of which should be expounded.

That the receiving subject of baptism is man is patent from Christ's command (Matth. 28: 19). Go teach all nations, baptizing them, &c.—whence also the more learned Pontificians are wont to excuse rather than defend the baptism of bells (*campanarum*), which we, however, assert to be a pure profanation of Christian baptism.

Moreover, when we say man, we understand the living, not the dead, contrary to the Cerinthians, who even baptized the dead—abusing that place of the Apostle (1 Cor. 15: 29), *Else what shall they do who are baptized for the dead?*; but it is far otherwise to be baptized for the dead than to baptize the dead: for they can be said to be baptized for the dead who are baptized to the mortification of the flesh or even to that lot in which, subjected to the opprobrium and persecution of the world, they bear about, as the Apostle speaks (2 Cor. 4: 10), in the body, the dying, *νεκρωσιν*, the mortification of the Lord Jesus.

Nor yet are all men who live in the world susceptible (*capaces*) of baptism, but they only who can be esteemed by us as belonging to the covenant, as being heirs of the New Testament, of which this sacrament is the sign and pledge.

Such, in the first place, are all adults, and they alone who profess faith in Christ and true repentance, of any people, condition or sex; because in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female, as is evident from the command of Christ (Matth. 28: 19). *Whosoever believeth and is baptized shall be saved*; also (Acts 2: 28). *Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, &c.*

But if any one, though having professed faith, lives improperly, he is not to be initiated by baptism; because bap-

tism is not only the sacrament of faith, but also of repentance; as also, neither is he, who may desire to favor or defend, along with the profession of faith in Christ and of penitence, errors or heresies contrary to the foundation of true faith: because repentance not only is from turpitude of life to sanctity of life, but also from errors to the acknowledging of the truth, as the Apostle speaks (2 Tim. 2: 25). Yea, truly, it is so much wanting, that heretics or the favorers of such errors shall be admitted to baptism, that by the command of the Apostle (Rom. 16: 17, and elsewhere), they are to be avoided by the faithful and debarred from the communion of the Church.

Such, in the second place, we esteem infants who have been born of faithful and federal parents, according to the promise of God (Gen. 17), *I will be thy God and thy seed's*: and that not only from the example of circumcision, which was a sign of that covenant and in place of which baptism succeeded (Col. 2: 11), but also because to whom the thing signified pertains to them the sign itself, cannot be denied, as the Apostle Peter expressly testifies (Acts 10: 47: and 11: 17). Now, truly, no one can deny that the benefits of the blood and Spirit of Christ pertain to the infants of the faithful except he, who wills them to be excluded from salvation; for as no one can enter the kingdom of God except he who has been born of water and of the Spirit (John 3: 5), so no one is Christ's who has not the Spirit of Christ, (Rom. 8: 9).

For the purpose of confirming this there is a truly illustrious place to the Ephesians (5: 26), where the Apostle says, *Christ loved his Church and gave himself for it—cleansing it with the washing of water by the word*. Whence it follows, either that the infants of the faithful are no part of that Church for which Christ gave himself, or that they too are cleansed with the washing of water by the word—so that we may now omit the examples of whole families that were baptized by the Apostles (Acts 16: 15 and 38, and 18: 8, and 1 Cor. 1: 16)—also the example of the Israelitish infants who no less than Israelitic adults were baptized un-

der the cloud and in the sea, as the Apostle testifies (1 Cor. 10). And truly, if infants themselves coalesce with the Church of Christ into one mystic body, they are to be discerned by some sign of this communion from others who are aliens from this body.

We moreover exclude from baptism the infants of those who are plainly aliens from the covenant, such as the children of Gentiles are, of the Mohammedans, the Jews, and the like, whom the Holy Spirit himself pronounces unclean (1 Cor. 7 : 14), and accordingly, as extraneous they are abandoned by the judgment of God, as the same apostle commands (1 Cor. 5 : 12, 13). Unless, perhaps, by legitimate adoption or servitude that is just and *equal* (*proprie dictam*), they may be enrolled as it were, and inserted in the families of the faithful ; for in this case many Reformed Churches baptize them to be brought in this manner by God into the communion of his covenant. Without controversy it was so in the ancient Church (Gen. 17 : 12, 13), as Augustine from this fact sometimes derived an efficacious argument for election by grace against the Pelagians.

We do not, however, for that cause, exclude from the communion of this sacrament those infants who are born from a Christian stock and baptized parents, although their parents by a wicked life or an impure faith render the efficacy of the covenant sealed by baptism void against themselves, if by the same parents or their kindred, under whose power they are, they are offered by baptism according to the order observed in our Churches : because, under the new covenant the son bears not the iniquity of the father, and God no less remains the God of the children of the same as himself testifies (Ezek. 16 and 23), where he calls the children of impious Israelites his own sons whom they bear to God, although they offered them to Moloch ; and God also ordinarily collects his Church from among them by the ordinary preaching of his word. Whence he also ordered the children of that kind of Israelites, many of whom had died in their iniquity, to be circumcised no less than the children of the pious (Josh. 5 : 4 : 7). The Israel-

itish Church, and the primitive Christian, without controversy, always required such children to be initiated.

The adjuncts of baptism are : First, its oneness, (unity); for as we are only born never but once, so also we are born again never but once, and accordingly, we also never but once receive the sign of regeneration. Whence, as circumcision once conferred was not repeated, so also neither by command nor by example does sacred Scripture teach that baptism once legitimately conferred should be repeated ; but on the contrary, wherever mention is made of baptism in the New Testament, mention is made of one baptism only, and never but once conferred. Whence, it is also and expressly called one, (Eph. 4 : 5).

No certain *time* has been prescribed for baptism as it was for circumcision. Meanwhile we judge, it ought to be sought as soon as it can be had by the order of the Church and the health of the individual to be baptized, because the ordinary signs (signacula) and instruments of divine grace cannot be neglected by us without sin, nor truly can they be despised except with great sin and danger.

Every *place* appointed for sacred assemblies is also sacred for baptism. Whence, we see in all the examples which the practice of the Apostles supplies, that baptism was conjoined with the preaching of the word, whether that place may have been public or a house of private individuals, provided only there may have been in them an assembly of the Church. However, that public places, when there is not a time of persecution, rather than private are to be appointed, for this action is demonstrated from this, that baptism is an appendage of the public ministry, not of private exhortation.

Although indeed there is no absolute necessity in baptism for particular witnesses, especially in churches which enjoy public quiet, their presence, nevertheless, provided they are pious and trustful (fidi), not only the thing itself shows to be useful, but also the custom of the whole primitive Church which, from a highly probable argument, along with the *imposition of names*, was taken from the very

right of circumcision, as an example of it exists (Isaiah 8 : 2, Luke 1 59).

But if any one cannot be certain about his baptism whether it was received in infancy, either from the testimony of the Church, or of parents, or of witnesses, or of others, or whether he may have been washed with no other than the baptism of midwives or private persons—we think that a man of this kind is to be baptized without scruple, because the baptism is not posterior and that which was prior is to be esteemed for nothing, as was rightly determined in the fifth Carthaginian Council (chap. 3), "It hath seemed good (placuit) unto us concerning infants, as often as very certain witnesses are not found who can without doubt testify that they were baptized, and they themselves are not qualified (idonei) by age to answer concerning the sacraments delivered to them, that they should be baptized without any scruple, lest that hesitancy (trepidatio) may avail to deprive them of the cleansing of the sacraments;" for as Leo rightly adds, "that cannot be said to be repeated which is not known to have been done."

Nor for that cause is conditional baptism to be approved of, which is wont to be observed in such like case by Pontificians after this form, *If thou hast not been baptized, I baptize thee*: as well—because a baptism of this kind wants the example of Scripture, and changes the form of baptism prescribed by Christ, as—because it leaves it uncertain to the baptized which baptism is true—a consequence not comporting with the end of baptism, which does not render ambiguous but signs and seals the divine promises.

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ART. V.—*RAUCH ON EDUCATION.**

MAN is the intended lord of nature. All that lives on earth bends to him. In proportion as animals approach him in rank,*they become more regular in form—in their organs of sense—in their muscular and nervous system ; and with this increasing regularity a higher degree of independence of the power and activity of nature is secured to them. We are accustomed to look with amazement on the artificial texture of the spider's web, on the beautiful windings of the snail's house, on the regular formations of the tents built by little bees ;—yet these creatures are irregular in their forms and their productions cannot vie in beauty with many a fresh and vigorous flower, that opens its long closed bud, when touched by the rays of the morning sun. It is the same power of nature, which causes the germ of the plant to sink its roots into the soil and to send its leaves into the air towards the sun, that forms the wonderful and lovely crystal in the depths of the mountain, that performs through the insect those wonders, which we admire as if they were the products of calculation and design. What we are inclined to consider as independence in these insects, is but the highest degree of dependence. Hence it is that whilst these artificial productions are found in vegetation and in those animals which stand near it and whose existence is closely connected with it, we do not find them among those animals that approach nearer to man. All that is left them is an instinct guided by one of the senses, for which reason their heads hang downward and keep them

* A Lecture by Dr. Rauch, delivered before the students of "Marshall College" and the citizens of Mercersburg during the winter of 1837. Now published for the first time.—Ed.

in constant contact with those herbs and plants and objects, on which they live, and with the soil on which they walk and die.

But man is even denied *this* instinct; for *him* Providence wished to rule over nature around him, and to guide and direct his own nature rather than be its slave and live in its service. His form is upright; and whilst his eye can look around on every side and measure the extent of the atmosphere, it was formed also, unlike that of the animal, to look upward and search after Him who created the world. Whilst his mouth is intended to receive his earthly food, it is also beautifully shaped for the flow of language—for the utterance of his feelings—for the adoration of his Benefactor. To make him conscious of this intended independence, nature, which acts towards all its other creatures like a kind mother, does nothing for man. He is born helpless, unable to make free use of his limbs, and without instinct to guide him in seeking his food. What he knows he must have acquired; what he can do he must have learned to do by exercise. Even his eye and ear, his taste and other senses, demand long and constant exercise before they acquire any degree of skill or security. Children, exposed from their earliest infancy, when found afterwards, have resembled animals more than man.—A boy taken up in the Hanoverian woods crept on his hands and feet; and though after much labor and time he learned to speak, he could not remember any thing of his former state in the wilderness. His faculties not having been exercised, were latent and slumbering, and he might have died without ever awaking to a consciousness of their powers. Since nature does nothing for us, it follows that we must do every thing for ourselves. Fire only can kindle fire; mind only can awaken mind. We must be among men to become men; we must be acted upon; our latent faculties must be aroused, must be drawn out into action, or else we remain like the animal. This mutual influence of men exerted on each other we call *Education* in its widest sense. Such education we find already

among savages. Even he must have learned the use of his bow ; must have learned to carve it, to hunt, and, as he belongs to some tribe, to obey. The degrees of education are different, and depend on the regularity with which our powers and faculties are exercised. But as the plant, whose roots take in moisture, whose leaves drink the air, whose flowers absorb the light, depends for its growth upon these elements, so man, as regards his intellect, depends on that mutual influence which we have called Education.

Yet I would not be understood for a moment, to cherish the unfounded idea, that Education is the *cause* and the development of the faculties the *effect* ; that, as the artist of marble, we can make what we choose of our children in spite of their different temperaments, dispositions, natural talents, inclinations, and above all, in spite of that will, against which we cannot even induce a youth of decision to listen to us, much less to learn from us. The sun is the cause of warmth and light on the earth ; and if the idea above mentioned were true, education would be the cause of light in our understandings and of warmth in our feelings and will ; yet nothing is less true than this. Air, which operates as a cause on iron and effects rust, cannot effect any thing in the animal, for *its* heart and lungs convert air into blood. So does neither the sun, nor the air, nor moisture, produce any effect in the germ of the plant ; though without these elements the plant could not grow, because they constitute the *conditions* necessary for its development. These elements only serve to call into action that power, that latent energy, that *nixus formativus* which Providence has laid in the germ, which gives form to the plant, which maintains it whilst alive, and enters another germ when it dies. Hence it comes, that whilst the plant receives its impulses from those elements with which it stands intimately connected by means of roots and leaves, it is, at the same time, not passive only, but active also ; in receiving them it *takes* them, converts the moisture into sap, the air into sweet aromas, and light into the many lovely colors with which its flowers are ornamented.

Hence it is, that though all plants drink the same air, they differ in the perfume which they exhale, in the colors with which they adorn our gardens and woods. And will it be otherwise with our youth? Their manifold and various talents, all the faculties of their minds, are the slumbering seed which the hand of the Lord has scattered, that it may awake, and grow, and ripen, and become beneficial to our race, whenever education shall stir up their latent energies. But they must develop themselves by their own activity; education can only call this activity into exercise, guide and direct it. It is the pupil's mind which must judge, must draw conclusions, must understand the ideas contained in words, must now with acuteness search into the secret connection of things around us, and now with depth enter into the concealed riches of thoughts, given by others; it is the pupil's will, that must purify his desires and reign over them, that must establish his principles, must be the basis of every action and hold him answerable for every deed to a higher Judge. On a tablet we may write what we choose; it receives without discrimination what is right and wrong, good and bad, true and false. In receiving these things it is passive and unconscious of what it receives. But the mind does not receive impressions like wax. In receiving it is active; and unless what is committed to memory, is understood, nothing is learned. A word is but a sound; a word learned by the parrot is but a sound without a meaning. We can give the pupil words only; the ideas contained in them he must himself reproduce. Though we can guide him in doing so, and though we can strengthen his mind by degrees, we cannot carry the idea, an invisible thought, into his mind and bind it fast there.

Childhood, however, is the proper time for the cultivation of our powers. As the limbs of the body are yet tender and plastic, so the will of youth readily suffers itself to be guided and directed. The first impressions we receive are strong and lasting, because full of vigor and health; we are irresistibly attracted by every thing novel. Leibnitz,

the great philosopher, when travelling, carried with him those manuscripts, which he wrote when a youth in the lecture room of his teachers. Children have a constant desire for activity. Their hands, their feet, their eyes, their tongues are forever in motion. They must play or run about, or ask for information; for at no time of life is curiosity more active and strongly expressed than in childhood. Rest is hated by a healthful child; it wants exercise; and a good education should satisfy the demand of its physical as well as its intellectual nature. If we neglect doing so, society suffers not only a loss, but a direct injury. To live and to be active are the same thing; talents which, if well directed, will benefit society, if left to themselves, will wrong it.

Much depends, however, on the *right mode* of educating children. Yet as long as we disagree in our notions of what education is, and of what should be its main purpose, it will be in vain to speak of modes. I must, therefore, beg leave to say a few words concerning *the main purpose* of education. Here every one may be ready to make the remark, that this point has been long settled; that the purpose is and must be *usefulness*. Teach those things which can be applied in future life and omit what life does not call for. Though on the whole I agree perfectly with this opinion, yet the term "usefulness" is vague, indefinite, varies in its meaning according to the character of individuals and ages. Whatever answers as a means for the satisfaction of our wants we call useful, be these wants sensual or spiritual. In an age, however, when sensual wants and desires reign over a people that stoops to make all its talents do homage to the senses; when the ideas of holiness, beauty and truth are esteemed only so far as they are good for something of which we stand in need; when every one thinks only of his own advantage and interest and seeks for those means, that will lead him to riches, to the gratification of his ambition or his vanity—in such a time the term *usefulness* is a precarious one. If it becomes the idol of all our efforts, of our institutions, laws and

education, nothing will any longer be considered holy or good on its own account, but on account of its usefulness. Thus we will profess religion, because it is useful; be honest, because it is useful; be correct in our demeanor and true in our intercourse with men, because it is useful. The idea of usefulness will then be the measure, by which we estimate every thing; the highest good we possess, will be degraded to a mere means of advancing some favored purpose. The possession of reason will be desired by the sensual man, that he may speculate successfully and make money easily, or that he may moderate and vary his pleasures, which might otherwise become insipid and destructive to health. Whilst on the one hand, as Hegel says, we praise the Maker of nature, because He has created the cork-tree to supply corks for our bottles, we regret, on the other, that we can make no use of the diameter of the earth to measure tape and cloth.

But—some one may reply—in our enlightened age, in an age which, according to our own assertions, has outstripped all former ages in wisdom, we have become wise enough to know, that one man cannot live without another; that the welfare of the single individual is closely connected with that of his fellow-men; that we must consequently, elevate ourselves above the care of individual interests to that of the general well-being of the State. In this knowledge consists the end of wisdom; by it we have broken the chains of darkness and ignorance. Reign we must over the world of atoms; investigate its powers and use them for the service of our external animal life; we must fly through space on the wings of the wind and exercise the activity of our will, now here, now there, with the swiftness of lightning; we must manifest the presence of mind every where and prove that all things stand at our command and are created for our use, that we may rejoice in the fullness of our sensual life. This is the great end of usefulness, and *this* is the usefulness we speak of. To this end all are at present united. One completes the skill of another; and whilst each carries on his own business and

occupation one frequently finishes the work commenced by another unknown to him, and commences a work to be completed by one after him. Thus all the members of a nation are united in one work; each one feels the efforts of another result pleasantly to his own advantage and every new trial passes like an electrical spark through a chain of many thousands to its final link.

But is this the *whole* work entrusted to our race? Shall we be united by desires and wants only and not also in the spirit? Shall we but know where every thing useful to the body is to be had, but seek in vain for what is kindred to the soul? Shall only our physical life enjoy its comforts and care, but our souls long in vain for their appropriate nourishment? Shall we improve every thing around us except those talents that connect the visible and the invisible world? Shall the main end of our efforts be nothing higher than the refinement of our selfishness, and shall the mind be condemned to be the slave of selfishness and the fool of time?

But suppose usefulness in life embraces the whole work to be done by those who are born to live for eternity; suppose that the sphere of our education be circumscribed by its relation to future use, the limits of which it never ought to exceed, and that *our own* idea of usefulness exhausts the whole sphere of man's activity and destination:—it ought, nevertheless, not to be the main design and aim of education. If a man has learned all the sciences and knows all wisdom, if he unites in himself the learning of all ages and is able to preach wisdom with the tongue of an angel, and is not a good man, a man of benevolence and firm principles, he may, like a Vampire, suck the very life-blood of our race, may, like a Helvetius or Voltaire or Machiavelli, use his talents and knowledge to the injury of his fellow-men. It is something quite different from this bare-headed, toothless idea of usefulness, which makes a man the benefactor of his fellow-men. Washington was inspired not by the idea of usefulness, but by patriotism, when he vindicated our nation's liberty; Lafayette did not leave

France that he might have a field of usefulness somewhere else, but the genius of liberty nourished him when a child to fight for her sacred interests when grown.

We must, it is evident, have another end in view, if we would educate our youth, as they ought to be educated. Harmony is the great end, after which Providence strives in man. No where in animated nature do we meet with it so strikingly as in the form of man. We discover indeed among all animals analogous manifestations of one and the same formation, or idea, which varies only according to different kinds and species and according to the elements in which they live. Some parts of this one formation are more distinctly marked in one class and less so in others; whilst those which are less marked, are in their turn principally prominent in another class, so that the beauty of this one general form is dispersed in isolated parts throughout the whole animal kingdom. But in man we find all parts in perfect harmony, and this harmony, in which no part is put forth at the expense of another, constitutes the beauty of the human form. So we find also again that many animals have one of the senses particularly strong, for example, the lynx, sight; the dog, scent. But no where do we meet with a perfect harmony of all the senses, as to strength and order, except in man. This symmetry of form and the senses is but a type of that harmony and symmetry, which Providence designed in our moral and intellectual constitution. The harmonious cultivation of the latent faculties of the mind is consequently the principal design of education. Only when the reason is fully developed and not merely a few of its parts, only when we are conscious of every power and energy in us, are we entirely *men*; whilst without this full development, we are like plants trimmed down to dwarfs by the knife of the gardener.

Do not fear that in this case there will be a want of men who will concentrate their talents upon one point, and continue to work miracles in their particular departments. Though every faculty that any one of us possesses, is pos-

sessed also by another, yet each one has it in a peculiar manner. All faculties limit and circumscribe each other, and the manner in which this is done involves a difference as regards their individual strength. Hence it is that in the one this, in the other that talent is left more or less free, and that therein consists the peculiarity which distinguishes one man from another and which inclines each to a particular sphere of action. Whilst, therefore, we desire that every organ should be developed and exercised, by which men may become acquainted with themselves, the things around them and above them, we ought, at the same time, to direct our pupils, in accordance with their peculiar talents to limit their activity and concentrate it upon one object, and to devote themselves with their whole soul and heart to one occupation. Yet unless all faculties are roused, this peculiarity cannot manifest itself. But, again, it is only among men that there exists a proper relation between knowledge and goodness, between the head and the heart, between science and practical morality, between understanding and will. When, however, with particular reference to a certain useful end, the mind is cultivated in one direction more than in another, the memory more than judgment, prudence more than feeling, cool speculation more than imagination—an unhealthy state of the mind is produced, which must result more or less to our own disadvantage and to that of our fellow-men. Life needs the entire man; we must be active not only with the head but also with the heart; not only with the will but also with the hand. Knowledge without the cultivation of the will, a good head with a bad heart, what can it avail us? In the will we live, and the heart must approve or condemn us, reward or punish us, strengthen or weaken us. The fortune of our lives and our government depends not exclusively on useful knowledge, but on our character as citizens; and to form this character by cultivating the whole man, is the aim of education in the proper sense.

Who that is conscious of his higher moral nature would stoop to be the slave of a mere sensual life? Would he

not purify his principles and make them the guide of his conduct? That man is cultivated, who having accustomed himself to amiable, cheerful and graceful manners, divides the hours of the day and gives each its occupation; who maintains this order with strict regularity, never giving more time to pleasure, sleep and recreation than they require; who constantly struggles against his own weakness and never harbors vanity nor selfishness, nor thrusts himself into notice, but waving his own rights and claims is willing to acknowledge those of his fellow-citizens; who does not indulge hatred, nor wrath, nor enmity, nor cowardice, nor pusillanimity, nor sensuality; who feels displeasure, as often as he discovers an impure wish in his breast; and who knowing the measure and extent of his talents, and his merits, and of the duties incumbent upon him, is modest. That man is cultivated who is free, not only *externally* by law, but free by his will. He is the free man, who is never determined in his actions by desires, or passions, or mere wishes, but who, recognizing in the divine law the only palladium of his liberty, places his will under it, and, guided by it, reigns by the force of will over all his passions and desires, disdaining every lawless deed and opposing every wrong tendency of his age. But whence should this proper order of life, this proper restraint upon our desires, this proper moderation of self-conceit be derived, if not from the order in our minds and the harmony between our knowledge and will—if not from the symmetrical cultivation of the whole inner man? Truly, the man that has no music in himself, takes no pleasure in listening to music; and he who has no harmony in his soul, cannot discover any in the stars that rule over his life. The internal harmony must produce a corresponding effect upon our actions and deeds; and any dissonance in that must produce a corresponding dissonance in these.

In what has been said, I have tried to answer the question: What is the best mode of educating the young? For the teacher who knows the end of his endeavors, if he has any mind at all, will easily discover the shortest way that leads

him thither, and if he should not, a few external rules will not be sufficient to guide him. We demand that education shall cultivate the whole man—the entire mind; we wish to accomplish this through instruction as one part of education. The selection of subjects to be taught, ought, therefore, to be liberal; our children cannot be satisfied with writing, reading and arithmetic, a little geography and thirty-six rules of Kirkham's Grammar; nor must we suffer them to learn from such motives as will strengthen their selfishness, such as fear of punishment or of future want, or hope of usefulness, or ambition. Nor ought we to claim but one faculty as the one through which we have access to their souls and through which alone they must learn, the memory, this storehouse of knowledge. We must rouse the whole inner man from the root up to all its branches—establish clearness in his understanding, purity in his will. But that which subdues the will and the understanding at once—which induces us to desire a thing as soon as we know of it, and which consequently unites knowledge and action, is *love*. Love to the subjects taught, must therefore be the great motive to learn, love to knowledge, to truth, to goodness, independently of any selfish calculation as to the use and advantage we may derive from them. Pascal remarks that we must know a thing in order to love it, and again that we must love a thing in order to know it—that the path to wisdom leads through love. But here is a circle, a difficulty which seems almost unconquerable. I cannot desire what I do not know, and I cannot become acquainted with a thing, unless I desire it. From this difficulty the teacher must deliver the pupil. Minds, says Plato, kindle each other. As the magnet attracts iron, so must the spirit of the teacher, if he has any, attract the fiery, cheerful and easily inflamed mind of the young. Let the teacher live with all his heart in his occupation; let him be inspired with love to truth and holiness; let his instructions be delivered in a free, lively and distinct manner; let him understand how to appeal now to the judgment, now to the feelings of his pupils; and espe-

cially let him be aware, that his instruction ought only to guide and aid the learner in reproducing all knowledge *by his own efforts*, and that what has been committed to memory without being distinctly understood will be buried there never to rise to life again ; and there is no danger, but that such a teacher will dissolve the spell of the difficulty with which a seeming contradiction encircles us.

Love, then, is the hinge on which our method must turn ; and the teacher who cannot succeed in producing it, himself bears testimony to his incapacity to teach. Each science, however has a method of its own ; and it would be no less awkward to apply one and the same to all, than it would be to attempt to swim in the air, or soar in the water.

It would be impossible to enter into particulars in the short compass of a Lecture, and I shall, therefore, add only one word more : That method will be infinitely best, which in all the sciences recognizes a reflection of the eternal Truth ; which knows how to lead the Fountain of life and of wisdom by many streams into every art, and into every science—how to connect every science with the Head of all knowledge.

ART. VI.—A PLEA FOR MATHEMATICS.

In the early history of science all branches of knowledge were included under the common name *mathesis*, *mathematics*, or *learning*. Subsequently the term was restricted to those subjects which were more abstruse in their character, and required close attention and patient application in their investigation. All such studies were designated *mathematical*, or *disciplinary*, because they were supposed to afford the best training to the intellectual faculties, and the student was called *mathetes*, or *disciple*, because he was regarded as passing through a prescribed course of discipline, the object of which was the development of his mind. At length, however, as the science of number and quantity, combined all the elements of mental discipline in a high degree, it won for itself, by way of preëminence, the title of *mathesis*, *mathematics*, or *science*. It was in this light that it was for the most part cultivated and recommended as a study among the ancients. Their best mathematicians made only a limited use of their knowledge for the useful purposes of life, and none of them had any adequate conception of the application of their theorems and formulas to the solution of the grand mysteries of the universe. Plato recommended mathematics as the best training for correct thinking in all departments of knowledge, and as essential to a proper understanding and appreciation of his own philosophy. The judgment of antiquity, we may add, has been confirmed by the judgment of all subsequent times, Christian, as well as heathen, and been incorporated in all the educational establishments of the present day.

But we may inquire for ourselves into the disciplinary influence of mathematical study, and endeavor to verify, by our own reflections the judgment of the ancients.

Viewed under one aspect, mathematics is a purely ideal science, entirely abstract, as it regards the visible and tan-

gible world. The most practical of all the sciences, it exists in its fundamental principles and their development, as an independent creation of the mind, a purely ideal world of its own, discovered, but not invented by the mind. It starts with zero, and by means of its symbols of plus and minus, it finds its subject-matter in the idea of quantity, that is, quantity, not as it exists under any particular form or in any particular place, but quantity as something abstract, as something or anything that may be increased or diminished. As such it may assume an infinity of forms, whilst its several constituent parts may occupy every conceivable relation to each other. Thus a point, a line, a surface, a triangle, a circle, or geometrical magnitudes generally, have in themselves no tangible existence. So too all our reasoning concerning quantity as something ideal, though aided by signs and symbols, is abstract. The ideas of equality, of inequality, or of proportion, by which one quantity is compared with another and its value determined by its relation to that which is known, exist only in the sphere of ideas; they cannot be grasped by sense, and are accessible only to thought.

From this it will be seen that the science of mathematics has its starting point in the ideal world, and that the superstructure which it rears lies on the outside of the world of facts and quantities that address themselves to the senses. This is the sphere of pure thought, the clime most congenial to the intellectual faculties and most favorable to their high and sublime activity. Man, however, is so constituted in his present moral attitude, that as a general thing, the world of sensible fact engages and absorbs his attention supremely, and, as a consequence, it is lamentably true, that it is only the lower faculties of his nature, those which connect him with the material world, that are exercised, whilst Reason, his noblest power, lies dormant. The mass of men, see, hear, taste, conceive, and indulge in dreams of fancy, but beyond this, it is seldom that they make an excursion. They cling to the shores of their native coast, ever keep in sight of its capes and promontories, and nev-

er venture out beyond the usual soundings into the great ocean of truth and discovery. The consequence is, man sinks more and more into the sphere of animality, and loses his high attributes of a spiritual and rational being.

Now it is the object of all true education to prevent this result, to reverse the process, to elevate man from his state of sensualism, to give the preponderance to his intelligence, to furnish him with an abode in the world of ideas, to open up to him new sources of pleasure and enjoyment, and to inspire him with new strength, by supplying his higher faculties with suitable stimulant. All branches of a good education are calculated to produce this result, some more and some less directly. The study of the pure mathematics, as is generally conceded, tends in this direction in a preëminent degree. Its tendency is to abstract the mind from the contemplation of the material to the immaterial, from the sensual to the spiritual. This we might say is the first conquest, which the mind gains in freeing itself from the slavery of the senses, and, we may also say, the most important.

When, however, the mind is thus raised above the world of sensible objects, and brought to gaze upon the bright empyrean above, it must learn to poise itself upon its own pinions, and be enabled to view with unwearied eye the new realities which now surround it. The power of *attention* must be acquired. This power seems to be a spontaneous activity, so long as man lives in the sphere of mere feeling, for men often feel compelled to yield their attentions to that which regales their senses. But just because this faculty of the mind is so wedded to sense, it is proportionally difficult to fix it upon ideas. To effect this, labor and struggle are requisite, the magnitude of which it is difficult to describe, but of which all successful scholars fortunately have had some practical experience, and so we may appeal to that. How was it when they first attempted to grasp the abstractions of Algebra or Geometry? They sat down with the full determination to master the contents of their lessons; the evening lamp was lighted,

and the quiet, cozy appearance of the chamber seemed to invite to study and reflection. They were thankful to their parents for sending them to school or college, and they congratulated themselves that they were students. They had formed the fixed purpose and the firm resolve, if not to reach the exalted position of those giants in science, whose works they were studying, at least to follow after them at a modest distance. But they had scarcely mastered a definition in their evening's lesson, before their minds had wandered from ideal realms to this lower mundane sphere. A noise in the streets distracted their thoughts, and scattered the formative idea into a thousand fragments. They either follow whither their truant attention leads, throw aside their books and problems, leave their chamber, and mingle with the throng on the streets, or finding it difficult to get back into the world of thought, and still more difficult to reconstruct the crystalized idea, which had just fallen from their grasp, they are carried away to parts unknown, or, perhaps, to their homes, to the farm, the cattle, the barnyard, or to the condition of the crops. But, *Nil arduum est*. A single discomfiture cannot subdue an energetic mind; it may, and it ought only to call forth an increase of energy and courage for the next conflict. By repeated efforts the attention yields to the judgment and the will, until at length it becomes the submissive and obedient servant of that arbiter of human destiny, the will, leading it over the fields of science, fixing it in long and deep meditation upon the profoundest mysteries of the universe, and giving it that intensity of application, and that patience in investigation, which enable it to penetrate into the arcana of nature, and bring into the light of the mid-day sun the laws upon which the universe itself rests. *Crescit eundo*. One victory over the natural mulishness of the mind in reference to the study of the abstract sciences, imparts to it additional courage and cheers it with new strength to gain other and more difficult ones in future campaigns. It is not necessary here to refer in detail to the characteristic habits of study,—of fixed attention,—of

long and patient application, engendered by mathematical study. They have become proverbial; and where not counteracted by wholesome recreation, and a just attention to the duties of social life, they have also become sufficiently amusing when viewed under one aspect, and sufficiently painful when viewed under another. The great Newton himself, apparently unconscious that he possessed a most exalted genius, attributes the success of his researches to his habits of study and persevering application. He says explicitly, "that whatever service he had done to the public, was not owing to any extraordinary sagacity, but solely to industry and patient thought."

With the attention awake and at the command of the will, the conquests of the mind in the sphere of science have fairly commenced. It is then prepared to analyse, to reason, to judge, to deduce, to infer, or gathering up the manifold, to embrace them in a single concrete unity, in a word, to generalize, to think. The power of thinking exists in all men as a possibility, but it needs exercise, training, development. This it finds in an eminent degree in mathematical study, for there, at every step, it is required to generalize, from Arithmetic up to the most abstruse problem in Calculus. To a certain extent, mathematical science is inductive, that is, it experiments in particular cases, with the view of arriving at a general principle, or formula; but this is not demonstration, nor does it give the mind the necessary guaranty of mathematical certainty, not even if numerous inductions should confirm the truth of the proposition. The object of mathematical investigation is universal and necessary truth; hence it becomes deductive, that is, it establishes a general formula, and when it has once discovered this, it proceeds from it as a certain and infallible truth, and brings into the same category many subsidiary truths, and solves an infinity of problems in one general solution. This process of thought is the highest flight of reason, and one of its proudest triumphs. It is constantly employed in mathematics, pure and mixed, where it not only serves to show the necessary truth

of many propositions that are known, but in the hands of the skilful analyst also becomes a fruitful means in the discovery of new laws and relations. Nowhere in the domain of science can a purely *a priori* method of reasoning be carried so far, so safely, or with so little aid from facts or experiments, as in the science of which we are now speaking. There is that in its concise and accurate language, its clear and well defined axioms, as well as in the formulas of its reasoning processes, which beautifully adapt it to be, as it is, one grand system of education, in which a world of truths and facts are held together by a few general principles. The Freshman, who has mastered Newton's Binomial Theorem, and the Senior, who has grasped Newton's principle of Universal Gravitation, will doubtless feel the force of these remarks.

In the nature of the case, mathematical thinking must be the same as correct thinking in all other branches of knowledge; for thinking and its laws must be the same everywhere, just as truth, its object, is the same, fixed and immutable; but there is this peculiarity in mathematical reasoning, which distinguishes it from all other kinds of reasoning. Its processes are the sure, the infallible guides to truth; its axioms are the necessary, the irresistible intuitions of the mind, so clearly and so accurately defined that they cannot be misunderstood, whilst the conclusions themselves are equally as irresistible as the axioms from which they are derived. He, therefore, who passes from one step to another and finally, to the conclusion of a demonstration, feels that he has found truth unmixed with error, and principles that are true without a single exception, whilst in other sciences, especially such as are entirely empirical, truth is more or less combined with error, giving rise to various theories or hypotheses, which in their turn supplant each other. In the sifting process, through which the mind passes in the analytic art, error is effectually precluded, and indeed in the nature of the case there is no room for its entrance. Hypotheses are admitted, but only for argument's sake, and then tested by an infallible standard, and either confirmed as necessary truth, or reduced

to an absurdity at once. Certainty and truth are the only treasures, which mathematics accumulates in its storehouse. This is a prerogative, which it must perhaps always enjoy among its sister sciences.

The necessary result of this kind of discipline and thinking must be evident to every one. It must accustom the mind to reason correctly and with precision on all other subjects. It inspires it with the love of truth in general; it gives it humility and patience, and accustoms it to depend upon its own resources and strength in its searches after hidden treasures. As it insists on a sufficient reason for every proposition that is laid down, its tendency is to beget a pure love of truth on the one hand, and a valid scepticism in reference to error on the other. Lord Bacon's idols of the den, of the forum, and the theatre, cannot long retain their authority in the presence of mathematical analysis; for these have no necessity in the nature of things, and are simply the products of the imagination, which have come to assert the authoritative force of reason itself.

But in this connection the question may very properly be asked, Is mathematical training favorable to the investigation of moral and religious truths? By some this has been answered in the negative. It is alleged that the mind trained in the exact sciences to habits of the most accurate and vigorous modes of thought, accustomed to take nothing for granted without a clear and satisfactory demonstration, must necessarily waver, fall into doubts, and scepticism, when it attempts to penetrate the mystery that envelops moral and religious subjects. In reply to this, it must be admitted, that mathematicians, and some of them the highest lights in the firmament of science, have been sceptics, infidels, and even atheists. Some of them have been cold, calculating, unsocial and selfish. They have devoted themselves so exclusively to their studies as to overlook everything else, and forget that they were in a world of social beings to whom they were bound by reciprocal duties. They were men of one idea only, and that

never transcended the limits of abstract number and quantity. Some of them have lost their eyes, their health, and their lives by devoting themselves exclusively and unremittingly to their favorite pursuits. But individual cases like these prove nothing to the point in hand. They only show that mathematicians may become one-sided as well as other men, that they can forget their duties to themselves, their fellow-men, and their God, as well as the devotee of pleasure or mammon. Man is possessed of various faculties, and the exclusive cultivation of any particular part of his being must necessarily result in injury to the symmetry of the whole. His social and religious nature requires cultivation simultaneously with his other activities. Where this is neglected, an abnormal moral development must take place, and the monstrosity will be the more hideous, in proportion to the strength of the original endowments of the mind. The great lights of France, her far famed philosophers and astronomers, lived in the midst of a corrupt social system, and hence it is much easier to trace their scepticism to early education, and to the irreligious atmosphere in which they lived, than to those elevating studies, by which they threw such a halo of glory around the name of French mathematicians. If they sailed through the celestial spaces, and discovered nothing beyond the verification of their mathematical formulas; if they observed no foot-prints of the Creator, and gazed only upon non-entity in regions resplendent with beams of divine glory, it may reasonably be supposed, that it was owing much more to the spiritual blindness that had befallen them from youth upwards, than to the intellectual penetration, which enabled them to make such distant voyages. Newton and Kepler, in many respects their superiors, were surrounded by a positive religious influence during their lives, and we find, accordingly, that they studied the book of nature, as a pious man studies the Bible, in order to secure more exalted views of the Creator, and then to reflect their light upon the minds of their fellow-men. Newton, it is known, was unwilling to converse with a sceptical astronomer on the subject of reli-

gion, because he had never studied it, and, as if oppressed with a sense of the vanity of human learning, found comfort in the thought, that his scientific labors were calculated to afford men higher views of God.

But other things being equal, we believe it may be satisfactorily shown, not only that mathematical education is not inimical, but in the highest degree favorable to moral and religious training. A little reflection will show that in the nature of the case it cannot be otherwise. If it accustoms the mind to reason correctly and logically, and makes truth and certainty the end of all its demonstrations, it would seem to follow, that the mind thus trained, would be best prepared to reason correctly and to embrace the truth in all other departments of knowledge, but especially in those in which his highest interests are to be found. This may be shown to be true both negatively and positively. A mathematical mind must be quick to detect fallacies, and slow to receive worthless traditions, or the mere ipse dixits of schools or self-constituted oracles. Trained to accept of nothing as truth, but that for which there is a good reason or a valid authority, it acquires a scepticism in reference to errors and barren notions, which is not only valid and legitimate, but necessary and useful in the sphere both of science and religion. For this reason it must be adverse to false religion, with their systems of morals, and, in general, to all kinds of superstition. This is as it should be; for truth and error can never coalesce, and, in all cases, skill, like that of the mathematician, is required to effect the analysis. The modern period of the world's history is, to a great extent, free from superstition, as compared with other times, and there can be no doubt whatever, that the study of the exact sciences has been one of the principal human instrumentalities in bringing about our emancipation.

When, however, the mathematician comes to consider the system of dogmas and morals revealed to him in the word of God, the case is materially different from what it is when the object of his investigation is simply the product

of the human imagination. Here, very consistently, he asks for the ground upon which this system rests, and what are its claims to his obedience. In answer to his queries, he is referred back to God as its author; when this point is once established, he discovers that all its utterances proceed from an infallible source in the Godhead. This is for him the sufficient reason for every scriptural requisition. Here in God he finds the sublime axiom, from which every truth affecting his moral and spiritual interests is deduced with as much certainty and necessity, as any truth in Geometry or Algebra. It is true, in his own department, he understands the reason of every step he takes in his demonstrations, whereas in divine revelation he finds his square and compass, his minus and plus unavailing; but this does not affect in the least his comprehensive axiom, that the word of God is true and cannot be false or contradictory. This axiom, moreover, is not something abstract, but a living concrete reality, and on that account entitled so much the more freely to his heart-felt reliance.

Under this view mathematics should have a prominent place in every well established course of education. The tendency of the time in various directions would indeed, if not resisted, lead to a radical change in our colleges and seminaries of learning, and substitute in the place of metaphysics, the dead languages, and the less practical parts of mathematics, various branches of knowledge of a more immediately useful character. Such changes as these might increase the student's knowledge of facts, and extend his general information; but they would not involve anything like correct training or a sound education. To be well informed, and to be well educated, are different things. The duties and responsibilities of life require not so much large funds of knowledge as active and well balanced minds. Law, Medicine and Theology supply knowledge for practical uses, but they presuppose as a necessary requisite on the part of the student, that he should have a keen, penetrating, and well disciplined mind, in order to master them and turn them to practical account.

In the next place, mathematical science may be recommended for its numerous applications to the useful purposes of life. This, however, is so evident to every one, that it is unnecessary for us to enlarge upon this aspect of our subject. A few illustrations will suffice. It is plain that the business-world is carried forward by mathematical processes. Numerical calculations are the unseen hinges upon which every enterprize is made to revolve; numbers and figures are the secret sentinels, which watch over its operations from beginning to end, pointing the way to success, and giving timely warning of danger or loss. A dwelling of the most modest pretensions must in the first place be constructed ideally by the mathematician, nor can its four walls occupy their proper places without employing a theorem that has come down from Pythagoras himself. Roads are laid out and constructed, land, provinces, countries and seas surveyed, and their boundaries fixed, and angry quarrels respecting the ancient landmarks allayed by the science of numbers. All machinery depends for the unerring accuracy of its work upon the skill of its projector. Enter one of our factories, behold wheel running into wheel, survey the long connections by which mechanical force is conveyed from one part of the building to the other, and the scene before you appears to be one of inextricable confusion. But be not disheartened by this vast display of force and locomotion; study attentively this vast machinery in its various parts, trace them in their connections, and you will find this multiplicity of parts combining to form one vast whole, a grand *multum in parvo*. Commence the work of analysis, and you will discover all the order, beauty, and symmetry of a mathematical problem. The scene before you is indeed nothing but a mathematical problem, projected into space from the mind of the architect, and now in the course of a tangible solution. The idea in its origin and development had its existence first in his mind, where it had already in idea produced the net value of the fabrics, which falls due to each stockholder; but then as all true ideas have life and power, it could not continue to

exist in abstracto, but struggling with the life and power inherent in ideas, it sought an existence in concreto, and hence the problem has become a cotton factory, or under other circumstances, a United States Mint, a factory at Birmingham, a Leviathan, an Atlantic Telegraph, or a Pacific Rail Road.

But the wealth of a nation, it is said, consists in its commerce as well as in its manufactures. Certainly it must be admitted, that the progress of nations and of the world at large has been very materially promoted by its assistance. But what, we may ask, is busy, daring, adventurous commerce, except a mathematical problem from beginning to end? The cargo is an unknown quantity, one of the variable kind, whose value must be determined by the conditions of the market, its ebbs and flows. These latter the shipper well understands, and hence he sends forth his vessel upon the ocean, when the value of his goods is at a minimum at home, and at a maximum in some distant port. But how shall he take advantage of the ebbs and flows of the market, and by what means shall he expedite matters, so that he shall be in the market just at the right time for the sale of his produce. He must go and consult the mathematician, who constructs a vessel for him in idea, then with scale and compass delineates it upon paper, and afterwards hands it over to the architect, who, guided by his formulas, projects it into space. During all the time the vessel is in the process of construction, the genius of science presides over the workmen, and is constantly invoked in the shipyard. She must be so constructed as to cleave the water with the least resistance; her centre of gravity must be in the right place, and her masts and sails so adjusted as to impart to the vessel her greatest velocity. If in addition, she is to be propelled by steam, scientific genius is called into requisition to a still greater extent. Her furnace, cylinders, huge levers, numerous pipes and valves, must be of a particular size and shape, so as to perform their functions aright. The cylinder must be measured, the force of the lever estimated to within a fraction,

and the valves made to open just at the right time, or else, soon after she is launched upon her proper element, the newspapers of the country are destined to be filled with heart-rending accounts of a sad catastrophe. The vessel that left the harbor under a stiff breeze is tossed upon the Gulf stream, her boiler useless, her sails and rudder gone, a mere wreck, rolling in the trough of the sea. Such are sometimes the results of a mathematical blunder, as simple as the substitution of a plus for a minus. But we will suppose, that no error of this kind has been committed, the noble vessel is a unity in all her parts, and provision has been made for every possible contingency or danger. How proudly she rides the wave on her appointed way, amidst storm and sunshine, the pride of the ocean, and one of the proudest trophies of science! Who shall guide her in her perilous course? Why does she not strike the Florida reefs, why, as if a "thing of life," does she near the cape of Good Hope, and around by Mozambique pursue her way to the Indies, and there at length enter the destined harbor at the appointed time? Science, with her trigonometrical formulas as tests, and employing the heavenly bodies as her finger-boards, has guided her with unerring accuracy over the deep, and now she brings her back again laden with the wealth of the East. The voyage has been a matter of figures, and now the grand problem is solved.

In the next place, the science of mathematics may be recommended *in view of its applications in the explanation of the phenomena of the material universe and in the discovery and verification of its laws.*

Lord Bacon based his philosophy of nature upon experience and observation. With justice he complains of the philosophers, who preceded him, that they attempted to teach what nature ought to be, and not what it is in reality. He, therefore, asks for a more accurate examination of facts, a more thorough sifting of the evidence pro and con, before a principle or law is admitted as an established,

scientific truth. A system of cross-questioning must be instituted, that will detect error and bring the truth to light. He thus infused a spirit of earnestness, and a judicious scepticism into the minds of scientific philosophers, which have been felt to the present day, and contributed immensely to the rapid advancement of natural science in modern times.

But as Macaulay (in his essay on Lord Bacon) justly remarks, he exaggerated the errors of the ancients and his predecessors. Men had eyes and curiosity enough to observe nature attentively long before his time, and the history of science goes to show, that from the earliest times they used the one, and indulged the other. This is particularly true in the field of Astronomy, where celestial phenomena were attentively and accurately observed at an early period, and all the principle facts, which could be discovered with the naked eye, known and well established, as appears from their knowledge of eclipses. Others, during the age immediately preceding that of Bacon, had been the patient and diligent observers of nature. This was true of Copernicus, especially of the old Swedish astronomer, Tycho Brahe, Galileo, and others. Sir David Brewster, an unbiased witness in the case, speaking of the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, says, "Newton possessed no secret that was not used by Galileo and Copernicus, and that he would have enriched science with the same splendid discoveries, even if the name and the writings of Bacon had never been heard of." But again, Bacon did not seem to observe, that the advocate and judge from whom he took his idea of the philosopher, after they have made the most thorough investigation of the case in hand, and weighed fact against fact, until the certainty of their conclusions seems indubitable, may after all be deceived by their testimony, and be necessitated to pronounce an unjust decision against the person at the bar. "The process," we are again using the language of Brewster, "was never tried by any philosopher except himself. * * * * As the subject of its application, he selected that of heat. With his usual sagacity

he collected all the facts, which science could supply, he arranged them with all the sagacity of a judge, and he conjured with all the magic of his exclusive processes. But after all this display of physical logic, nature thus interrogated was still silent. The oracle, which he had established refused to give its responses, and the ministering priest was driven with discomfiture from his own shrine. This example, in short, of the application of his system, will remain to future ages as a memorable instance of the absurdity of attempting to fetter discovery by any artificial rules."*

But why does the friend of Bacon, as he certainly was, express himself in this manner? Simply because, as a mathematician, as well as a philosopher, he knew that observation, experiment and induction were not in themselves sufficient to establish physical science upon a permanent basis. The conclusion drawn from a multiplicity of facts or phenomena, may be true, yet unless the existence of the general law, which establishes its truth and necessity, is vigorously demonstrated, there is a possibility that it may not be true, and hence though the mind may possess a certain degree of certainty, it must also be oppressed with more or less of doubt. The law may have been inferred from only apparent points of resemblance, or the operation of some other and deeper law may have escaped attention. Science thus constructed needs additional proof, and this can be found only by applying the "logic of mathematics." Previous to the time of Newton, Physics in general, and Astronomy in particular, were empirical, and had advanced as far as mere empiricism could carry them. Copernicus had by a process of reasoning located the sun in the centre of the solar system; Kepler had discovered the laws of planetary motion, the nature of the curves described by the planets in their orbits, traced the sun to the foci of immense ellipses, and shown the relation of their periodic times to their distance from the sun.

* Brewster's *Life of Sir I. Newton*, p. 289.

Galileo, by turning the telescope for the first time to the heavens, discovered new bodies in distant space, and thus widely extended the boundaries of human vision. The science of Astronomy, however, still remained in a chaotic state: in fact, it could not in strict propriety be called a science at all. Great and important facts had been discovered, but these were without any point of connection or unity, and it was impossible to trace them back to any internal necessity. It was believed that there must be harmony and unity in the celestial phenomena, because, in accordance with the religious spirit of the age, the universe was regarded as having sprung from the divine mind, and, as such, ought to manifest traces of divine harmony and unity in its lineaments. Kepler was penetrated with this conviction, and after he had discovered his laws he surmised that the solar system must be held together by an attractive principle residing in the sun. But this was only a happy guess, and mathematician as he was, he never attempted to verify it by analysis. For a single discoverer, he had already made a sufficiently valuable addition to science by the discovery of the laws which have immortalized his name, and it was reserved for Newton, another and greater genius, to discover and demonstrate the true unity that pervades the heavenly bodies. He was the first philosopher that employed mathematics as the principle of his philosophy, and the most successful in showing that the latter could be established upon a permanent basis only as it rested upon the former. In his hands mathematics remained no longer an abstract science, designed merely to arouse or stimulate the mind, but a scientific apparatus, adapted to test the accuracy and to extend the boundaries of scientific truth. Availing himself of this new appliance in the study of nature, he commenced where Kepler left off, and advancing step by step, admitting nothing but what he could prove, he demonstrated the truth of Kepler's surmise, and showed that it was a reality, a mathematical truth, as indisputable as any theorem in Euclid. If the planets revolved in elliptical orbits around the sun,

analysis made it appear that they *must* be solicited by a force residing in the sun. In the next place the law of this force was investigated. Galileo had taught him the law by which an apple falls to the ground, and he proceeded to inquire whether the force, with which bodies fall to the earth, was not the same as that which held the planets in their places. In the first place, he showed that the moon was falling from a straight or tangential line towards the earth with the same velocity as any other body, at her distance, if it were acted upon by the attraction of the earth. He then turned his attention to the planets, and discovered that they also were ever falling from a straight line towards the sun, in accordance with the same law. Thus at length, by his Geometry and Algebra, with his diagrams and equations before him, taking one step after another, and placing himself upon demonstration alone, he discovered his great law, that all bodies in the universe attract each other with a force proportional to their masses, and inversely as the square of their distances. With this principle the mystery of the material universe was solved. Light, order, and beauty sprung up where previously nothing apparently but chaos and mystery reigned. The principle of universal gravitation having been established, the laws of Kepler became the legitimate deductions of a higher and more comprehensive principle, and it was proved, *a priori*, that the planets must move in elliptical orbits with the sun at their foci; that when near the sun they must speed their velocity, just as when farthest off they must slacken their pace; that the times of their revolution must bear a definite relation to their distances; that the earth must be round, flattened at the poles and protuberant at the equator; that the waters of the ocean must ebb and flow at the approach of the sun and moon; that the axis of the earth must vibrate and describe a curve around the pole of the ecliptic in a long series of years, causing the mysterious phenomenon of the precession of the equinoxes; and that the moon is constrained to cross the plane of the ecliptic at a different point at each successive return of full

moon, and after the lapse of about eighteen years return to the same point from which she started out, and then repeat the cycle of eclipses in the same order during the succeeding eighteen years. Facts like these, and others similar to them, were all proved to be sequences of one universal law, which bound them together and gave them an existence. It was a grand mathematical problem in all its parts, the solution of which involves only the known and well established principles of Algebra, Geometry, or Calculus, and may be made intelligible to any one, who will take the trouble of making himself acquainted with the elements of analysis. But it must also be remarked that it can be made intelligible only to such.*

Again, the Newtonian law has been repeatedly assailed, and that by mathematicians themselves. There were irregularities in the celestial phenomena, which seemed to contradict the law; there were phenomena, which it did not apparently explain: phenomena too, which seemed to predict disorder and confusion in our system at some distant day. A deeper analysis, however, explained the cause of these irregularities, and proved that they were the necessary consequences of the law in question, which, so far from preparing the way for the destruction of the present system of things, were only periodic in their nature and destined in their own appointed time to correct themselves.

Additional illustrations of a similar character might be drawn from other branches of Natural Philosophy, but it will suffice if we only refer to them. The same refined analysis, which has shed so much light upon the science of Astronomy, has been applied with equal success in the departments of Mechanics, Acoustics, and Optics. In regard to light, figures have shown, that the scale preponderates greatly in favor of Euler's undulatory theory, in oppo-

* Admission to the sanctuary of Astronomy, and to the privileges and feelings of a votary, is only to be gained by one means,—a sound and sufficient knowledge of mathematics, the great instrument of all exact inquiry, without which, no man can ever make such advances in this or any other of the higher departments of science, as can entitle him to form an independent opinion on any subject of discussion within their range.—*Herschel's Astronomy.*

sition to the corpuscular of Sir Isaac Newton, and a deeper investigation may yet establish it beyond the reach of doubt. Other imponderables, such as heat, magnetism, and electricity, have yielded one after another to mathematical reasoning, and the laws, that control them, have been expressed by mathematical symbols. Indeed, it is now generally conceded, that nature from its humblest to its highest sphere is, so to speak, only the embodiment of certain fixed, mathematical laws, all of which, if the human mind possess sufficient penetration, may yet be discovered and expressed by analytical formulas. Under this view the material world, at least, may in itself be regarded as simply a system of concrete mathematics, and, the truth, which dawned on the mind of Plato, may continue to be verified more and more fully in the onward progress of discovery,—that “God is a Geometrician.” M. Compte thinks the matter of all the sciences is subject to mathematical laws, but that owing to the inherent weakness of the human mind, it is vain for us to expect to employ mathematical reasonings on subjects that transcend the inorganic world. In the organic world, where the mysterious principle of life manifests itself, the phenomena becomes so complex and intricate, that they must forever baffle the mathematician in his attempts to reduce them to laws as certain and precise as those of Geometry.*

But however that may be, it is certain, that the inorganic world has as yet been only partially explored, and just as rapidly as one problem after another is solved, others of increasing difficulty call for solution. The Newtonian theory of the solar system explains in the most satisfactory

* No person can read his *Positive Philosophy* without admiring, on the one hand, the order, system, and compass of thought, which it displays in discussing the science of nature, and without disgust, on the other hand, at its total blindness in reference to every thing that transcends nature. His work is valuable for the masterly exhibition and development which it gives of the idea of science, but beyond this of little account, except as an exponent of the new phase of infidelity, which is making its appearance in France and England. From the start it ignores the idea of Theology and Philosophy, and leaves the man of science without a God, and the system of nature with no basis to rest upon:

Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum.

manner the phenomena of the universe as it is at present constituted. But the sublime genius of Laplace started the still deeper inquiry, respecting the *manner* in which the universe came to exist under its present form, and ever since his time, the question, with the theory which he proposed, has excited a deep interest among philosophers and mathematicians. Some have been so sanguine as to believe that the successive steps, the scientific genesis, by which the sun, moon, and planets rose out of chaos, may yet be pointed out and demonstrated; others, among whom is the author of *Kosmos*, doubt the success of such investigations, and regard the question as a problem that lies beyond the reach of the human intellect. Under one form or another, however, it may be remarked, it is doubtless destined to be finally settled. Mathematical learning and penetration will either wind through its labyrinthian mazes, as the geologist does in the primitive history of our globe, and bring back a reliable history of creation, or else, discover the difficulties in the way of its settlement and so, as in other cases, demonstrate the impossibility of its solution. In this grand question, as well as in all others pertaining to the material universe, the mathematician can be employed as the only reliable guide, the only safe engineer.

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ART. VII.—MAHAN'S LOGIC.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC, or an Analysis of the Laws of Thought. By Rev. ASA MAHAN, Author of an "Intellectual Philosophy," "A Treatise on the Will," etc. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1857. pp. 387.

THE work is both a comprehensive and a minute treatise on the general subject of Logic, in Four Parts, the First discussing the Analytic Conceptions and Terms, of Judgments, and of Arguments or Syllogisms; the Second, the Dialectic, or Doctrine of Fallacies—Invalid Conceptions—Invalid Judgments—and Fallacies of Reasoning; the Third, the Doctrine of Method; and the Fourth, Applied Logic. The author takes ground against the fundamental principle commonly adopted by logicians, that general negative propositions distribute the subject and predicate, but general affirmative propositions distribute the subject only; and maintains in consequence that "a reconstruction of the whole science is of course demanded." This is the key to the distinctive features of the science of Logic as unfolded by Rev. Mr. Mahan.

The position of the book is, in one sense, correct. It is not a *law*, as Bishop Whately and many others maintain, but rather an *accident* of general affirmative propositions, that they distribute the subject only; not a law, because not a necessity implied in the idea of affirmation; but an *accident*, because distribution depends upon the variable extent of the predicate. Affirmation is equally valid whether but one attribute, or several attributes, or all the attributes of the subject are set in the predicate. If but one or several attributes are set in the predicate, the predicate is broader than the subject; for these attributes may belong to objects other than those denoted by the subject. But if *all* the attributes of the subject are set in the predicate, it is neither broader nor narrower, but just equal in extent to the subject; for no other class of objects can possess all the attributes of the subject, and those attributes only, except that class denoted by

the subject. In all cases, then, of what we may call *complete* affirmation, the extent of subject and predicate is the same; the attributes set in the predicate belong to all the objects comprehended in the subject, and collectively to no others; and pure conversion is valid.

But we can not concur with Mr. Mahan in adopting the new theory of Sir William Hamilton concerning the quantification, as it is called, of the predicate. He says: "To Sir Wm. Hamilton the world is indebted for one of the most important attainments in this science which has been made for centuries, to wit: in the *quantification* of the *predicate* as well as of the subject. In all propositions alike, as he maintains, if we refer to the *judgment* itself, that is, to what is really thought in the mind, the predicate always has as real a quantity as the subject." p. 84. This new doctrine of quantification proceeds upon a false idea of affirmation, and, as a consequence, involves a confusion of the offices of predicate and subject. The germ of an affirmative judgment is the subject-conception, a containing whole, in which we distinguish two essential elements, form and matter, or extent and contents, or quantity and quality. It comprehends a number of individual objects, which possess certain attributes, or marks, or constituent parts. Affirmation does two things: it designates these two elements and expresses their mutual relation; that is, it designates the number of objects, and asserts one or more attributes, or parts, to be constituents of each one of the objects. The first demand is met by the subject, the second by the predicate. The subject is not only a containing whole, but assumes a form also which expresses the number of individual objects with which the judgment is dealing. It comprehends all these objects, or some of them, or but one. It is general, particular, or singular. Thus it is the special office of the subject to deal with the *quantity* of an affirmative judgment. The predicate, on the other hand, does not say how many objects the subject comprehends, but what the subject itself is; it lays out an attribute or the attributes of the subject as that which is contained in it;

in other words, the predicate sets forth the contents of the subject. It may set forth the whole or only part of the contents; in either case, however, it sets forth of what kind or nature the subject is. Thus it is the special office of the predicate to deal positively, not with the quantity, but with the *quality* of an affirmative judgment. The logical expression of the union of these essential elements in a given conception is affirmation.

The quantification of the predicate by Sir William Hamilton is not, therefore, "one of the most important attainments" in the science of Logic; but it is rather a retrogression; it involves a real confusion of quality and quantity. The degree of completeness with which the predicate sets forth of what nature or kind or quality the subject is, is mistaken for quantity, or for the number of individual objects, of which this nature or quality is affirmed. As Mr. Mahan adopts this metaphysical error as a principle and modifies his system of Logic accordingly, it vitiates a large part of his valuable work.

There is a sense, indeed, in which we may speak of the *extent* of the predicate, but it is a different sense from that in which the word is used when applied to the subject. Whilst the extent of the subject pertains to the *individual objects* of a class, the extent of the predicate pertains to the attributes or *nature* of the class. When all the attributes or the entire nature is set in the predicate, the predicate is limited to the subject; it can not belong to any other object or class of objects. Then we say the extent of subject and predicate is the same or equal. But it would be more accurate to say that the *limitation* of the predicate corresponds to the *extension* of the subject; for the predicate, containing the complete contents or entire nature of the subject, belongs to the whole class of objects, but to no other class. Hence both are distributed: the predicate expresses the nature of each object of the class, and any object of which the predicate can be affirmed must belong to that class.

On the one hand, therefore, Mr. Mahan is correct in

maintaining that general affirmative judgments may distribute the predicate as well as the subject; but in sustaining this position by the quantification of the predicate, he commits a grave philosophical error—an error that multiplies symbolical formulas needlessly, introduces confusion into the analysis of judgments, and must be the source of various fallacious processes of reasoning.

To illustrate this error of the author's system of Logic we might analyze the very examples which he employs to evince the quantification of the predicate; for want of space, however, we must forego the advantage of such an analysis.

Of the four Parts of the work, the third and fourth possess, on the whole, the most merit. The train of thought is perspicuous, for the most part truthful, and sufficiently comprehensive; though by the introduction of numerous illustrations the author allows himself to be drawn into a number of discussions, which, though good in themselves, are nevertheless no necessary part of a scientific treatise on logic. For this reason the work is an excellent book of reference on a number of philosophical points to the general scholar or the advanced student, but is less valuable for the purposes of a text-book. A text-book should be short but not defective, exhaustive but not repetitious, comprehensive but not arbitrary nor prolix, and rigidly scientific in the introduction of topics and in the general order of discussion, employing such illustrations, and such only, as are necessary to exhibit principles, and their internal connection, clearly and forcibly. Judged according to this standard we must regard the book as deficient, though we have no hesitation, at the same time, in saying that it possesses many and some great merits.

The author seems to have been a diligent student of German philosophy, of whose distinctive characteristics he has a high appreciation. The influence of the German, in distinction from the Scotch, method of thinking can be traced unmistakably, especially throughout the discussion of the Doctrine of Method and of Applied Logic. We will conclude this brief review with an extract in which Mr. Mahan characterizes the two methods:

"We have already distinguished between the *fragmentary* and *scientific* methods of developing thought, the former consisting in a mere aggregation of topics generally contemplated and discussed in connection with some one department of thought and investigation, and the latter in a systematic development of said department itself in accordance with the immutable laws and principles of scientific definition and logical division and arrangement of topics. As far as method, in the development of thought, is concerned, the productions of the German mind preëminently bear the characteristics of scientific development, while those of the Anglo-Saxon partake, to a very great extent, of the fragmentary. Each department of thought is developed by the German mind from a certain "stand-point," and is so developed that every particular topic is distinctly presented as a necessary part of an all-comprehending whole, thus distinctly realizing the idea of system. In treatises proceeding from the Anglo-Saxon mind, on the other hand, we too often meet with little more than an aggregation of topics falling within the sphere of the department of thought to be developed, while each topic is developed with little reference to the idea of a whole including its parts."

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ANT. VIII.—HYMN OF BONAVENTURA.

Recordare sanctae crucis
 Qui perfectum viam ducis
 Delectare jugiter ;
 Sanctae crucis recordare
 Et in ipsa meditare,
 Insatiabiliter.

Quum quiescas aut laboras,
 Quando rides, quando ploras,
 Doles sive gaudeas,
 Quando vadis, quando venis,
 In solatiis, in poenis,
 Crucem corde teneas.

Crux in omnibus pressuris,
 Et in gravibus et duris
 Est totum remedium ;
 Crux in poenis et tormentis,
 Est dulcedo pie mentis,
 Et verum refugium.

Crux est porta paradisi
 In qua sancti sunt confisi
 Qui vicerunt omnis ;
 Crux est mundi medicina,
 Per quam bonitas divina
 Facit mirabilia.

Crux est salus animarum,
 Verum lumen et praeclarum,
 Et dulcedo cordium :
 Crux est vita beatorum
 Et thesaurus perfectorum,
 Et decor et gaudium.

Crux est speculum virtutis,
 Gloriosae dux salutis.
 Cuncta spes fidellum ;
 Crux est decus salvandorum
 Et solatium eorum
 Atque desiderium.

Crux est arbor decorata
 Christi sanguine sacrata
 Cunctis plena fructibus,
 Quibus animae eruantur
 Cum supernis nutriuntur
 Cibis in coelestibus

Crucifixe ! fac me fortem
 Ut libenter team mortem
 Plangam donec vixero ;
 Tecum volo vulnerari,
 Te libenter amplexari
 In cruce desiderio.

THE CROSS—HYMN OF BONAVENTURA.

TRANSLATION.

Make the Cross your meditation,
All who long for full salvation :

Joy in it forevermore.

Look up to the Cross and love it,
There is naught on earth above it,
O forget it nevermore.

Toiling, resting, smiling, weeping,
Glad or mournful vigils keeping,

Comforted or sorrowing :

Going, coming, ever raise it
To your faith—and whilst you praise it,
Joy from it be borrowing.

In sore trial and affliction,
Think of Jesus' crucifixion :

Seek the cross congenial.

Pain and anguish die before it,
What a refuge ! O adore it !

Source of bliss perennial.

Cross ! Thy blessed sacrifice
Is the gate of Paradise :

Standard o'er victorious.

Antidote for sin's sore bruises,
Guilt, who takes it, wholly looses—

Medicine most glorious.

O the Cross ! 'tis health and glory ;
Tell with joy its blessed story :

Hear it all ye dutiful.

Store-houses filled, and failing never,
Whence all saints may draw forever
Strength and graces beautiful.

Mirror of the soul, reflecting
Holy light, and power perfecting,

Cheering, strength'ning steadily.

To the saints by it is given
Glorious aid in winning heaven,
Furnished freely, readily.

Blessed tree ! with flowers perfuming :
Purple blood on all its blooming :

Tree of fruits supernal.

Millions on its food have flourished ;
Millions more by it are nourished
In the life eternal.

Jesus ! O Thou crucified !

Jesus ! who for me hast died !

Praise, praise for Thine agony !
Clinging to Thy Cross, and sighing
O'er my sins, and o'er Thy dying,

I am wholly lost in Thee !

VIII.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

"HONOR TO THE ILLUSTRIOUS DEAD." A Lecture in behalf of the Mount Vernon Association : delivered in the State Capitol, Nashville, Tenn., Wednesday, Dec. 4, 1857. By Richard Owen, M. D., Professor in the University of Nashville.

This chaste and earnest Address illustrates some peculiarities and advantages of our Form of Government; refutes the charge made against Republics of being ungrateful to those who have rendered services to their country; argues the importance of cultivating the purer feelings which spring out of the relation of husband to wife, of parent to child, of brother to brother, of friend to friend, and of citizen to his country, in order to avoid becoming liable to the charge of ingratitude to our benefactors; holds up the life and character of Washington for imitation; exhorts all to perpetuate the memory of his life as "the most perfect combination of physical, intellectual and moral excellence of which history has preserved any record"; maintains the propriety of the nation purchasing Mt. Vernon for a monument to his greatness, as a means of perpetuating the advantages secured to us by Washington and other heroes of the Revolution; and closes with a fervent and eloquent appeal to Americans to quell all angry passions, all dissensions, jealousies and hatreds, and carry out in good faith the sublime precept and example of "Peace on earth, good will to men," in order to hand down intact to coming generations the blood-bought heritage of our fathers.

E. V. G.

THE TRUE GLORY OF WOMAN, as portrayed in the Beautiful Life of the Virgin Mary, Mother of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. By Rev. H. Harbaugh, A. M. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1858.

Mr. Harbaugh's reputation, as a popular religious writer, is so widely established by the success of his previous numerous publications, that the simple announcement of his name on the title page can hardly fail to recommend the work here named to general attention and interest. The admirers of his spirit and style, who are counted by thousands—we might say perhaps by tens of thousands—may expect to find new cause for being pleased with him, as a matter of course, in the present volume. We pretend not, in this brief notice, to enter into any examination of its merits. Neither can we allow ourselves to go into the general merits of that very interesting subject or theme to which it is devoted; however much disposed we should be, in other circumstances, to improve the book as an

occasion for such purpose. We can only say, we are well pleased that Mr. Harbaugh, who is in so much favor with the Protestant public generally, has seen fit to take the theme thus publicly and popularly in hand. For if it be true that Roman Catholics make too much of the Blessed Virgin, it is no less certain that the great body of Protestants now fall over to quite the opposite extreme; entertaining towards her, and for her, sentiments actually at war with a full believing apprehension of the great mystery of the Incarnation. Few seem to see or feel, that the danger of believing too little here, is just as real, and fully as serious, as the danger of believing too much. In a most important sense, the Virgin Mother of our Lord J  sus Christ is an object of faith. Her position in the economy of the Christian salvation is a truly supernatural position, not to be measured by ordinary experience or natural understanding. In such view, it belongs necessarily to the proper wholeness of the Creed. Gnosticism pretended to magnify the dignity of Christ, by turning the entire earthly side of His being into a shadow. But this was in truth to nullify his being altogether. To make little of the Virgin Mary—to think of her as only a common pious woman—is an error, which runs directly towards the same result. To make earnest in our minds with the real coming of Christ in the flesh, we must allow habitually a corresponding dignity to her—the highly favored, or full of grace, and blessed among women—through whose intervention, not blind, but voluntary and free, this glorious advent took place. We may possibly return to the subject at some future time.

N.

THE NEW AMERICAN CYCLOPEDIA: A Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge. Edited by George Ripley and Charles Dana. Vol. II. Araktsheeff—Beale. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 346 and 348 Broadway. London: 16 Little Britain. 1858.

In a former number we noticed the first volume of this extensive work, which was published last December. That volume met with such a ready sale that the first edition was exhausted in less than two weeks. This fact shows at least that an earnest want for a work of the kind exists. We noticed the first volume favorably; and we must say our estimate of the work is increased by an examination of the second volume. Who could expect in a work of such compass, to find every article exactly to his mind. The one who demands this has himself his peculiar bias of thinking, and may be as well in error as others. Think of a volume, like the one before us going over more than 2,000 words, and then say whether perfection, if measured even by an absolute standard, were such an one at hand, could be expected; how much less can we hope for that

kind of perfection which each one may ask according to his individual standard. We do not speak thus apologetically for the work because we think it needs it especially; but to show how unjust it is, as a few papers have done, to select here and there an article, point out some supposed or real defects, and then measure by such specimens the merits of the entire work. Such critics remind one of a certain bird which sails over a thousand beauties of landscape which it does not admire, and at length lights down with gusto on a carcass!

The present volume contains 776 neatly printed, large double column pages. The first half finishes the letter A, and the other half is devoted to the letter B, which is not yet finished. Among the list of contributors we discover many of the most prominent literary and scientific scholars in the country. The need of a full Cyclopaedia, coming down to our time, is felt, and we are glad that the present enterprise promises to succeed so well.

H. H.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will. By Joseph Haven, Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 590 pp.

We had prepared a long notice, or rather short review, of this well-written work on Mental Philosophy for the present number; but it has been crowded out. Room is left us only for a few words. The work is the result of extensive reading in the department of philosophy, and of profound study. The author does not collect the opinions of others, though as he ought to do he studies them closely, but thinks for himself on the basis of what others have produced who have gone before him. He has wrought out a system, which, whilst internally connected, in the main, at least, with the Scotch and New England method of philosophizing, nevertheless bears at every point the marks of his own genial spirit and ripe scholarship. Judged from Professor Haven's point of observation, his production is thorough and successful. The arrangement is clear; the discussion brief yet full; the language is perspicuous, forcible and beautiful, rising even gracefully at times into eloquence. As a whole, it is superior to any work belonging to this school, that has left the American press for the last decade of years; and the study of it in our Colleges will carry our youth, in some respects, beyond the mechanical method of thinking that prevails so extensively among us at the present day.

We can not, however, accord unqualified approval to this system of psychology. We must differ from the learned and highly esteemed author on many points of minor importance, and on some that are fundamental. But of these points of difference we can not now speak. We may recur to this subject in a future number.

E. V. G.